Responsive Judicial Review

Democratic dysfunction can arise in both 'at risk' and well-functioning constitutional systems. It can threaten a system's responsiveness to both minority rights claims and majoritarian constitutional understandings. Responsive Judicial Review aims to counter this dysfunction using examples from both the global north and global south, including leading constitutional courts in the US, UK, Canada, India, South Africa, and Colombia, as well as select aspects of the constitutional jurisprudence of courts in Australia, Fiji, Hong Kong, and Korea. In this book, Dixon argues that courts should adopt a sufficiently 'dialogic' approach to countering relevant democratic blockages and look for ways to increase the actual and perceived legitimacy of their decisions—through careful choices about their framing, and the timing and selection of cases. By orienting judicial choices about constitutional construction toward promoting democratic responsiveness, or toward countering forms of democratic monopoly, blind spots, and burdens of inertia, judicial review helps safeguard a constitutional system's responsiveness to democratic majority understandings. The idea of 'responsive' judicial review encourages courts to engage with their own distinct institutional position, and potential limits on their own capacity and legitimacy. Dixon further explores the ways that this translates into the embracing of a 'weakened' approach to judicial finality, compared to the traditional US-model of judicial supremacy, as well as a nuanced approach to the making of judicial implications, a 'calibrated' approach to judicial scrutiny or judgments about proportionality, and an embrace of 'weak – strong' rather than wholly weak or strong judicial remedies. Not all courts will be equally well-placed to engage in review of this kind, or successful at doing so. For responsive judicial review to succeed, it must be sensitive to context-specific limitations of this kind. Nevertheless, the idea of responsive judicial review is explicitly normative and aspirational: it aims to provide a blueprint for how courts should think about the practice of judicial review as they strive to promote and protect democratic constitutional values.

Judicial Review: A Practical Guide is a handbook which aims to be a first port of call in all matters concerning judicial review applications, whether in civil or criminal proceedings. This new edition has been significantly amended to take account of the following developments in law and practice, including: * Development of the Unified Tribunal system with transfers of judicial reviews * Regionalisation of Administrative Court * Clear development of mistake of fact as a mistake of law * Increasing understanding of the impact of the Human Rights Act * Limitations upon judicial review in the context of immigration * Ongoing case-law developments * Changes to Appeals (CPR Pt 52) * Developments in costs and funding In addition to the authors' commentary, Judicial Review: A Practical Guide contains over 20 precedents covering all aspects of the litigation process, together with all the main legislative and judicial materials.

This powerfully argued appraisal of judicial review may change the face of American law. Written for layman and scholar alike, the book addresses one of the most important issues facing Americans today: within what guidelines shall the Supreme Court apply the strictures of the Constitution to the complexities of modern life? Until now legal experts have proposed two basic approaches to the Constitution. The first, “interpretivism,” maintains that we should stick as closely as possible to what is explicit in the document itself. The second, predominant in recent academic theorizing, argues that the courts should be guided by what they see as the fundamental values of American society. John Hart Ely demonstrates that both of these approaches are inherently incomplete and inadequate. Democracy and Distrust sets forth a new and persuasive basis for determining the role of the Supreme Court today. Ely’s proposal is centered on the view that the Court should devote itself to assuring majority governance while protecting minority rights. “The Constitution,” he writes, “has proceeded from the sensible assumption that an effective majority will not unreasonably threaten its own rights, and has sought to assure that such a majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats itself. It has done so by structuring decision processes at all levels in an attempt to ensure, first, that everyone’s interests will be represented when decisions are made, and second, that the application of those decisions will not be manipulated so as to reintroduce in practice the sort of discrimination that is impermissible in theory.” Thus, Ely’s emphasis is on the procedural side of due process, on the preservation of governmental structure rather than on the recognition of elusive social values. At the same time, his approach is free of interpretivism’s rigidity because it is fully responsive to the changing wishes of a popular majority. Consequently, his book will have a profound impact on legal opinion at all levels—from experts in constitutional law, to lawyers with general practices, to concerned citizens watching the bewildering changes in American law.

