Relational Vulnerability

This book breaks new theoretical ground by constructing a framework of ‘relational vulnerability’ through which it analyses the disadvantaged position of those who undertake unpaid caregiving, or ‘dependency-work’, in the context of the private family. Expanding on existing socio-legal scholarship on vulnerability and resilience, it charts how the state seeks to conceal the embodied and temporal reality of vulnerability and dependency within the private family, while promoting an artificial concept of autonomous personhood that exposes dependency-workers work to a range of harms. The book argues that the legal framework governing the married and unmarried family reinforces principles of individualism and rationality, while labelling dependency-work as a private, gendered, and sentimental endeavor, lacking value beyond the family. It also considers how the state can respond to relational vulnerability and foster resilience. It seeks to provide a more comprehensive understanding of resilience, theorising its normative goals and applying these to different hypothetical state responses.

This book advocates a new way of thinking about mortgage contracts. This claim is based on the assumption that we currently live in a political economy in which consumer debt fulfils a social function. In the field of housing this is evidenced by the expansion of mortgage credit through which consumers are to purchase residential property as a means of social inclusion and personal welfare. It is suggested that contract law needs to adjust to this new social function in order to avoid welfare losses in terms of default, over-indebtedness, and possibly eviction. To this end, this book analyses theoretical contract law frameworks and makes concrete proposals for contract law in the EU legal order.

This book brings together legal scholars engaging with vulnerability theory to explore the implications and challenges for law of understanding vulnerability as generative and a source of connection and development. The book is structured into five sections that cover fields of law where there is already significant recourse to the concept of vulnerability. These sections include a main chapter by a legal theorist who has previously examined the creative potential of vulnerability and responses from scholars working in the same field. This is designed to draw out some of the central debates concerning how vulnerability is conceptualised in law. Several contributors highlight the need to re-focus on some of these more positive aspects of vulnerability to counter the way law is being used enable persons to escape the stigma associated with vulnerability by concealing that condition. They seek to explore how law might embrace vulnerability, rather than conceal it. The book also includes contributions that seek to bring vulnerability into a non-binary relationship with other core legal concepts, such as autonomy and dignity. Rather than discarding these legal concepts in favour of vulnerability, these contributions highlight how vulnerability can be entwined with relational autonomy and embodied dignity. This book is essential reading for both students studying legal theory and practitioners interested in vulnerability.

This handbook makes a major contribution to the growing international research and policy interest in children’s experienced well-being or quality of life in childhood, linking it to ongoing research on children’s risk and vulnerability. The editors and contributors adopt the broader concept of ‘risk’ in addition to ‘vulnerability’. Not much work considers the connections between risks that children experience and their quality of life. In examining children’s quality of life, the chapters discuss various issues of risk and vulnerability that may affect their lives and also how the quality of childhood might be enhanced and maintained even in the face of these factors. The chapters discuss experiences of violence and abuse; access to basic services such as housing, health and education; and children’s vulnerability due to broader external factors such as war, conflict, and environmental events. The volume also includes the impacts of new technologies on children and the consequent risks and vulnerabilities they may face, alongside the benefits. This important volume brings together a diverse range of perspectives from established experts and emerging scholars in these fields of work. It covers a wide range of geographical and cultural contexts, and includes theoretical, empirical, policy and practice-based contributions. This handbook is a natural first point of reference for academics and policy professionals interested in quality of life, well-being, and children's rights.

Vulnerability has traditionally been viewed through the lens of specific groups of people, such as ethnic minorities, children, the elderly, or people with disabilities. With the rise of digital media, our perceptions of vulnerable groups and individuals have been reshaped as new vulnerabilities and different vulnerable sub-groups of users, consumers, citizens, and data subjects emerge. Vulnerability and Data Protection Law not only depicts these problems but offers the reader a detailed investigation of the concept of data subjects and a reconceptualization of the notion of vulnerability within the General Data Protection Regulation. The regulation offers a forward-facing set of tools that-though largely underexplored-are essential in rebalancing power asymmetries and mitigating induced vulnerabilities in the age of artificial intelligence. Considering the new risks and potentialities of the digital market, the new awareness about cognitive weaknesses, and the new philosophical sensitivity about the condition of human vulnerability, the author looks for a more general and layered definition of the data subject's vulnerability that goes beyond traditional labels. In doing so, he seeks to promote a 'vulnerability-aware' interpretation of the GDPR. A heuristic analysis that re-interprets the whole GDPR, this work is essential for both scholars of data protection law and for policymakers looking to strengthen regulations and protect the data of vulnerable individuals.

This volume breaks new ground by investigating the ethics of vulnerability. Drawing on various ethical traditions, the contributors explore the nature of vulnerability, the responsibilities owed to the vulnerable, and by whom.

Humans are responsible for biodiversity loss in many related and sometimes conflicting ways. Human-wildlife conflict, commonly defined as any negative interaction between people and wildlife, is a primary contributor to wildlife extinction and a manifestation of the destructive relationship that people have with wildlife. The author presents this 'wicked' problem in a social and legal context and demonstrates that legal institutions structurally deny human-wildlife conflict, while exacerbating conflict, promoting values consistent with individual autonomy, and ignoring the interconnected vulnerabilities shared by human and non-human species alike. It is the use of international and state law that sheds light on existing conflicts, including dingo conflict on K'Gari-Fraser Island in Australia, elephant conflict in Northern Botswana, and the global wildlife trade contributing to COVID-19. This book presents a critical analysis of human-wildlife conflict and its governance, to guide lawyers, scientists and conservations alike in the transformation of the management of human-wildlife conflict.

Enhanced knowledge of the nature and causes of mental disorder have led increasingly to a need for the recruitment of ‘cognitively vulnerable’ participants in biomedical research. These individuals often fall into the ‘grey area’ between obvious decisional competence and obvious decisional incompetence and, as a result, may not be recognised as having the legal capacity to make such decisions themselves. At the core of the ethical debate surrounding the participation of cognitively vulnerable individuals in research is when, if at all, we should judge them decisionally and legally competent to consent to or refuse research participation on their own behalf and when they should be judged incompetent in this respect. In this book, the author develops a novel justificatory framework for making judgments of decisional competence to consent to biomedical research with reference to five groups of cognitively vulnerable individuals - older children and adolescents, adults with intellectual disabilities, adults with depression, adults with schizophrenia and adults with dementia, including Alzheimer’s disease. Using this framework, the author argues that we can make morally defensible judgments about the competence or incompetence of a potential participant to give contemporaneous consent to research by having regard to whether a judgment of competence would be more harmful to the ‘generic rights’ of the potential participant than a judgment of incompetence. The argument is also used to justify an account of supported decision-making in research, and applied to evaluate the extent to which this approach is evident in existing ethical guidelines and legal provisions. The book will be of interest to bioethicists as well as psychiatrists and academic medical lawyers interested in normative questions raised by the concepts of competence and capacity.