Reforming Intelligence

These days, it's rare to pick up a newspaper and not see a story related to intelligence. From the investigations of the 9/11 commission, to accusations of illegal wiretapping, to debates on whether it's acceptable to torture prisoners for information, intelligence—both accurate and not—is driving domestic and foreign policy. And yet, in part because of its inherently secretive nature, intelligence has received very little scholarly study. Into this void comes Reforming Intelligence, a timely collection of case studies written by intelligence experts, and sponsored by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School, that collectively outline the best practices for intelligence services in the United States and other democratic states. Reforming Intelligence suggests that intelligence is best conceptualized as a subfield of civil-military relations, and is best compared through institutions. The authors examine intelligence practices in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, as well as such developing democracies as Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, and Russia. While there is much more data related to established democracies, there are lessons to be learned from states that have created (or re-created) intelligence institutions in the contemporary political climate. In the end, reading about the successes of Brazil and Taiwan, the failures of Argentina and Russia, and the ongoing reforms in the United States yields a handful of hard truths. In the murky world of intelligence, that's an unqualified achievement.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was the most significant legislation affecting the U.S. intelligence community since 1947. Enacted in the wake of 9/11, the act attempted to ensure closer coordination among intelligence agencies esp. in regard to counterterrorism efforts. It established the position of Dir, of Nat. Intell. (DNI) with extensive authority to coordinate the nation¿s intelligence effort. The DNI speaks for U.S. intelligence, briefs the Pres., has authority to develop the budget for the nat. intelligence effort, and manage appropriations made by Congress. Contents of this report: Intro.; Background; The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004; Positive Assessment; Negative Views; An Alternative View; Future Direction.

This book presents a thorough analysis of US intelligence reforms and their effects on national security and civil liberties.

In From Mandate to Blueprint, Thomas Fingar offers a guide for new federal government appointees faced with the complex task of rebuilding institutions and transitioning to a new administration. Synthesizing his own experience implementing the most comprehensive reforms to the national security establishment since 1947, Fingar provides crucial guidance to newly appointed officials. When Fingar was appointed the first Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis in 2005, he discovered the challenges of establishing a new federal agency and implementing sweeping reforms of intelligence procedure and performance. The mandate required prompt action but provided no guidance on how to achieve required and desirable changes. Fingar describes how he defined and prioritized the tasks involved in building and staffing a new organization, integrating and improving the work of sixteen agencies, and contending with pressure from powerful players. For appointees without the luxury of taking command of fully staffed and well-functioning federal agencies, From Mandate to Blueprint is an informed and practical guide for the challenges ahead.

This comparative analysis of the sometimes fraught process of achieving democratic governance of security intelligence agencies presents material from countries other than those normally featured in the Intelligence Studies literature of North America and Europe. Some of the countries examined are former Communist countries and several in Latin America are former military regimes. Others have been democratic for a long time but still experience widespread political violence. Through a mix of single-country and comparative studies, major aspects of intelligence are considered, including the legacy of, and transition from, authoritarianism; the difficulties of achieving genuine reform; and the apparent inevitability of periodic scandals. Authors consider a range of methodological approaches to the study of intelligence and the challenges of analysing the secret world. Finally, consideration is given to the success – or otherwise – of intelligence reform, and the effectiveness of democratic institutions of control and oversight. This book was originally published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

Examining the political foundations of American intelligence policy, this book develops a new theory of intelligence adaptation to explain the success or failure of major reform efforts since World War II. Durbin draws on careful case histories of the early Cold War, the Nixon and Ford administrations, the first decade after the Cold War, and the post-9/11 period, looking closely at the interactions among Congress, executive branch leaders, and intelligence officials. These cases demonstrate the significance of two factors in the success or failure of reform efforts: the level of foreign policy consensus in the system, and the ability of reformers to overcome the information advantages held by intelligence agencies. As these factors ebb and flow, windows of opportunity for reform open and close, and different actors and interests come to influence reform outcomes. Durbin concludes that the politics of US intelligence frequently inhibit effective adaptation, undermining America's security and the civil liberties of its citizens.

Ever since the publication in 2004 of the 9/11 Commission Report, the U.S. intelligence community has been in the throes of a convulsive movement for reform. In Preventing Surprise Attacks (2005), Richard A. Posner carried the story of the reform movement up to the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which produced a defective plan for reorganizing the intelligence system, partly as result of the failure of the 9/11 Commission and Congress to bring historical, comparative, and scholarly perspectives to bear issues. At that time, however, the new structure had not yet been built. Posner's new book brings the story up to date. He argues that the decisions about structure that the Administration has made in implementation of the Act are creating too top-heavy, too centralized, an intelligence system. The book * exposes fallacies in criticisms of the performance of the U.S. intelligence services; * analyzes structures and priorities for directing and coordinating U.S. intelligence in the era of global terrorism; * presents new evidence for the need to create a domestic intelligence agency separate from the FBI, and a detailed blueprint for such an agency; * incorporates a wealth of material based on developments since the first book, including the report of the presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction and the botched response to Hurricane Katrina; * exposes the inadequacy of the national security computer networks; * critically examines Congress's performance in the intelligence field, and raises constitutional issues concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President; * emphasizes the importance of reforms that do not require questionable organizational changes. The book is published in cooperation with the Hoover Institution

A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations. In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge. Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.