Rent Seeking Windfall Gains And Economic Development

Diploma Thesis from the year 2007 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: 1,7, Helmut Schmidt University - University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg (Professur für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Finanzwissenschaft), language: English, abstract: This paper addresses a ma jor paradox of the economic world, the seemingly negative impact of wealth in form of natural resources and development aid on growth. In the last 50 years a striking discrepancy in the economic performance of countries blessed by massive windfall gains became obvious. Robust empirical evidence was produced showing an inverse relation of both natural resources and development aid on economic growth. Regressions involving migrant's remittances did also yield ambiguous results under certain conditions. I try to embrace all windfall gains under the notion of "Easy Rents", characterised by easy generation of, easy access to and easy control over the abundant monetary assets. The influence of the rents is proposed to work through biased price distortions, induced by sectoral competition, rent-seeking and \bad" economic policy, creating unfavourable conditions for the growth-driving tradables sector. The conducted research and empirical testing indicates the appreciation of relative prices caused by political and economic disturbance. Following the results, a strong tendency of "Easy Rents" to exert deteriorating influence on a economy seems to be in place.

Diploma Thesis from the year 2007 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: 1,7, Helmut Schmidt University - University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg (Professur für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Finanzwissenschaft), language: English, abstract: This paper addresses a ma jor paradox of the economic world, the seemingly negative impact of wealth in form of natural resources and development aid on growth. In the last 50 years a striking discrepancy in the economic performance of countries blessed by massive windfall gains became obvious. Robust empirical evidence was produced showing an inverse relation of both natural resources and development aid on economic growth. Regressions involving migrant's remittances did also yield ambiguous results under certain conditions. I try to embrace all windfall gains under the notion of "Easy Rents", characterised by easy generation of, easy access to and easy control over the abundant monetary assets. The influence of the rents is proposed to work through biased price distortions, induced by sectoral competition, rent-seeking and \bad" economic policy, creating unfavourable conditions for the growth-driving tradables sector. The conducted research and empirical testing indicates the appreciation of relative prices caused by political and economic disturbance. Following the results, a strong tendency of "Easy Rents" to exert deteriorating influence on a economy seems to be in place.

February 1998 Why has foreign aid had so seemingly poor a macroeconomic impact in many developing countries? Is there a relationship between concessional assistance, widespread corruption, and other types of rent-seeking? To address the relationship between concessional assistance, corruption, and other types of rent-seeking activities, the author provides a simple game-theoretic rent-seeking model. Insights with interesting implications emerge from the analysis: - An increase in government revenue (from windfalls, for example, or from increased foreign aid) does not necessarily lead to the provision of more public goods and in certain circumstances may reduce it. - The mere expectation of aid may suffice to increase rent-dissipation and reduce productive public spending. But if the donor community can enter into a binding policy commitment, this result may be reversed. The author provides some preliminary empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that windfalls and foreign aid, in countries suffering from a divided policy process, are on average associated with more extensive corruption. He finds no evidence that donors systematically allocate aid to countries with less corruption. The results accords with recent empirical findings that aid is more effective, the greater the effort to direct it to good performers. But such a regime shift may involve an aid policy that in the short run provides more assistance to countries in less need and less aid to those in most need. Enforcing such a regime shift might be difficult. This paper--a product of the Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to study the effectiveness of foreign aid.

Examines the political economy of growth in Venezuela since the discovery of oil in 1920.

It is now twenty years since the concept of rent-seeking was first devised by Gordon Tullock, though he was not responsible for coining the phrase itself. His initial insight has burgeoned over two decades into a major research program which has had an impact not only on public choice, but also on the related disciplines of economics, political science, and law and economics. The reach of the insight has proved to be universal, with relevance not just for the democracies, but also, and arguably more important, for all forms of autocracy, irrespective of ideological com plexion. It is not surprising, therefore, that this volume is the third edited publication dedicated specifically to scholarship into rent-seeking behavior. The theory of rent-seeking bridges normative and positive analyses of state action. In its normative dimension, rent-seeking scholarship has expanded, enlivened, in some respects turned on its head, the traditional welfare analyses of such features of modern economics as monopoly, externalities, public goods, and trade protection devices. In its positive dimension, rent-seeking contributions have provided an important analy tical perspective from which to understand and to predict the behavior of politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats, the media and the academy within the political market place. This bridge between normative and positive elements of analysis is invaluable in facilitating an understanding of and evaluating the costs of state activity within a consistent paradigm.

The quest for benefit from existing wealth or by seeking privileged benefit through influence over policy is known as rent seeking. Much rent seeking activity involves government and political decisions and is therefore in the domain of political econo

This book traces the economic history of South Vietnam from 1955 to 1975, the period encompassing the Vietnam war.