Reviewing The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

As currently interpreted, it is difficult to see why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) warrants much support as a nonproliferation convention. Most foreign ministries, including that of Iran and the United States, insist that Article IV of the NPT recognizes the "inalienable right" of all states to develop "peaceful nuclear energy." This includes money-losing activities, such as nuclear fuel reprocessing, which can bring countries to the very brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. If the NPT is intended to ensure that states share peaceful "benefits" of nuclear energy and to prevent the spread of nuclear bomb making technologies, it is difficult to see how it can accomplish either if the interpretation identified above is correct. Some argue, however, that the NPT clearly proscribes proliferation by requiring international nuclear safeguards against military diversions of fissile material. Unfortunately, these procedures, which are required of all non-nuclear weapons state members of the NPT under Article III, are rickety at best. Each chapter of this book is dedicated to clarifying the NPT's key ambiguities, and the chapters are roughly structured to trace the NPT's text, article by article. The analysis set forth here was mostly written or commissioned by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Much more, of course, could have been included in this book. But rather than seeking to be comprehensive, the aim throughout is to provide a guide for both policymakers and security analysts. This guide should assist in navigating the most important debates over how best to read and implement the NPT and, in the process, spotlighting alternative views of the NPT that are sound and supportable. Related products: Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2016 can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/044-000-02684-8 The Warsaw Pact, Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance: Soviet-East European Military Relations in Historical Perspective: Sources and Reassessments can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00306-2 Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01098-6

As currently interpreted, it is difficult to see why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) warrants much support as a nonproliferation convention. Most foreign ministries, including that of Iran and the United States, insist that Article IV of the NPT recognizes the "inalienable right" of all states to develop "peaceful nuclear energy." This includes money-losing activities, such as nuclear fuel reprocessing, which can bring countries to the very brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. If the NPT is intended to ensure that states share peaceful "benefits" of nuclear energy and to prevent the spread of nuclear bomb making technologies, it is difficult to see how it can accomplish either if the interpretation identified above is correct. Some argue, however, that the NPT clearly proscribes proliferation by requiring international nuclear safeguards against military diversions of fissile material. Unfortunately, these procedures, which are required of all non-nuclear weapons state members of the NPT under Article III, are rickety at best. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear inspections, which are intended to detect illicit nuclear activities and materials, certainly have a mixed record. Not only has the IAEA failed to find existing covert reactors and fuel-making plants, which are critical to bomb making, the agency still cannot assure the continuity of inspections for spent and fresh reactor fuels that could be processed into bomb usable materials at roughly two-thirds of the sites that it currently inspects. What is easily as worrisome is that even at declared nuclear fuel-making sites the IAEA routinely loses count of many bombs worth of production each year. Finally, in the practical world, the NPT hardly admits of modification and is far too easy for violating states to withdraw from. Under Article X, treaty members are free to leave the NPT with no more than 3 months notice merely by filing a statement of the "extraordinary events [relating to the subject matter of the treaty] it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests." As demonstrated by North Korea with its withdrawal from the NPT, these slight requirements are all too easy to meet. As for amending the treaty, it is nearly impossible. Not only must a majority of NPT members ratify any proposed amendments, but every member of the IAEA government board and every NPT nuclear weapons state member must ratify the proposal as well, and this is only to get amendments for consideration by those states that have not yet ratified the NPT. Ultimately, any state that chooses not to so ratify is free to ignore the amendment, and therefore the treaty is functionally incapable of being amended. For all of these reasons, the NPT is not just seen as being weak against violators and difficult to improve, but it is seen effectively as a legal instrument that enables nations to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Consequently, each chapter of this book is dedicated to clarifying the NPT's key ambiguities, and the chapters are roughly structured to trace the NPT's text, article by article. The analysis set forth here was mostly written or commissioned by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Much more, of course, could have been included in this book. But rather than seeking to be comprehensive, the aim throughout is to provide a guide for both policymakers and security analysts. This guide should assist in navigating the most important debates over how best to read and implement the NPT and, in the process, spotlighting alternative views of the NPT that are sound and supportable.

The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the most controversial instruments in international law. This text argues that countries with nuclear weapons misrepresent the Treaty to prevent other states from developing peaceful nuclear energy, holding back nuclear disarmament in the process.

Most foreign ministries, including that of Iran and the United States, insist that Article IV of the NPT recognizes all states' "inalienable right" to develop "peaceful nuclear energy" including such money-losing activities as nuclear fuel reprocessing. This can bring countries to the very brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. If the NPT is intended to ensure that states share peaceful "benefits" of nuclear energy and prevent the spread of nuclear bomb making technologies, how it can accomplish either if the interpretation above is correct? Some argue that the NPT clearly proscribes proliferation by requiring international nuclear safeguards against military diversions of fissile material. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear inspections, which are intended to detect illicit nuclear activities and materials, certainly have a mixed record. Not only have they failed to find existing covert reactors and fuel-making plants, the agency still cannot assure the continuity...

