Rationality In Economic Thought

The main theme of this book is the methodological problem of rationality in economic thought. The author investigates the different interpretations of this problem advanced by major figures in the history of economic thought. The book examines the history and rationality of the 'theory of value' from Adam Smith to Alfred Marshall and attempts to understand these arguments and criticisms within a general methodological vein. It goes on to provide a complete historical account of the ideas and arguments on value propounded by Smith, Ricardo, Marx, Jevons, Walras and Marshall as well as by more recent scholars such as Sraffa and Debreu and interprets their methodological differences. The author proposes a novel 'pragmatic-pluralist' methodological interpretation which borrows and creatively synthesizes ideas from many sources, including Wittgenstein (language-games), Searle (performatives), Habermas (communicative reason), hermeneutics, Marx and the pragmatic tradition. Rationality in Economic Thought will be of interest to students and scholars of the history of economic thought, economic methodology and the philosophy of the social sciences.

Looks at ways to increase the scope and power of institutional economics. Different approaches to economic methodology are considered and the broader notions of rationality offered by institutional economics are discussed.

The concept of rationality is the heart of modern economics. Neo-classical theory seems unable to proceed without assuming a rational agent seeking to find the optimal means to a well defined end. Yet many find this uncritical treatment of rationality problematic. It takes little account of culture history or creativity and consequently many economists find this insistence on rationality of little use when trying to explain a wide range of economic phenomena. Increasingly these include a large number of game theorists and others involved in mainstream theory as well as those typically opposed to neo-classicism. The Economics of Rationality contains a number of critical perspectives on the treatment of rationality in economics.

This work examines the claim to scienific status made by supporters and practitioners of neoclassical economics. The approach taken is that of the history and philosophy of science. Analysis points to the conclusion that theories of economic choice are necessarily normative, essentially because of the nature of human behavior.

Ideas linked to rational choice theory started to appear frequently in the economics literature in the 1960s and 1970s, but the attention given to rationality widened to include commentators presenting far-reaching appraisals and critiques. The literature grew to a steady flow and spanned diverse areas of thought including socialist and `rational-choice Marxist' assessments, and other approaches including institutional, sociological, psychological, ethical, choice-theoretical, strategic, and game-theoretical treatments of rationality. This diversity of literature led to the creation of this volume. What does rationality mean? Was there some common core of meaning that held all of these seemingly disparate developments together, or were there discernable schools of thought with peculiarities that set them clearly apart from one another? The essays in this volume illustrate that diversity, and despite the variety of approaches there remains a common core of meaning that accommodates not so much a radically different set of concepts of rationality as a highly variegated array of methods and approaches to this subject. Contributors address topics of their choice on the concept of rationality in economics, and the selection of these contributors is meant to represent a variety of backgrounds and approaches.

First published in 1993. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The theory of practical rationality does not belong to one academic discipline alone. There are quite divergent philosophical, economical, sociological, psychological and politological contributions. Sometimes the disciplinary boundaries impede theoretical progress. On the other hand it is an indication for the high complexity of the subject that so many divergent paradigms compete with one another, or - what is worse - live separately in a kind of splendid isolation. Decision theory in the broader sense, embracing the theory of games and collective choice theory, can help to understand practical reason in philosophical analysis. But there are interesting aspects which cannot be dealt with adequately within a decision-theoretic conceptual framework. To have both of these convictions justifies to neglect dis ciplinary boundaries and poses a problem for the orthodoxies of either sides. All the essays of this volume focus on the relation between economic rationality and practical reason and discuss different aspects of the same problem, i. e. a basic deficiency in the standard economic theory of practical rationality. But philosophical analysis would not be of much help if it just rejected the economic paradigm. It must rather help to integrate economic aspects into a broader view on practical reason.

Reconceptualizes economic theory as a tool for understanding the Roman monetary system and its social and cultural contexts.