Revisiting Searle On Deriving Ought From Is

This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving "Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle’s 1964 article How to Derive "Ought " from "Is’’ sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an "is" - it simply follows that you "ought" to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein’s philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action. The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle’s essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law. With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is", but "Is" from "Ought".

INTRODUCTION Paolo Di Lucia and Lorenzo Passerini Glazel, Introduction. Veritas in Dicto, Veritas in Re Amedeo Giovanni Conte, Three Paradigms for a Philosophy of the True: Apophantic Truth, Eidological Truth, Idiological Truth SECTION I. Truth of Language (De Dicto Truth) vs. Truth of Things (De Re Truth) Roberta De Monticelli, Ockham’s Razor, or the Murder of Concreteness. A Vindication of the Unitarian Tradition Richard Davies, Monadic Truth and Falsity Stefano Caputo, One but not the Same Paolo Heritier, True God and True Man: Some Implications SECTION II. Truth of Things and the Normative and Axiological Dimensions of Reality Anna Donise, A Stratified Theory of Value Venanzio Raspa, On Emotional Truth Sergei Talanker, No True Persuasive Definition Marginalizes? Carlos Morujão, Subjective Meanings and Normative Values in Alfred Schutz’s Philosophy of Human Action SECTION III. Truth, Validity, and Normativity Pedro M. S. Alves, A Phenomenological Analysis of the Nomothetic Noema. Discussing the De Dicto and De Re Formulations of Normative Sentences Wojciech Żełaniec, Things We Must Never Do (If Any) Sara Papic, Can Linguistic Correctness Provide Us with Categorical Semantic Norms? Virginia Presi, Custom in Action. Ferdinand Tönnies’ Ontology of the Normative SECTION IV. Truth and Validity in Action: Norm Effectiveness and Nomotropic Behaviour Pascal Richard, Norms as “Intentional Systems” Alba Lojo, The Semantic Conception of Efficacy and Constitutive Rules: Mapping a Tough Relationship Giovanni Bombelli, Normativity, Truth, Validity and Effectiveness. Remarks Starting from the Horizon of the “Common Sense” SECTION V. Further Contributions Caterina Del Sordo and Roberta Lanfredini, Matter at a Crossroads: Givenness vs Forceful Quality Stefano Colloca, On the Deontic Validity of the General Exclusive Norm Alessandro Volpe, Doing Justice to Solidarity: On the Moral Role of Mutual Support

This book reflects the various dimensions of play. It gathers together experience with role-play, tabletop, and online games and develops and assesses tools. It also reflects the human condition in this world of games as it becomes a digital world. We are living in a World of Games where every game is a world through which we learn about the world. A World of Games is fun and engaging, but it also provides deceptive pleasures. What may seem like fun is far from harmless. And then there are the many ways of learning in the mode of play.

John R. Searle is one of the world's leading philosophers. During his long and outstanding career, he has made groundbreaking and lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, to the philosophy of mind, as well as to the nature, structure, and functioning of social reality. This volume documents the 13th Münster Lectures on Philosophy with John R. Searle. It includes not only 11 critical papers on Searle’s philosophy and Searle's replies to the papers, but also an original article by John R. Searle on his overall philosophical enterprise entitled "The Basic Reality and the Human Reality". "I think Münster is probably unique among contemporary universities in its ability to produce such a high level of philosophical production from their philosophy students." - John R. Searle

The Philosophy of Money and Finance presents sixteen original essays providing a comprehensive introduction to questions concerning the nature of money and monetary value, the epistemology of markets, and the ethics of financial systems.

Social work rests on complex philosophical assumptions that should be central to practice, education, and training. In this book, Frederic G. Reamer explores how these issues bear on the purpose, methods, and perspectives of social work and their far-reaching implications for practice and scholarship. Reamer examines major themes across the domains of moral and political philosophy, logic, epistemology, and aesthetics. He raises questions such as: How can ethical theories inform social workers’ moral judgments? In what ways are canons of inductive and deductive logic relevant to social workers’ thinking about their work? To what extent can scientific inquiry help social workers understand the nature and effect of their interventions? How can concepts related to aesthetics shed light on the nature of social work? Reamer’s nuanced inquiry never loses sight of the concrete applications of philosophy to social work practice with individuals, families, groups, organizations, and communities, or to broader goals of social change. This second edition of The Philosophical Foundations of Social Work is revised and updated throughout to address contemporary challenges. It focuses especially on newer thinking about the role of non-Western philosophical perspectives and the relevance of philosophy to social workers’ commitments to multiculturalism, feminism, and antiracism.

Thought Experiments in Ethics, 2021 CONTENTS Preface i Chapter I The Story in Your Head: Tomoceuszkakatiti and Gyugyu 1 Chapter II How Thought Experiments Move Us: The Samaritan and His Neighbours 16 Chapter III What Makes a Thought Experiment? 34 Chapter IV Thought Experiments in Practical Philosophy and Bioethics 75 Chapter V The Experience Machine 93 Chapter VI The Last Man Argument 129 Chapter VII The Trolley Problem 158 Chapter VIII The Violinist Analogy 213 Conclusion 246 Notes 248

This book is concerned with two intimately related topics of metaphysics: the identity of entities and the foundations of classification. What it adds to previous discussions of these topics is that it addresses them with respect to human-made entities, that is, artefacts. As the chapters in the book show, questions of identity and classification require other treatments and lead to other answers for artefacts than for natural entities. These answers are of interest to philosophers not only for their clarification of artefacts as a category of things but also for the new light they may shed on these issue with respect to to natural entities. This volume is structured in three parts. The contributions in Part I address basic ontological and metaphysical questions in relation to artefact kinds: How should we conceive of artefact kinds? Are they real kinds? How are identity conditions for artefacts and artefact kinds related? The contributions in Part II address meta-ontological questions: What, exactly, should an ontological account of artefact kinds provide us with? What scope can it aim for? Which ways of approaching the ontology of artefact kinds are there, how promising are they, and how should we assess this? In Part III, the essays offer engineering practice rather than theoretical philosophy as a point of reference. The issues addressed here include: How do engineers classify technical artefacts and on what grounds? What makes specific classes of technical artefacts candidates for ontologically real kinds, and by which criteria?​