As currently interpreted, it is difficult to see why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) warrants much support as a nonproliferation convention. Most foreign ministries, including that of Iran and the United States, insist that Article IV of the NPT recognizes all states' "inalienable right" to develop "peaceful nuclear energy."1 This includes money-losing activities, such as nuclear fuel reprocessing, which can bring countries to the very brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. If the NPT is intended to ensure that states share peaceful "benefits" of nuclear energy and prevent the spread of nuclear bomb making technologies, it is difficult to see how it can accomplish either if the interpretation above is correct. Some argue, however, that the NPT clearly proscribes proliferation by requiring international nuclear safeguards against military diversions of fissile material. Unfortunately, these procedures, which are required of all non-nuclear weapons state members of the NPT under Article III, are rickety at best. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear inspections, which are intended to detect illicit nuclear activities and materials, certainly have a mixed record. Not only has the IAEA failed to find existing covert reactors and fuel-making plants, which are critical to bomb making, the agency still cannot assure the continuity of inspections for spent and fresh reactor fuels that could be processed into bomb usable materials at roughly two-thirds of the sites that it currently inspects. What is easily as worrisome is that even at declared nuclear fuel-making sites, the IAEA routinely loses count of many bombs' worth of production each year. Finally, in the practical world, the NPT hardly admits of modification and is far too easy for violating states to withdraw from. Under Article X, treaty members are free to leave the NPT with no more than 3 months notice merely by filing a statement of the "extraordinary events [relating to the subject matter of the treaty] it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests." As North Korea demonstrated with its withdrawal from the NPT, these slight requirements are all too easy to meet. As for amending the treaty, it is nearly impossible. Not only must a majority of NPT members ratify any proposed amendments, but every member of the IAEA government board and every NPT nuclear weapons state member must ratify the proposal as well, and this is only to get amendments for consideration by those states that have not yet ratified the NPT. Ultimately, any state that chooses not to so ratify is free to ignore the amendment, and the treaty is functionally unamendable. For all of these reasons, the NPT is not just seen as being weak against violators and difficult to improve, but it is seen effectively as a legal instrument that enables nations to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Former President George W. Bush highlighted this in a February 2004 nuclear nonproliferation speech in which he argued that the NPT had created a "loophole" in promoting all aspects of civilian nuclear technology including nuclear fuel making. This allowed proliferating states to "cynically manipulate" the treaty to develop and acquire nearly all the technology and materials they needed to make nuclear weapons. President Bush attempted to shore up the NPT by calling on the world's non-weapons states that have not yet developed nuclear fuel making to foreswear such activities and to allow more intrusive civilian nuclear inspections in exchange for their assured access to nuclear fuel from those states now producing enriched uranium.

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. It entered into force in 1970, and 190 states have subscribed. The treaty covers three mutually reinforcing pillars—disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy—and is the basis for international cooperation on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. The basic bargain at the core of the NPT is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament; countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them; and all countries can access peaceful nuclear technology.The NPT Review ProcessThe Treaty allows for the Parties to gather every five years to review its operation. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Parties extended the Treaty indefinitely and formalized the practice of convening a Review Conference (RevCon) every five years, as well as holding Preparatory Committee meeting during each of the three years preceding a RevCon. The 2015 NPT RevCon will take place at the United Nations in New York from April 27-May 22. The U.S. looks forward to a constructive RevCon, and we pledge to work with others to reaffirm and strengthen the NPT as a critical element of our common security.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Contents: (1) Intro.: Overview of the NPT; (2) Past NPT Review Conf.: 1995, 2000, 2005; (3) Issues for the 2010 Conf.: Disarmament: New U.S.-Russian START Agreement; U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, Negative Security Assurances; Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; Fissile Material Cut-Off Negotiations; Non-proliferation and Compliance: Safeguards; Non-compliance; NPT Withdrawal; Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones; Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy; Future of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Universality of the Treaty; WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East; (4) Possible Outcomes and Potential Impact; (5) Legislation in the 111th Cong. Append.: (A) Text of the NPT; (B) Resolution on the Middle East (1995); ( C) 13 Practical Steps (2000). Illus.

This book presents different views on nuclear disarmament and arms control and a brief history of nuclear non-proliferation policy and the nuclear test ban issue. It describes the preparations for and results of the 1990 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the 1991 Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference. With a view to 1995, it assesses the chances for consensus or dissension regarding regarding nuclear proliferation and the test ban, and the prospects for an extension of NPT. It concludes by examining the future and the threat of a new North-South divide over these issues.