Constitutional Statecraft in Asian Courts explores how courts engage in constitutional state-building in aspiring, yet deeply fragile, democracies in Asia. Yvonne Tew offers an in-depth look at contemporary Malaysia and Singapore, explaining how courts protect and construct constitutionalism even as they confront dominant political parties and negotiate democratic transitions. This richly illustrative account offers at once an engaging analysis of Southeast Asia's constitutional context, as well as a broader narrative that should resonate in many countries across Asia that are also grappling with similar challenges of colonial legacies, histories of authoritarian rule, and societies polarized by race, religion, and identity. The book explores the judicial strategies used for statecraft in Asian courts, including an analysis of the specific mechanisms that courts can use to entrench constitutional basic structures and to protect rights in a manner that is purposive and proportionate. Tew's account shows how courts in Asia's emerging democracies can chart a path forward to help safeguard a nation's constitutional core and to build an enduring constitutional framework.

This book is about judicial review of public administration. Many have regarded this to divide European legal orders, with judicial review of administrative action in the general courts or specialized administrative courts, or with different distance from the executive. There has been considerably less of comparison of the basic procedural and substantive principles. The comparative study in this book of procedural fairness and propriety in the courts reveals not only differences but also some common and connecting elements, in a 'common core' perspective. The book is divided into four parts. The first explains the nature and purpose of a comparison to understand the relevance and significance of commonality and diversity between the legal systems of Europe, and which considers other legal systems which are distant and distinct from Europe, such as China and Latin America. The second part contains an overview of the systems of judicial review in these legal orders. The third part, which is the heart of the 'common core' method, contains both a set of hypothetical cases and the solutions, according to the experts of the legal systems selected for our comparison, to the cases. The fourth part serves to examine the answers in comparative terms to ascertain not so much whether a 'common core' exists, but how it is shaped and evolves, also in response to the influence of supranational legal orders as the European Union and the Council of Europe.

This landmark volume of specially commissioned, original contributions by top international scholars organizes the issues and controversies of the rich and rapidly maturing field of comparative constitutional law. Divided into sections on constitutional design and redesign, identity, structure, individual rights and state duties, courts and constitutional interpretation, this comprehensive volume covers over 100 countries as well as a range of approaches to the boundaries of constitutional law. While some chapters reference the text of legal instruments expressly labeled constitutional, others focus on the idea of entrenchment or take a more functional approach. Challenging the current boundaries of the field, the contributors offer diverse perspectives - cultural, historical and institutional - as well as suggestions for future research. A unique and enlightening volume, Comparative Constitutional Law is an essential resource for students and scholars of the subject.

Constitutional courts around the world play an increasingly central role in day-to-day democratic governance. Yet scholars have only recently begun to develop the interdisciplinary analysis needed to understand this shift in the relationship of constitutional law to politics. This edited volume brings together leading scholars of constitutional law and politics to provide a comprehensive overview of judicial review, covering theories of its creation, mechanisms of its constraint, and its comparative applications, including theories of interpretation and doctrinal developments. This book serves as a single point of entry for legal scholars and practitioners interested in understanding the field of comparative judicial review in its broader political and social context. This book's comparative and interdisciplinary accounts of a phenomenon of worldwide significance and its advanced introduction to the origins, functions, and contours of judicial review make it both accessible and indispensable. Comparative Judicial Review should be considered essential reading for every graduate student, early career scholar, and constitutional law professor seeking to become more comparative in their approach. Contributors include: K.J. Alter, S.G. Calabresi, W.-C. Chang, E.F. Delaney, R. Dixon, L, Esptein, T. Ginsburg, J. Greene, A. Harel, R. Hirschl, S. Issacharoff, V. Jackson, T. Jacobi, R.A. Kagan, D. Kapiszewski, J. Knight, D. Landau, Y.-L. Lee, H. Lerner, S. Mittal, T. Roux, W. Sadurski, A. Shinar, G. Silverstein, K. Stilt, Y. Tew, M. Versteeg, S. Waheedi, B.R. Weingast, E. Zackin