Recognition Or Disagreement

Axel Honneth is best known for his critique of modern society centered on a concept of recognition. Jacques Rancière has advanced an influential theory of modern politics based on disagreement. Underpinning their thought is a concern for the logics of exclusion and domination that structure contemporary societies. In a rare dialogue, these two philosophers explore the affinities and tensions between their perspectives to provoke new ideas for social and political change. Honneth sees modern society as a field in which the logic of recognition provides individuals with increasing possibilities for freedom and is a constant catalyst for transformation. Rancière sees the social as a policing order and the political as a force that must radically assert equality. Honneth claims Rancière's conception of the political lies outside of actual historical societies and involves a problematic desire for egalitarianism. Rancière argues that Honneth's theory of recognition relies on an overly substantial conception of identity and subjectivity. While impassioned, their exchange seeks to advance critical theory's political project by reconciling the rift between German and French post-Marxist traditions and proposing new frameworks for justice.

When people disagree about justice and about individual rights, how should political decisions be made among them? How should they decide about issues like tax policy, welfare provision, criminal procedure, discrimination law, hate speech, pornography, political dissent and the limits of religious toleration? The most familiar answer is that these decisions should be made democratically, by majority voting among the people or their representatives. Often, however, this answer is qualified by adding ' providing that the majority decision does not violate individual rights.' In this book Jeremy Waldron has revisited and thoroughly revised thirteen of his most recent essays. He argues that the familiar answer is correct, but that the qualification about individual rights is incoherent. If rights are the very things we disagree about, then we are quarrelling precisely about what that qualification should amount to. At best, what it means is that disagreements about rights should be resolved by some other procedure, for example, by majority voting, not among the people or their representatives, but among judges in a court. This proposal - although initially attractive - seems much less agreeable when we consider that the judges too disagree about rights, and they disagree about them along exactly the same lines as the citizens. This book offers a comprehensive critique of the idea of the judicial review of legislation. The author argues that a belief in rights is not the same as a commitment to a Bill of Rights. He shows the flaws and difficulties in many common defences of the 'democratic' character of judicial review. And he argues for an alternative approach to the problem of disagreement: when disagreements about rights arise, the respectful way to resolve them is by decision-making among the right-holders on a basis that reflects an equal respect for them as the holders of views about rights. This respect for ordinary right-holders, he argues, has been sadly lacking in the theories of justice, rights, and constitutionalism put forward in recent years by philosophers such as John Rawls and Donald Dworkin. But the book is not only about judicial review. The first tranche of essays is devoted to a theory of legislation, a theory which highlights the size, the scale and the diversity of modern legislative assemblies. Although legislation is often denigrated as a source of law, Waldron seeks to restore its tattered dignity. He deprecates the tendency to disparage legislatures and argues that such disparagement is often a way of bolstering the legitimacy of the courts, as if we had to transform our parliaments into something like the American Congress to justify importing American-style judicial reviews. Law and Disagreement redresses the balances in modern jurisprudence. It presents legislation by a representative assembly as a form of law making which is especially apt for a society whose members disagree with one another about fundamental issues of principle, for it is a form of law making that does not attempt to conceal the fact that our decisions are made and claim their authority in the midst of, not in spite of, our political and moral disagreements. This timely rights-based defence of majoritarian legislation will be welcomed by scholars of legal and political philosophy throughout the world.

Many assume falsely that religious disagreements engage rules of evidence presentation and belief justification radically different than the ordinary disagreements people have every day, whether those religious disagreements are in Sri Lanka between Hindus and Buddhists or in the Middle East among Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

The essays in “The Crisis of American Democracy: Essays on a Failing Institution” seek to answer central questions about American democracy, such as: if American democracy is failing, what are the causes of this failure? What are the consequences? And what can be done to fix it? These standalone essays present diverse perspectives on some of the impediments to achieving a true democracy in the present-day United States of America, as well as prescriptions for overcoming these obstacles. Leading academics from across North America, contribute their perspectives on this timely debate.

We live in a pluralist world of multi-level law and governance. More than ever before multiple legal systems and governing authorities at different levels - sub-state, state, supranational, international - are recognized as applying to, and claiming authority over, the affairs of the same sets of individuals and institutions. Yet our constitutional theories fail to adequately capture this pluralist state of affairs. This book examines some of the key conceptual and theoretical puzzles which the contemporary state of multilevel pluralism poses for our constitutional theories. It offers fresh perspectives on these questions by addressing the pluralism of norms and authorities from the viewpoint of legality and legitimacy respectively, proposing novel solutions for pluralizing constitutional theory in the light of contemporary multilevel governance. Our turbulent times are on a steady trajectory of ever-more pluralism of law and governance to tackle the defining social and political problems of our age including populism, pandemic, and climate change and this book provides an essential intervention in debates on how to pluralize constitutional theory to better understand and, perhaps more importantly, legitimize the tools to address these increasingly shared problems.

This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: 12 contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy. They develop our understanding of epistemic phenomena that are central to any thoughtful engagement with others' beliefs.

In the light of intense international focus on ongoing forms of world poverty, this book examines the potential of the concept of recognition in contemporary political philosophy to respond morally to this dire condition. This book uses recognition theories to develop a two-tiered response to the problem of global poverty. First, it highlights non-degradation, non-humiliation and the avoidance of social suffering as essential components to the agency of the very poor. This runs counter to liberal arguments that focus only on the deficit of basic material interests. Second, even if universal conditions of agency are met, many of the world’s extreme poor may still suffer domination. The book argues that empowering the world’s poor to resist domination is an essential response to global poverty. By conceiving poverty in terms of agency and empowerment, this book highlights the transnational relevance of recognition theory to one of the most crucial problems affecting a rapidly globalising world. Global Justice and Recognition Theory will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in social and political philosophy, political theory, and global justice.

This volume showcases original, agenda-setting studies in the field of learner corpus research of both spoken and written production. The studies have important applications for classroom pedagogy. The volume brings readers up-to-date with new written and spoken learner corpora, often looking at previously under-examined variables in learner corpus investigations. It also demonstrates innovative applications of learner corpus findings, addressing issues such as the effect of task, the effect of learner variables and the nature of learner language. The volume is of significant interest to researchers working in corpus linguistics, learner corpus research, second language acquisition and English for Academic and Specific Purposes, as well to practitioners interested in the application of the findings in language teaching and assessment.