Science Pseudo Science And Moral Values

"Every professor knows his own area, but who is able to see the whole picture?" Based on the author's background and the wide-ranging areas she has studied in the university, Gila Gat-Tilman presents articles on science, psuedo-science and moral values from an all-encompassing perspective. The first article in this book represents an overview of science and academic knowledge. Articles that follow discuss moral values, the Sabbath, experiments on animals, and the philosophical questions of certainty. Additionally, she includes the biography of two people whose influence has helped hone her viewpoint. Science has improved our lives, and pseudo-science has followed suit. But pseudo-science, built upon baseless, faulty and tendentious theories and assumptions, has won unjustified credibility, as if it was real science, and has only caused harm. In ancient times there were philosophers like Socrates who investigated the question of what is justice and what is the good. They said that one should know what is the good in order to be good. They clarified what are the values that one should hold dear. In the generations that followed, those values were sanctified by religions, were kept in a sanctified way, and improved the life of the society. In our days, the values in the Ten Commandments are not enough, because technology has markedly changed our life, increased our performance abilities, and created new layers of relationships between strangers. Inventions such as the engine, telephone, television, and the computer enable mass communication, with all the implications. For example, today, from birth to death, every person is registered and the authorities have records about them that areused to influence their educational and employment chances. The Ten Commandments are a start for establishing the basis of moral values in our day, but they are not enough. We therefore need additional basic values, which when observed in a sacrosanct way, will provide people with the ability to properly integrate their social life into our society for the good of everyone. The author has a broad, varied academic knowledge in many fields. Her keen ability to focus on what is happening to others and put herself in their position has enabled her to see the bigger picture in society and to understand which values are lacking and must be widely adopted. This book offers these moral values.

This volume collects the papers presented at a conference on “Science, Pseudo–science and Society,” sponsored by the Calgary Institute for the Humanities and held at the University of Calgary, May 10–12, 1979. More than many such collections, this one preserves some trace of the intellectual excitement which surrounded this gathering of scholars. A primary inspiration for the symposium on “Science, Pseudoscience, and Society” was a growing awareness of the crucial role the study of pseudo–science plays in the areas of contemporary scholarship which are concerned with the nature of science and its relationship to broader social issues. This volume is organized around three major questions concerning the relationships among science, pseudo–science, and society. The papers in the first section address the question of whether it is possible to draw a sharp demarcation between science and pseudo–science and what the criteria of that demarcation might be. The papers in the second section, recognizing the historical importance of various of the pseudo–sciences, consider their impact—positive or negative—on the development of the sciences themselves. The papers in the third section deal with the question of the relationship between the sciences and pseudo–sciences, on the one hand, and social factors on the other.

The idea that science is or should be value-free, and that values are or should be formed independently of science, has been under fire by philosophers of science for decades. Science and Moral Imagination directly challenges the idea that science and values cannot and should not influence each other. Matthew J. Brown argues that science and values mutually influence and implicate one another, that the influence of values on science is pervasive and must be responsibly managed, and that science can and should have an influence on our values. This interplay, he explains, must be guided by accounts of scientific inquiry and value judgment that are sensitive to the complexities of their interactions. Brown presents scientific inquiry and value judgment as types of problem-solving practices and provides a new framework for thinking about how we might ethically evaluate episodes and decisions in science, while offering guidance for scientific practitioners and institutions about how they can incorporate value judgments into their work. His framework, dubbed “the ideal of moral imagination,” emphasizes the role of imagination in value judgment and the positive role that value judgment plays in science.

Sam Harris dismantles the most common justification for religious faith--that a moral system cannot be based on science.

In April 2002, the U.S. National Academies hosted an interacademy workshop involving participants from the United States and Iran on the topic of Science and Ethics. The explicit purposes of the workshop were (a) to engage important members of the American and Iranian scientific communities in meaningful discussions of the topic of science and ethics and particularly differences in the approaches in the west and in Islamic countries in general and Iran in particular, (b) to encourage greater participation by Iranian scientists in international scientific discussions by exposing them to seasoned veterans in international meetings, and (c) to identify specific topics and approaches that could be carried out by the Academies in the two countries to contribute to international understanding of the importance of considering the ethical dimensions of scientific research and related activities. This report includes documents prepared by four breakout groups and a statement on priority areas for future interacademy cooperation developed at the final plenary session. Also included are background papers prepared by some participants prior to the workshop that were not previously published.

This volume collects the papers presented at a conference on “Science, Pseudo–science and Society,” sponsored by the Calgary Institute for the Humanities and held at the University of Calgary, May 10–12, 1979. More than many such collections, this one preserves some trace of the intellectual excitement which surrounded this gathering of scholars. A primary inspiration for the symposium on “Science, Pseudoscience, and Society” was a growing awareness of the crucial role the study of pseudo–science plays in the areas of contemporary scholarship which are concerned with the nature of science and its relationship to broader social issues. This volume is organized around three major questions concerning the relationships among science, pseudo–science, and society. The papers in the first section address the question of whether it is possible to draw a sharp demarcation between science and pseudo–science and what the criteria of that demarcation might be. The papers in the second section, recognizing the historical importance of various of the pseudo–sciences, consider their impact—positive or negative—on the development of the sciences themselves. The papers in the third section deal with the question of the relationship between the sciences and pseudo–sciences, on the one hand, and social factors on the other.

By investigating the re-emergence of intellectual, moral, and civic virtues in the practice and teaching of science, this text challenges the increasing professionalization of science; questions the view of scientific knowledge as objective; and highlights the relationship between democracy and science. Written by a range of experts in science, the history of science, education and philosophy, the text establishes the historical relationship between natural philosophy and the Aristotelian virtues before moving to the challenges that the relationship faces, with the emergence, and increasing hegemony, brought about by the professionalization of science. Exploring how virtues relate to citizenship, technology, and politics, the chapters in this work illustrate the ways in which virtues are integral to understanding the values and limitations of science, and its role in informing democratic engagement. The text also demonstrates how the guiding virtues of scientific inquiry can be communicated in the classroom to the benefit of both individuals and wider societies. Scholars in the fields of Philosophy of Science, Ethics and Philosophy of Education, as well as Science Education, will find this book to be highly useful.