Reshaping The Expeditionary Army To Win Decisively

Today, the U.S. Army is decisively engaged in both fighting an unfamiliar type of war and transforming itself to meet the challenges of future warfare. But what are those challenges? What capabilities does U.S. strategy demand of its military instrument? Where are the major capability gaps, and how should they inform Army Transformation to ensure the future expeditionary Army has the right campaign qualities? This paper argues that the major capability gap in today's force - and vital for future campaigns - is the ability to conduct stabilization. It begins with exploring the changes in U.S. strategy that are the impetus behind the need for greater capacity to conduct post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Then, it analyzes the emerging role of the Army in post-conflict operations in the context of modern combat to more fully understand the specific requirements of stabilization. The paper then develops an operational concept - progressive stabilization - that complements the Army's concept of rapid decisive operations while improving its ability to contribute to long-term conflict resolution. It outlines three key force attributes an expeditionary force structure must have to provide the requisite mix of combat and stabilization capabilities. Finally, this paper builds on those attributes to suggest three areas where Army leaders must make near-term adjustments in the Modular Force to ensure the nation has a truly expeditionary force with the campaign capacity for both rapid decisive operations and stabilization.

Today the U.S. Army is decisively engaged in both fighting an unfamiliar type of war and transforming itself to meet the challenges of future warfare. But what are those challenges? What capabilities does U.S. strategy demand of its military instrument? Where are the major capability gaps and how should they inform Army Transformation to ensure the future expeditionary Army has the right campaign qualities? This paper argues that the major capability gap in today's force - and vital for future campaigns - is the ability to conduct stabilization. It begins with exploring the changes in U.S. strategy that are the impetus behind the need for greater capacity to conduct post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Then it analyzes the emerging role of the Army in post-conflict operations in the context of modern combat to more fully understand the specific requirements of stabilization. The paper then develops an operational concept - progressive stabilization - that complements the Army's concept of rapid decisive operations while improving its ability to contribute to long-term conflict resolution. Finally this paper outlines three key force attributes that must guide Army Transformation if it is to generate an expeditionary force with the campaign capacity for both rapid decisive operations and progressive stabilization.

Today, the U.S. Army is decisively engaged in both fighting an unfamiliar type of war and transforming itself to meet the challenges of future warfare. But what are those challenges? What capabilities does U.S. strategy demand of its military instrument? Where are the major capability gaps, and how should they inform Army Transformation to ensure the future expeditionary Army has the right campaign qualities? This paper argues that the major capability gap in today's force-and vital for future campaigns-is the ability to conduct stabilization. It begins with exploring the changes in U.S. strategy that are the impetus behind the need for greater capacity to conduct post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Then, it analyzes the emerging role of the Army in post conflict operations in the context of modern combat to more fully understand the specific requirements of stabilization. The paper then develops an operational concept progressive stabilization-that complements the Army's concept of rapid decisive operations while improving its ability to contribute to long-term conflict resolution. It outlines three key force attributes an expeditionary force structure must have to provide the requisite mix of combat and stabilization capabilities. Finally, this paper builds on those attributes to suggest three areas where Army leaders must make near-term adjustments in the Modular Force to ensure the nation has a truly expeditionary force with the campaign capacity for both rapid decisive operations and stabilization.

During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US Army went through a monumental process of organizational adaptation—a process driven by soldiers and leaders that spread throughout the institution and led to revolutionary changes in how the army supported and conducted its operations in Iraq. How the army adapted and the implications of this adaptation are the subject of this indispensable study. Intended for policymakers, defense and military professionals, military historians, and academics, this book offers a solid critique of the army’s current capacity to adapt to likely future adversary strategies and provides policy recommendations for retaining lessons learned in Iraq.

This book recounts the successes and failures of the US Army's Army Transformation program in the larger context of the Department of Defense's overall military transformation effort. Spurred by the belief that RMA represented the future, the Department of Defense (DoD) set out to transform the U.S. armed forces by adopting RMA concepts. Led by President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the DoD spent billions in an attempt to make the hypothetical capabilities real, changing the entire structure of the armed forces as a result. The services, the media, Congress, and the military industry each had its own agenda, all of which continue to come into play in the development of RMA strategies. The interplay of politics, technology, and military reality offers a fascinating narrative. Sure to be found controversial by some, compelling by all, this is the only available book-length examination of the way the U.S. Army and Department of Defense have tried to create the capabilities promised by the high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs. Of more immediate concern, it is also the only in-depth account of the effect RMA and transformation concepts had on the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan, author Thomas K. Adams argues, arose from the DoD's implacable desire to implement RMA-driven transformation concepts—whether they were appropriate or not. What we need to do, he maintains, is to fight the war we have, not the war we want.

In stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations like the U.S. mission in Iraq, negotiation is a common activity. The success or failure of the thousands of negotiations taking place daily between U.S. military officers and local civilian and military leaders in Iraq affects tactical and operational results and the U.S. military's ability to achieve American strategic objectives. By training its leaders, especially junior ones, to negotiate effectively, the U.S. military will be better prepared to succeed in the increasingly complex operations it is conducting--in Iraq as well as the ones it will face in the new strategic environment of the 21st century. This monograph analyzes the U.S. Army's current predeployment negotiation training and compares it with the negotiating experience of U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers deployed to Iraq. The author argues that successfully adapting to the nature of the contemporary operating environment requires changes that include increased training in negotiation. Based on interviews with U.S. officers, the author identifies three key elements of negotiation in SSTR operations and offers recommendations for U.S. soldiers to consider when negotiating with local Iraqi leaders; for U.S. military trainers to consider when reviewing their predeployment negotiation training curriculum; and for the Army and Marine Corps training and doctrine commands to consider when planning and structuring predeployment training.