Reformed Epistemology And The Problem Of Religious Diversity

Can Christian belief be warranted? Can someone hold to Christian exclusivism even in the face of mutually exclusive religious belief systems? In contemporary philosophy of religion there has been much debate about whether the diversity of mutually exclusive religious beliefs is a good reason to give up any form of religious exclusivism. Amidst this discussion, the Christian exclusivist claims that the tenets of Christianity are true, and mutually exclusive religious views are false. Opponents of Christian belief argue, however, that the diversity of mutually exclusive religious beliefs is a good reason to give up one's Christian exclusivism. This is the problem of religious diversity for Christian exclusivism. In this book, Joseph Kim defends Christian belief in conversation with the problem of religious diversity and argues that mutually exclusive religious beliefs do not serve as defeaters for Christian belief. Kim engages Alvin Plantinga's proper function account of warrant and argues that the Christian exclusivist need not give up her Christian belief when faced with the problem of religious diversity even when she is unable to give an argument for the truth of Christian belief to those that disagree. This book also explores the areas surrounding the problem of religious diversity and serves as a good introduction to the central issues that intersect contemporary epistemology and the philosophy of religion.

In recent philosophical discourse, there has been a proliferation of work in the field of philosophy of religion, and in particular at the intersection between epistemology and philosophy of religion. Much of that interest has centred on the emergence of what has come to be known as 'Reformed Epistemology'. The central claim of Reformed epistemologists is that belief in God is properly basic. The purpose of the arguments offered by Reformed epistemologists is to oppose what Plantinga calls the 'de jure' objection to theistic belief - the idea that it is somehow irrational, a dereliction of epistemic duty, or in some other sense epistemically unacceptable, to believe in God. This objection is distinct from what Plantinga labels the 'de facto' objection - the objection that, whatever the rational status of belief in God, it is, in fact, a false belief. The primary goal of Reformed epistemology, then, is to defend Christian belief against the de jure objection, thereby showing that everything really depends on the truth of Christian belief. This book demonstrates the feasibility of combining the Reformed epistemologist's position with an argument for theism that the author draws from Charles Taylor's work. In it, he shows the value that would be added to the Reformed epistemologist's position by such a combination.

In contemporary philosophy of religion, there has been heated debate about whether the diversity of mutually exclusive religious beliefs is a good reason to give up any form of religious exclusivism -Christian exclusivism for instance. On one hand, Christian exclusivists defend the truth of Christian beliefs; on the other hand the opponents of Christian belief base their criticism upon religious diversity and disagreement. Kim defends Christian belief and Alvin Plantinga's version of Reformed Epistemology.

Rationality and Theistic Belief offers a strong dissenting voice on the work of both Plantinga and Alston. Certain to provoke vigorous discussion, it makes a significant contribution to the contemporary discussion of the epistemology of religious belief.

Epistemological questions about the significance of disagreement have advanced alongside broader developments in social epistemology concerning testimony, the nature of expertise and epistemic authority, the role of institutions, group belief, and epistemic injustice, among others. During this period, related issues in the epistemology of religion have re-emerged as worthy of new consideration, and available to be situated with new conceptual tools. Does disagreement between, and within, religions challenge the rationality of religious commitment? How should religious adherents think about exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist frameworks as applied to religious truth, or to matters of salvation or redemption or liberation? This volume explores many of these issues at the intersection of the epistemology of disagreement and religious epistemology. It engages in careful reflection on religious diversity and disagreement, offering ways to balance epistemic humility with personal conviction. Recognizing the place of religious differences in our social lives, it provides renewed efforts at how best to think about truths concerning religion.

'Repairing Eden' describes the problem of losing one's Christian faith because of the world's religious diversity and provides a unique solution by urging Christians toward a humble, mystical path.

A veritable who's who in the field of contemporary philosophy of religion here considers various issues in the epistemology of religious beliefs. The writings of William P. Alston, the leading figure in the revival of the Anglo-American philosophy of religion, provide the focus of these essays, all but two previously unpublished. Philosophers of religion, meta-physicians, epistemologists, and theologians will find in this volume some of the most important work available in the theory of knowledge and the epistemic status of religious belief.

In this book, an international team of scholars from leading American, British and Continental European universities presents original ideas about religious epistemology, the philosophy of God's action in the world, including the problem of evil and Divine Providence, and the philosophical challenge of religious diversity.