Reinterpreting Criminal Complicity And Inchoate Participation Offences

In Reinterpreting Criminal Complicity and Inchoate Participation Offences, Dennis J. Baker argues that the mental element in complicity is one of intention, that recklessness alone is not sufficient. This is demonstrated by showing that the ancient and modern authorities on complicity required intention. The book argues the ‘causal participation’ element in complicity means that the conduct element can only be established when there is intentional encouragement on the part of the accessory. As the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, like most of the statutory provisions found in the United States, deems that both perpetrator and accessory are perpetrators for the purpose of punishment and crime labelling, limiting the mental element in complicity to intentional participation is, the author argues, the only way to reconcile these provisions with the requirements of proportionate punishment and fair labelling. As some forms of reckless encouragement and assistance will not be criminalised if the mental element in complicity is intention only, the author suggests that the solution is to amend section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 to criminalise reckless participation. In addition, the author argues that standard complicity and joint enterprise complicity have the same mental and conduct elements and thus joint enterprise complicity is not a distinct form of complicity.

In Reinterpreting Criminal Complicity and Inchoate Participation Offences, Dennis J. Baker argues that the mental element in complicity is one of intention, that recklessness alone is not sufficient. This is demonstrated by showing that the ancient and modern authorities on complicity required intention. The book argues the ‘causal participation’ element in complicity means that the conduct element can only be established when there is intentional encouragement on the part of the accessory. As the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, like most of the statutory provisions found in the United States, deems that both perpetrator and accessory are perpetrators for the purpose of punishment and crime labelling, limiting the mental element in complicity to intentional participation is, the author argues, the only way to reconcile these provisions with the requirements of proportionate punishment and fair labelling. As some forms of reckless encouragement and assistance will not be criminalised if the mental element in complicity is intention only, the author suggests that the solution is to amend section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 to criminalise reckless participation. In addition, the author argues that standard complicity and joint enterprise complicity have the same mental and conduct elements and thus joint enterprise complicity is not a distinct form of complicity.

Following on from the earlier edited collection, Loss of Control and Diminished Responbility, this book is the first volume in the Substantive Issues in Criminal Law series. It serves as a leading point of reference in the area relating to participation in crime and identifies the need for a consistent approach to the doctrinal and theoretical underpinnings of complicity liability. With a section on the UK analysing points of current interest, the book also has a large comparative section dealing with foreign jurisdictions and examines on the basis of a unified research grid how different legal systems treat core issues of participation in the context of criminal law. This book is a valuable reference resource for those in the criminal justice community in the UK and abroad and for academics, the judiciary and policy-makers.

Jonathan Herring's unique and bestselling approach of separating out the doctrinal and theoretical aspects of the law, alongside expertly selected extracts, makes this book enduringly popular with students and teachers.

This textbook is an introduction to more advanced writings on criminal law, primarily designed to allow students to think critically and analyse specific topics. Each chapter is structured around key questions and debates that provoke deeper thought. It asks questions such as: Why do we have the laws that we have? Could the criminal law look differently? How should the law be applied to novel situations? Does the law in fact reflect prejudices? The aim of the book is not to present a complete overview of theoretical issues in criminal law, but rather to illustrate the current debates among those working in shaping the area. The text features summaries of the views of notable experts on key topics and each chapter ends with a list of guided further reading. New to this Edition: - A new debate on the law on body modification - Fresh discussion of the law on dishonesty - Important new case law on causation - Detailed discussion of developments on the law on accessory - Significant developments on the law on sexual offences

The law governing the relationship between speech and core international crimes a key component in atrocity prevention is broken. Incitement to genocide has not been adequately defined. The law on hate speech as persecution is split between the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Instigation is confused with incitement and ordering's scope is too circumscribed. At the same time, each of these modalities does not function properly in relation to the others, yielding a misshapen body of law riddled with gaps. Existing scholarship has suggested discrete fixes to individual parts, but no work has stepped back and considered holistic solutions. This book does. To understand how the law became so fragmented, it returns to its roots to explain how it was formulated. From there, it proposes a set of nostrums to deal with the individual deficiencies. Its analysis then culminates in a more comprehensive proposal: a Unified Liability Theory, which would systematically link the core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes with the four illicit speech modalities. The latter would be placed in one statutory provision criminalizing the following types of speech: (1) incitement (speech seeking but not resulting in atrocity); (2) speech abetting (non-catalytic speech synchronous with atrocity commission); (3) instigation (speech seeking and resulting in atrocity); and (4) ordering (instigation/incitement within a superior-subordinate relationship). Apart from its fragmentation, this body of law lacks a proper name as Incitement Law or International Hate Speech Law, labels often used, fail to capture its breadth or relationship to mass violence. So this book proposes a new and fitting appellation: atrocity speech law.

This volume presents new research in artificial intelligence (AI) and Law with special reference to criminal justice. It brings together leading international experts including computer scientists, lawyers, judges and cyber-psychologists. The book examines some of the core problems that technology raises for criminal law ranging from privacy and data protection, to cyber-warfare, through to the theft of virtual property. Focusing on the West and China, the work considers the issue of AI and the Law in a comparative context presenting the research from a cross-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary approach. As China becomes a global leader in AI and technology, the book provides an essential in-depth understanding of domestic laws in both Western jurisdictions and China on criminal liability for cybercrime. As such, it will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers working in the areas of AI, technology and criminal justice.