Routledge Library Editions Free Will And Determinism

This set reissues a number of classic titles on free will and determinism. They approach the topic from a range of differing viewpoints, and in so doing, provide an excellent overview and in-depth analysis of this fundamental philosophical problem.

This set reissues a number of classic titles on free will and determinism. They approach the topic from a range of differing viewpoints, and in so doing, provide an excellent overview and in-depth analysis of this fundamental philosophical problem.

The problem of determinism arises in all the major areas of philosophy. The first part of this book, first published in 1991, is a critical and historical exposition of the problem and the most important ideas and arguments which have arisen over the many years of debate. The second part considers the various forms of determinism and the implications that they engender.

XI Determinism and Phenomenology -- 1. The Demand for a Sufficient Reason -- 2. Overt and Covert Forces -- 3. Casuistry and Verdicts -- 4. The Partial Efficacy of Reason -- XII Theoretical and Practical Explanation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Theoretical Explanation -- 3. Practical Explanation: Logical Completeness -- 4. Practical Explanation: Universalisability -- 5. Practical Explanation and Justification -- 6. Practical, Theoretical and Personal Explanation -- 7. Applications to the Problem -- XIII Determinism, Science and Morality -- 1. Determinism and Expirical Discovery -- 2. Libertarian Objections -- 3. The Issue Emerging -- 4. Determinism and Scientific Progress -- 5. Determinist Moralities -- XIV Conclusion -- 1. Where thought must Stop -- 2. Metaphysical Explanation -- 3. Libertarianism, Determinism and Ultimacy -- 4. The Natural and the Common View -- 5. Assessment of the Issues -- 6. Dialogue in Philosophy -- Appendices -- Appendix I Moral Libertarianism -- Appendix II 'Could have done Otherwise' -- Index

The problem of freedom and determinism is one of the most enduring, and one of the best, problems in philosophy. One of the best because it so tenaciously resists solution while yet always seeming urgent, and one of the most enduring because it has always been able to present itself in different ways to suit the preoccupations of different ages. This book, first published in 1980, sets out to defend free will: it elaborates a sober and systematic case for libertarianism in the face of the overwhelming threat that is posed by the scientific study of the brain.

This book, first published in 1936, divides into roughly two parts: a re-examination of historical material; and a positive theory of causation suggested by the results of this re-examination. The historical study discloses an ambiguity in the meanings of causation and determinism; it discloses also that this ambiguity is transferred to the meaning of freedom.

Cover -- Half Title Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Probability And Possibility For Choice -- 1 Introductory -- 2 A Theory About Personal Power -- 3 A Criticism Of Keynes -- 4 Some More Theories About Personal Power -- 5 An Analogy Between Two Kinds Of Possibility -- 3 Probability And Natural Powers -- 1 Introductory -- 2 The Relation Between Epistemic And Natural Possibility -- 3 A Criticism Of The Doctrine That 'Probable' Is Ambiguous -- 4 A Comparison Of Possibility With Probability -- 4 Some Unobservable Properties -- 1 Introductory -- 2 Certainty, Necessity And Hume -- 3 Epistemology And Determinism -- 4 An Analysis Proposed And Defended -- 5 Power And Law -- 5 Some Puzzles About Potentiality -- 1 Introductory -- 2 The idea of a 'circumstance' -- 3 The Distinction Between Intrinsic And Extrinsic Properties -- 4 The Refutation Of Actualism -- 5 The Refutation Of The Theory That 'All Power Is Conditional' -- 6 The Powers Of People Andthe Powers Of Things -- 1 Introductory -- 2 The Distinction Between Natural And Personal Power -- 3 The Refutation Of Ryle's Dispositionalist Account Of Human Capacities -- 7 IFS And Cans -- 1 Introductory -- 2 The Refutation Of The Theory That All Personal Power is Conditional -- 3 A Refutation Of The Orthodox Account Of 'I Can', As Equivalent To A Conditional Statement -- 4 A Contradiction In Dispositionalism -- 5 Further Objections To The Orthodox View -- 6 The Verification Of 'I Can': More About Trying -- 8 Deliberation, Freedom And Meaning -- 1 Introductory -- 2 More About Possibility And The Context Of Deliberation -- And About The Relation Between Power And Will -- 3 On Not Being Able To Help It: A: Discussion Of The Relationship Between Power And Responsibility -- 4 On The Meaning Of Words Like 'Can'

That a science of human conduct is possible, that what any man may do even in moments of the most sober and careful reflection can be understood and explained, has seemed to many a philosopher to cast doubt upon our common view that any human action can ever be said to be truly free. This book, first published in 1961, looks into crucially important issues that are often ignored in the familiar arguments for and against the possibility of free action. These issues are brought to light and examined in some detail.