Rule Of Law And Fundamental Rights

This book, which originated from the broadly held view that there is a lack of Rule-of-law in Mexico, and from the emphasis of traditional academia on cultural elements as the main explanation, explores the question of whether there is any relationship between the system of constitutional review ― and thus the ‘law’ as such ― and the level of Rule-of-law in a given state. To do so, it elaborates a theoretical model for achieving Rule-of-law and compares it to the constitutional review systems of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Mexico. The study concludes that the two former states correspond to the model, while the latter does not. This is fundamentally due to the role each legal system assigns to ordinary jurisdiction in carrying out constitutional review. Whereas the US and Germany have fostered the policy that constitutional review regarding the enforcement of basic rights is the responsibility of ordinary courts, Mexico has relied too heavily on the specialized constitutional jurisdiction.

This book provides an analysis of key approaches to rule of law oversight in the EU and identifies deeper theoretical problems.

This book addresses the problem of abuse - not what is commonly understood as 'abuse of human rights' where authorities violate fundamental rights by simply denying them. Rather, it refers to authorities and individuals claiming human (fundamental) rights and the rule of law in ways that violate the fundamental rights of other people. Most contributors to this volume agree that in certain instances fundamental rights are used improperly, with troubling consequences, and that making us aware of such improprieties is necessary for the most efficient and just operation of the constitutional system. Several methods how to approach the issue are covered in this book, ranging from the use of existing doctrinal categories (e.g. conflict of rights) to developing a doctrine of abuse of rights. They help in clarifying improper uses of rights and the rule of law in constitutional and international law. The thought-provoking essays in this book are a welcome contribution to the debate if and how to deal with the negative consequences of rights-based action.

This book presents a comprehensive review of fundamental rights issues that are currently in the spotlight. The first part explores why the question of whether or not fundamental rights have horizontal effect is a topic of endless debate. The second part focuses on human rights and the rule of law. It begins by arguing that the hitherto valid model of the rule of law is now outdated, and then goes on to outline the importance of the judicial dimension in countering threats to the independence of the judiciary. Lastly, the third part addresses a classic issue in the field of human rights: states’ margin of appreciation, highlighting two aspects: (i) the elements used by the ECJ to determine the scope of the margin of appreciation, which varies depending on the subject matter, the nature of the right in question, as well as the severity and the purpose of the interference; and (ii) the margin of appreciation enjoyed by national courts when interpreting the law. Exploring current issues concerning a topic of eternal interest, the book will appeal to scholars and practitioners alike. Written by formidable intellectual talents, committed to the study of fundamental rights, it rigorously analyses the most recent judgments of both the ECJ and the ECHR.

Tremblay's theory of the rule of law involves a set of practical principles that constitute the ideal type of a conception of law that is both constitutive and regulative of legal discourse and practice. Tremblay examines two competing ideal types, the "rule of law as certainty" and the "rule of law as justice." The former, a standard doctrine within contemporary legal, social, and political theory, is shown to be incoherent. Thus the "rule of law as justice," he shows, provides the best basis for understanding legal discourse in general and Canadian constitutional law in particular. Tremblay offers a coherent reconstruction of Canadian law from fundamental principles of the rule of law as justice and tests the theory through applications to key judicial decisions that have proven resistant to positivist interpretation. The Rule of Law, Justice, and Interpretation is both a stimulating work of contemporary legal theory and an innovative challenge to the traditions of Canadian constitutional law. Tremblay examines fundamental issues of legal epistemology and ontology and brings rigorous analytical jurisprudence to bear on interpretations and applications specific to Canadian constitutional law. Given the important implications of his theory for statutory and constitutional interpretation, especially with respect to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the potential crisis involving provincial rights of secession and partition, this book will be central to the practice of law in Canada.

Revision of author's thesis (doctoral)--University of Amsterdam, 2012.