Reserve Component Soldiers As Peacekeepers

In the continuing effort to maintain a ready force and honor the United States commitments throughout the world, in 1993 the Chief of Staff of the Army directed a test of the use of Reserve Component forces for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. A battalion composed of 80% RC individual volunteers and 20% Active Component soldiers was activated, trained and deployed as the 28th MFO rotation to the Sinai (Jan-Jul 95). ARI conducted an assessment of personnel and training issues using performance, interview and survey data. The four research questions and their findings are as follows. (1) Personnel: Who volunteered and why? What, if any, changes should be made to the volunteer screening process? (2) Family Support: How well did the family support system work? What was the impact of Sinai service on the family and civilian lives of volunteers? (3) Training/Performance: What are the unique and minimal training requirements? Did the training process produce a cohesive unit that could perform the mission? (4) Impact on the 29th ID(L): What is the impact on the ARYG units that sent volunteers, both during the deployment and post-deployment? Recommendations for future deployments are discussed in the text. ARI will continue to assess the impact of the deployment and post-redeployment re-entry on National Guard soldier commitment/retention, marital stability and financial well-being through October 1997. Cost analyses are not included in the ARI portion of the MFO assessment.

In this thesis I examine the role of the National Guard in supporting current National Security and National Military Strategy. I argue that the global security environment has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War making "Homeland Security" a primary mission for the military, specifically the National Guard. Concurrently, the unprecedented number of overseas deployments to perform peacekeeping missions has severely affected the active Army's combat capability. I argue that the US Army has not embraced the requirements for "Homeland Security," focusing instead on maintaining its 10 active division force structure. To meet the needs of National Military Strategy, the active Army has instead relied on the reserve components to perform overseas peacekeeping missions. I argue that the National Guard has also looked to performing these missions as a method of institutional survival. Together, both components have undermined the Constitutional underpinnings of the Reserve Component as a strategic reserve, to be mobilized in cases of "war or national emergency." I argue that making "Homeland Security" a primary federal mission of the National Guard, along with restructuring current combat, combat support, and combat service support ratios will allow the National Guard to support National Military Strategy and "Homeland Security."

One of the most vexing issues that has faced the international community since the end of the Cold War has been the use of force by the United Nations peacekeeping forces. UN intervention in civil wars, as in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, has thrown into stark relief the difficulty of peacekeepers operating in situations where consent to their presence and activities is fragile or incomplete and where there is little peace to keep. Complex questions arise in these circumstances. When and how should peacekeepers use force to protect themselves, to protect their mission, or, most troublingly, to ensure compliance by recalcitrant parties with peace accords? Is a peace enforcement role for peacekeepers possible or is this simply war by another name? Is there a grey zone between peacekeeping and peace enforcement? Trevor Findlay reveals the history of the use of force by UN peacekeepers from Sinai in the 1950s to Haiti in the 1990s. He untangles the arguments about the use of force in peace operations and sets these within the broader context of military doctrine and practice. Drawing on these insights the author examines proposals for future conduct of UN operations, including the formulation of UN peacekeeping doctrine and the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force.

First published in 1998, Peacekeeping in Africa was written to help make up the shortfall in the number of books that concentrated specifically on peacekeeping in Africa. The book covers the main peacekeeping operations of Africa, and provides a wealth of background material. In doing so, it explores the policies and actions of the international organisations concerned and the participating African states. It also considers the impact of sub-regional powers and the role of the USA, Britain, and France. Comprising three parts, Peacekeeping in Africa examines world perspectives, case studies, and wider issues surrounding Africa’s peacekeeping operations.