Reforming The Global Financial Architecture

Instability has become global and systemic. Strengthening international institutions and arrangements would reduce the threat of crises and allow those that do occur to be better managed. These proposals take the developing world into account.

This volume is a report prepared for the 1999 Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting. Arguing that contemporary crises are very different from traditional balance of payment problems, it identifies issues in crisis resolution and proposes a new governance structure.

Papers presented at a conference in London in May 1999.

This paper briefly surveys the progress made in various areas of reform of the international financial architecture since the outbreak of the East Asian crisis, and explains the principal technical and political obstacles encountered in carrying out fundamental changes capable of dealing with global and systemic instability. It ends with a brief discussion of what developing countries could do at the global, national or regional level to establish defence mechanisms against financial instability and contagion.

In 2007-2008 the global financial and economic system was in turmoil. This volume focuses on how the global financial architecture was redesigned following the financial crash of 2008. Its central claim is that the reforms constituted a paradigm shift, a move from the dominance of market authority to the re-assertion of state authority over financial markets and actors. The book underscores that the cycle of boom and bust, of crisis response, reform and eventual relapse are not only economic but also conceptual and ideological. Ideas matter in the political and economic calculus of policy making. Economies are underpinned by and linked to ideological narrative, a prevailing policy consensus that places limits on policy actions and options and constitutes a dominant worldview or paradigm. To become real, to be lasting, to impact actual policy choices and market actor decisions, a re-regulatory paradigm shift cannot just be conceptual or ideological. It must also be present in the institutional constructs and policy decisions that flow from the ideological regulatory shift. To gauge the fluctuating strength of the paradigm shift the book addresses the G20 summit process, the creation of the FSB, the policy output of the new forums, for signs of permanency, strength, and possible effectiveness. This work presents important new material on the financial crisis and the regulatory response to it, which will be valuable for researchers, teachers and students alike.

The Global Credit Crisis of 2008-09 has underscored the urgency of reforming the international financial architecture. While a number of short-term reforms are already in train, this paper contemplates more ambitious reforms of the international financial architecture that might be implemented over the next ten years. It proposes routinizing the expansion of IMF quotas and the conduct of exchange rate surveillance. It contemplates an expanded role for the SDR in international transactions, which would require someone-like the IMF-to act as market maker. It considers proposals for reimposing Glass-Steagall-like restrictions on commercial and investment banking, something that will have to be coordinated internationally to be feasible. Other proposals would require banks to purchase capital insurance; here the question is who would be on the other side of the market. Again there is likely to be a role for the IMF. Then there are arguments for a new agency or institution to deal with cross-border bank insolvencies. Any such entity will require staff support, which might plausibly come from the Fund. Finally, some insist that international colleges of regulators are not enough-that it is desirable to create a World Financial Organization (WFO) with the power to sanction members whose national regulatory policies are not up to international standards. A WFO will similarly need staff support, of which the IMF would be one possible source. All this of course presupposes meaningful IMF governance reform so that the institution has the legitimacy and efficiency to assume these additional responsibilities. The paper therefore concludes with some conventional and unconventional proposals for IMF governance reform.

More than ten years on from the most intense phase of the global financial crisis, and the collective international response in the G20 summit in London, a ‘new normal’ has emerged with systems in place to mitigate against further banking crises. This updated new edition analyzes this post-crisis international and national regulatory framework and asks whether the current paradigm is fit for purpose as new dangers gestate and develop. This new edition includes a discussion of the impact of the aggressively deregulatory and anti-globalist policies of the Trump administration and its pursuit of an ‘America First’ policy and explores its implications for the regulatory landscape constructed and tended by previous leaders. The author addresses new and future systemic risks, many outside the regulated banking sector, which have grown in importance since 2015. He develops possible future scenarios for the international regulatory architecture, both negative and positive, asking, ‘Are we better prepared for future banking crises?’ New risks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and economic crash, are testing the global system; and the G20, without US leadership, may be failing in this latest most severe crisis of our lifetimes. This book provides a unique narrative explanation drawn from leading actors of key events and policy changes as they unfolded immediately post-crisis. The author builds upon the first edition to capture key developments that have occurred during the past five years, while raising key questions and vulnerabilities, and looking at future risks and challenges that may emerge. This text will be of great interest to students, teachers and researchers of financial frameworks, globalisation and political economy.