Russia S Oil In America S Future

"Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin will hold a summit at the end of September that will focus on economic and other ties between the United States and Russia. The two presidents have long recognized the central position of energy in our bilateral relations, and in that sphere, nothing is as critical as oil. Today Russia may again be the largest oil exporter in the world, but very little yet comes to the United States. Russia's oil industry is dominated by rich and aggressive young private companies. Generally, they are eager to deal with foreigners, but despite significant state reforms they often are still inhibited by a dilapidated, state-controlled delivery system and a residue of traditional thinking and institutions. Many of Russia's as-yet-unresolved post-Soviet prob-lems exploded in mid-2003 when the prosecutor general's office attacked Yukos, the country's most modernized, productive and pro-American private oil company. Thus even as Washington and American oil industry leaders actively sought alternatives to unstable sources in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, basic questions re-emerged in Russia about the privatizations of the 1990s, the security of private property, the mixing of law and politics, and the exercise of power in the Kremlin. Today Russians, with the support of American and European allies, must create conditions that will welcome the foreign funds, technology, and expertise needed to develop the critical oil industry but also to lay foundations of law and infrastructure that will help make Russia a stable member of the world community. Americans must decide how much involvement Russia can constructively absorb to promote not only short-term oil supplies but also long-term Russian development and broader U.S. foreign policy goals. Finally, the critical long-term lesson of 9/11 and other recent experiences for Americans is that even as we cultivate Russia as an ally and major source of oil, we must actively develop alternative sources of energy. In an unstable world, the United States must not forever be held hostage by other nations with their often very different cultures, institutions and interests."--Summary.

The Russian gas industry provides 50% of Russian domestic energy supplies, a substantial proportion of CIS gas supplies, and around 20% of European gas demand. Declines in production at existing fields mean that Gazprom will face increasingly difficult decisions about moving to higher cost fields on the Yamal Peninsula. The alternative will be increasing imports from Central Asian countries and allowing other Russian gas producers to increase their role in the industry. Russian exports to Europe will gradually increase and deliveries of Russian LNG will commence to Asia and the both coasts of North America. Pipeline gas deliveries to East Asian countries may have a longer time horizon. Export projects aimed at new markets will depend crucially on the maintenance of (oil and) gas prices at the levels of 2003-05. European exports will also depend on the pace of EU market liberalisation and Gazprom's ability to agree mutually acceptable terms for transit, principally with Ukraine and Belarus. Reform, liberalisation and restructuring of the Russian gas industry have been more substantial than has generally been recognised. Most important has been price reform which, in 2005, allowed Russian industrial customers to become profitable to serve at regulated prices. Price increases may significantly reduce future increases in domestic gas demand. The increasing need for production from companies other than Gazprom will ensure that liberalised access to networks expands considerably over the next decade. In the 2000s, Gazprom reclaimed its CIS gas business from intermediaries, while maintaining its de facto monopoly of exports to Europe and establishing a similar degree of authority over future exports to Asia. The merger of Gazprom and Rosneft will provide the potential to become a force in the domestic and international oil markets, particularly given the authority that the president has conferred on the company in terms of Russian energy policy.

The world’s largest exporter of oil is facing mounting problems that could send shock waves through every major economy. Gustafson provides an authoritative account of the Russian oil industry from the last years of communism to its uncertain future. The stakes extend beyond global energy security to include the threat of a destabilized Russia.

Russian Oil Supply traces the development of the Russian oil industry from its inception in the 1870s through the present. The fundamental geology of the two main producing basins (Volga-Ural and West Siberia) is presented along with a review of key production technologies. The technical, economic, and policy aspects of achieving the 1987-88 peak production are described as well as the mechanics of the production collapse that followed and, since 1999, the recovery of Russian output. The performance of Russia's major oil companies, independents and joint ventures is analyzed and conclusions drawn on the future course of production and exports.