Science And Religion In Wittgenstein S Fly Bottle

Are science and religion in accord or are they diametrically opposed to each other? The common perspectives-for or against religion-are based on the same question, "Do religion and science fit together or not?†? These arguments are usually stuck within a preconceived notion of realism which assumes that there is a 'true reality' that is independent of us and is that which we discover. However, this context confuses our understanding of both science and religion. The core concern is not the relation between science and religion, it is realism in science and religion. Wittgenstein's philosophy and developments in quantum theory can help us to untie the knots in our preconceived realism and, as Wittgenstein would say, show the fly out of the bottle. This point of view changes the discussion from science and religion competing for the discovery of the 'true reality' external to us (realism), and from claiming that reality is simply whatever we pragmatically think it is (nonrealism), to realizing the nature and interdependence of reality, language, and information in science and religion.

Wittgenstein once said, 'I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view'. However, since he never advocated any one religion many people have wondered just what this religious point of view could be. This book answers this question by clarifying the overall nature(s) of his philosophies (the early and the later) and then by exploring the idea of a religious point of view as an analogy for a philosophy. As a result, the author reveals the concordance between the later Wittgenstein and central aspects of Hebraic thought. Although perhaps this ought not to be surprising (Wittgenstein himself described his thought as 'one hundred per cent Hebraic'), the truth of the matter has been obscured by popular supposition that Wittgenstein was anti-Semitic.

Are science and religion in accord or are they diametrically opposed to each other? The common perspectives-for or against religion-are based on the same question, "Do religion and science fit together or not?†? These arguments are usually stuck within a preconceived notion of realism which assumes that there is a 'true reality' that is independent of us and is that which we discover. However, this context confuses our understanding of both science and religion. The core concern is not the relation between science and religion, it is realism in science and religion. Wittgenstein's philosophy and developments in quantum theory can help us to untie the knots in our preconceived realism and, as Wittgenstein would say, show the fly out of the bottle. This point of view changes the discussion from science and religion competing for the discovery of the 'true reality' external to us (realism), and from claiming that reality is simply whatever we pragmatically think it is (nonrealism), to realizing the nature and interdependence of reality, language, and information in science and religion.

Does Wittgenstein's philosophy lead to atheism? Is it clearly religious? Perplexingly, both of these questions have been answered in the affirmative. Despite the increasing awareness and use of Wittgenstein's philosophy within theological circles the puzzle persists: 'Does his philosophy really fit with theology?' It is helpful to show that Wittgenstein has no agenda towards atheism or religious belief in order to move ahead and properly discuss his philosophy as it stands. A study of Wittgenstein's key concepts of logic and language in his major works from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty reveals how he came to see in his later work that meaning is not simply intuitive or a consequence of solitary empirical investigation; rather, meaning is shown in how words are woven into the community of concrete life practices. A discussion of Christology and Luther's distinction between the theologian of glory and the theologian of the cross provide clear theological analogies for Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It also provides important evidence to show-through examples of scripture, liturgy, and practice-that Wittgenstein's philosophy is a useful tool that can fit with theology.

Advancing our understanding of one of the most influential 20th-century philosophers, Robert Vinten brings together an international line up of scholars to consider the relevance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas to the cognitive science of religion. Wittgenstein's claims ranged from the rejection of the idea that psychology is a 'young science' in comparison to physics to challenges to scientistic and intellectualist accounts of religion in the work of past anthropologists. Chapters explore whether these remarks about psychology and religion undermine the frameworks and practices of cognitive scientists of religion. Employing philosophical tools as well as drawing on case studies, contributions not only illuminate psychological experiments, anthropological observations and neurophysiological research relevant to understanding religious phenomena, they allow cognitive scientists to either heed or clarify their position in relation to Wittgenstein's objections. By developing and responding to his criticisms, Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion offers novel perspectives on his philosophy in relation to religion, human nature, and the mind.

This book provides an in-depth and rigorous examination of key 20th-century American thinker, Paul Holmer; his work in both theology and philosophy; and his under-explored writings on Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. On Paul Holmer identifies what is singular and significant about Holmer's work and celebrates his capacity to cut through conventional classifications and categories. It introduces readers to his thought through discussions of key issues, such as: philosophical theology, faith and reason, the church, society, science, culture, scripture and education. Rallying against the obfuscating methods of contemporary theology and philosophy, Holmer's thought is an important corrective to literal and absolutest thinking, and continues to be a unique voice in theological and philosophical debates today.

Wittgenstein criticised prevailing attitudes toward the sciences. The target of his criticisms was ‘scientism’: what he described as ‘the overestimation of science’. This collection is the first study of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism - a theme in his work that is clearly central to his thought yet strikingly neglected by the existing literature. The book explores the philosophical basis of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism; how this anti-scientism helps us understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical aims; and how this underlies his later conception of philosophy and the kind of philosophy he attacked. An outstanding team of international contributors articulate and critically assess Wittgenstein’s views on scientism and anti-scientism, making Wittgenstein and Scientism essential reading for students and scholars of Wittgenstein’s work, on topics as varied as the philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophical practice, the nature of religious belief, and the place of science in modern culture. Contributors: Jonathan Beale, William Child, Annalisa Coliva, David E. Cooper, Ian James Kidd, James C. Klagge, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Rupert Read, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, Severin Schroeder, Benedict Smith, and Chon Tejedor.

The task of the following considerations is the elucidation of the relationship of religion to thought. Every philosophical investigation with this task proceeds under the expectation that it will take into account religious self-understanding. Herein lies the special difficulty of a philosophical theory of religion. On the one hand, the philosopher of religion may not assume this self-understanding in order to avoid offering a religious theory (a theology) instead of the philosophical theory expected from him. On the other hand, he cannot by-pass religious self-understanding because this is the key to insight into the uniqueness of religious discourse. Without knowledge of this uniqueness, it is impossible to indicate the conditions under which religious statements lead to the question of truth. Even if religion cannot prescribe to philosophical investigation, whose methods the latter must apply to examine its object, it may in addition require that the standard by which it is measured be suited to grasp those special characteristics which mark it as different from other realms of life. Therefore, it may be required of the philosophical interpretation, that the question of the legitimacy and validity of religious self-understanding be treated from the very beginning as an open one, and not as one already decided. If this question is rashly decided in the negative, then all analysis of religious propositions is necessarily done along the guidelines of a method that in its foundation masks of the religious thematic.