Science And The Air Force

This book, originally published in 1969, discusses the development of the complex relationships between science and technology and warfare from the Renaissance to the 1960s. The nature of warfare has always been largely determined by contemporary technology. Instances of technological change undertaken for the sake of military advantage have also been relatively common in history. The relationships between science and warfare however have been much more variable and ambiguous. "Science, Technology, and Warfare" requires a fourth term to be complete "Management " because the primary military innovator never has been the scientist, technologist, or soldier, but rather the administrative "organizer of victory."

This history documents a watershed event within the United States Air Force -- the creation of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). As the "high technology" service, the Air Force has always searched for ways to continuously improve its science and technology enterprise. In that context, the making of AFRL was not a bureaucratic accident. Rather, it was the product of a complex mixture of historical forces and pressures at work that convinced people at all levels that the time was ripe to bring about fundamental reform in how the Air Force conducts its business of science and technology. In terms of significance, a wealth of past studies has focused on almost every aspect of the "operational" side of the Air Force. But there has been a scarcity of available scholarly studies that address the far-reaching implications of science and technology. This book is a major contribution that helps fill that gap. Organization and infrastructure are critically important components of the total science and technology picture. Thus, the manner in which its laboratory system is organized is a critical factor in the Air Force's ability to assure that it is investing in and delivering the most relevant technologies possible. This book documents how the Air Force moved from 13 separate labs to one consolidated lab. The narrative is divided into two parts. Part one addresses the reasons why the Air Force decided to consolidate its far-flung science and technology enterprise into one lab. How the new lab was implemented is the focus of part two. This study is especially revealing because the reader is given access to the inner workings and struggles of a major Air Force organizational restructuring through interviews with key individuals who participated directly in the decision-making process to establish a single lab. A chronology of the lab's creation is included. (19 tables, 22 figures, 19 photographs).

Under mandate of Section 253, Study and Report on Effectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology Program Changes, of the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. Air Force contracted with the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct the present study. In response, the NRC established the Committee on Review of the Effectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology Program Changes-composed of academics, active and retired industry executives, former Air Force and Department of Defense (DoD) civilian executives, and retired general officers with acquisition and science and technology (S&T) backgrounds. The committee was to review the effectiveness of the Air Force S&T program and, in particular, the actions that the Air Force has taken to improve the management of the program in recent years in response to concerns voiced in numerous study reports and by Congress. The committee's principal charter was to assess whether, as a whole, the changes put in place by the Air Force since 1999 are sufficient to assure that adequate technology will be available to ensure U.S. military superiority. The committee conducted four open meetings to collect information from the Air Force and its Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), the U.S Navy, the U.S. Army, and DoD. A great many factors influence any judgment of the S&T program's sufficiency in supporting future warfighter needs; these factors include threat assessment, budget constraints, technology opportunities, workforce, and program content. Given the relatively short time available for this study and considering the detailed reviews conducted annually by the SAB, the technical content of the S&T program was necessarily beyond the committee's purview. Rather, the committee focused on S&T management, including areas that have been studied many times, in depth, by previous advisory groups. Besides addressing technical content, those prior studies and congressional concerns highlighted four overarching S&T issues: advocacy and visibility, planning, workforce, and investment levels. In response, the Air Force instituted changes in S&T management. The NRC is requested to conduct a study to determine how changes to the Air Force science and technology program implemented during the past two years affect the future capabilities of the Air Force. Effectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology Program Changes reviews and assess whether such changes as a whole are sufficient to ensure the following: A. That concerns about the management of the science and technology program that have been raised by the Congress, the Defense Science Board, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, and the Air Force Association have been adequately addressed. B. That appropriate and sufficient technology is available to ensure the military superiority of the United States and counter future high-risk threats. C. That the science and technology investments are balanced to meet near-, mid-, and long-term needs of the Air Force. D. That the Air Force organizational structure provides for a sufficiently senior level advocate of science and technology to ensure an ongoing, effective presence of the science and technology community during the budget and planning process. This report also assess the specific changes to the Air Force science and technology program as whether the biannual science and technology summits provide sufficient visibility into, and understanding and appreciation of, the value of the science and technology program to the senior level of Air Force budget and policy decision makers.

This monograph on the forecasting of long-range Air Force science began as an attempt to describe the five major scientific studies undertaken by the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF)/U.S. Air Force (USAF) since the end of World War II. These reports included Toward New Horizons (1945), the Woods Hole Summer Studies (1957-1958), Project Forecast (1964), New Horizons II (1975), and Project Forecast II (1986). They seemed at first to represent nothing more than isolated efforts to predict the technological future. But shortly after initiating research on the subject, it became clear that several themes linked the five reports. Rather than a collection of unrelated analyses, common threads were seen to run through them. The realization of this pattern was surprising. Taken at face value, the reports appeared to be entirely different. They were not produced in any one place; they were not directed by people with similar backgrounds or educations. Both in number and type of participants, they differed widely. Methodologies were not at all uniform. Their conclusions varied significantly. In fact, they did not even have the same purposes. Toward New Horizons was initiated to summarize the most advanced air power technologies of World War II and project them into the future . The Woods Hole Summer Studies organized hundreds of academic scientists to predict the short and long-term military uses of space. Project Forecast had the mandate of revitalizing Air Force thinking by linking national policy issues to scientific vistas and new weapon systems. New Horizons II endeavored to point the way toward technological improvements in a period of expected scarcity. Finally, Project Forecast II sought to infuse the Air Force laboratories with new avenues of basic science research. Thus, for a variety of internal and external reasons, at roughly ten year intervals since the Second World War, the Air Force launched major science and technology forecasts.