Raw Feeling

Robert Kirk attempts to answer the problem of consciousness that derives from the notorious gap between our knowledge of ourselves as matter and our subjective knowledge of what we experience.

Ten years ago, Carol Alt was feeling bad. Really bad. She had chronic headaches, sinusitis, and stomach ailments; she was tired and listless. And then Carol started eating raw—and changed her life. Eating in the Raw begins with her story and then presents practical, how-to information on everything you need to know about the exciting movement that’s been embraced by Demi Moore, Pierce Brosnan, Sting, Edward Norton, and legions of other health-minded people. You’ll learn: •What exactly raw food is—and isn’t—and how to integrate it into your diet •How to avoid the all-or-nothing pitfall: you can eat some cooked foods, you can eat some foods partially cooked, and you don’t have to deprive yourself •Why raw food is not just for vegetarians or vegans—Carol eats meat, and so can you •The differences between cooked and raw vitamins, minerals, and enzymes, and what they mean for you •An ease-in approach to eating raw, and how to eat raw in restaurants In addition, Carol answers frequently asked questions and offers forty simple recipes for every meal, from light dishes such as Gazpacho and Lentil Salad to entrees including Tuna Tartare and Spaghetti al Pesto and even desserts like Pumpkin Pie and Apple Tart with Crème Anglaise—rounding out a thorough, accessible, and eminently compelling case why in the raw is the best way to eat.

A proposal that extends the enactive approach developed in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to issues in affective science. In The Feeling Body, Giovanna Colombetti takes ideas from the enactive approach developed over the last twenty years in cognitive science and philosophy of mind and applies them for the first time to affective science—the study of emotions, moods, and feelings. She argues that enactivism entails a view of cognition as not just embodied but also intrinsically affective, and she elaborates on the implications of this claim for the study of emotion in psychology and neuroscience. In the course of her discussion, Colombetti focuses on long-debated issues in affective science, including the notion of basic emotions, the nature of appraisal and its relationship to bodily arousal, the place of bodily feelings in emotion experience, the neurophysiological study of emotion experience, and the bodily nature of our encounters with others. Drawing on enactivist tools such as dynamical systems theory, the notion of the lived body, neurophenomenology, and phenomenological accounts of empathy, Colombetti advances a novel approach to these traditional issues that does justice to their complexity. Doing so, she also expands the enactive approach into a further domain of inquiry, one that has more generally been neglected by the embodied-embedded approach in the philosophy of cognitive science.