Regulatory Bureaucracy

In this book, Professor McGarity reveals the complex and problematic relationship between the "regulatory reform" movements initiated in the early l970s and the United States' federal bureaucracy. Examining both the theory and application of "regulatory reform" under the Reagan administration, the author succeeds in offering both a relevant analysis and critique of "regulatory reform" and its implementation through bureaucratic channels. Using several case studies from the early Reagan years, this book describes the clash of regulatory cultures resulting from the President's attempt to incorporate "regulatory analysis" into the bureaucratic decisionmaking process. McGarity examines the roles that regulatory analysts and their counterparts in the Office of Management and Budget play in decisionmaking by offering hundreds of interviews with scientists, engineers, regulatory analysts and upper level personnel in federal agencies. The author then critiques the reformers' claim that regulatory analysis will result in "better" decisionmaking. Yet while McGarity recognizes the limitations of regulatory analysis, he concludes with suggestions for enhancing its effectiveness. This book could be used not only as a textbook for political science and government courses but also for graduate applications in public policy and public administration.

Enforcement or Negotiation presents a study of the development and operations of the federal Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement during its first four years (1978-82), with special emphasis on the issue of regulatory enforcement. It examines the causes and consequences of the agency's change from an enforced compliance style of regulation toward a more discretionary negotiated compliance . The analysis is grounded in a variety of methods, including personal interviews, examination of archival data, and structured questionnaires. A comparative analysis of how the legislation was implemented differently in two regions of the United States demonstrates the crucial importance of local conditions on the implementation of regulatory mandates. The OSM's efforts to balance demands for equity and efficiency are documented, as well as the differences in oppositional strategies employed by large and small mining companies.

Who determines the fuel standards for our cars? What about whether Plan B, the morning-after pill, is sold at the local pharmacy? Many people assume such important and controversial policy decisions originate in the halls of Congress. But the choreographed actions of Congress and the president account for only a small portion of the laws created in the United States. By some estimates, more than ninety percent of law is created by administrative rules issued by federal agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services, where unelected bureaucrats with particular policy goals and preferences respond to the incentives created by a complex, procedure-bound rulemaking process. With Bending the Rules, Rachel Augustine Potter shows that rulemaking is not the rote administrative activity it is commonly imagined to be but rather an intensely political activity in its own right. Because rulemaking occurs in a separation of powers system, bureaucrats are not free to implement their preferred policies unimpeded: the president, Congress, and the courts can all get involved in the process, often at the bidding of affected interest groups. However, rather than capitulating to demands, bureaucrats routinely employ “procedural politicking,” using their deep knowledge of the process to strategically insulate their proposals from political scrutiny and interference. Tracing the rulemaking process from when an agency first begins working on a rule to when it completes that regulatory action, Potter shows how bureaucrats use procedures to resist interference from Congress, the President, and the courts at each stage of the process. This exercise reveals that unelected bureaucrats wield considerable influence over the direction of public policy in the United States.

Was the so-called “Reagan Revolution” a disappointment regarding the federal systems of special-interest regulation? Many of that administration's friends as well as its opponents think so. But under what criteria? To what extent? And why? When Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, the popular belief was that the size of government would be cut and that some of the regulatory excesses of the prior decade would be rolled back. However, the growth of the federal government continued throughout the Reagan presidency and no agencies were phased out. What were the apparently powerful forces that rendered most of the bureaucracy impervious to reform? In this book, professional economists and lawyers who were at, or near, the top of the decision-making process in various federal agencies during the Reagan years discuss attempts to reign in the bureaucracy. Their candid comments and personal insights shed new light on the susceptibility of the American government to bureaucratic interests. This book is required reading for anyone wishing to understand the true reasons why meaningful, effective governmental reform at the federal level is so difficult, regardless of which political party controls the White House or Congress.