Securing The Future Of Afghanistan

The authors describe possible regional security structures and bilateral U.S. relationships with Iraq and Afghanistan. They recommend that the United States offer a wide range of security cooperation activities to compatible future governments in Kabul and Baghdad but should also plan to hedge against less-favorable contingencies. They emphasize that the U.S. Air Force should expect to remain heavily tasked for the foreseeable future.

The Committee's report focuses on the planned withdrawal of combat troops at the end of 2014 and the transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces. It also examines the progress towards a secure and stable Afghanistan within the wider region, including Pakistan, and the plans by the UK, NATO and other allies for a smooth transition of responsibility for security to the Afghan Government and the ANSF. Securing the future of Afghanistan requires the concerted efforts of all the Afghan people; regional neighbours, in particular Pakistan; the USA; NATO and other coalition partners. In the process of establishing a peaceful and functioning Afghanistan, the Committee calls for evidence of: (i) At least the start of an Afghan-led peace settlement with the insurgency; (ii) Open and free elections; (iii) An appropriately trained and equipped ANSF with continuing financial support; (iii) A strong judicial system which protects the human rights of all Afghans; (iv) Economic development aid to continue in support of the well being and safety of all sections of society; (v) Effective measures to tackle corruption, drug production and the drug trade. The MoD needs to work with international partners and the ANSF to identify ways of meeting significant gaps in necessary capabilities such as helicopters and close air support and medical care from 2015. The Defence Committee concludes that at the end of UK operations the best the UK will be able to do is to withdraw in good order and engage with external partners to improve Afghanistan's future prospects.

Government response to HC 413 of session 2012-13 (ISBN 9780215056771). Incorrect session years given after 'third special report of ....'

Canada's commitment in Afghanistan matters because it concerns global and Canadian security, Canada's international reputation, and the well-being of some of the world's most impoverished and vulnerable people.

Iraq and Afghanistan arguably present the most pressing foreign and defense policy concerns for the United States today. Years after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States continues to expend considerable diplomatic, economic, and military resources -- not to mention the personal sacrifices of U.S. troops and civilians -- on pursuing security and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much of the focus of the United States and its coalition partners understandably remains on near-term efforts to stabilize the two countries. However, even after more than six years of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and more than four in Iraq, there is a lack of clarity within U.S. policy and planning circles and among the governments and peoples of the two countries and their neighbors about the United States' long-term intentions and objectives. Yet it is clear that lasting security and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan are critical to U.S. interests, which include promoting regional stability, ensuring access to resources, and defeating global terrorism. Advancing these interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the surrounding regions will require a long-term role for U.S. military forces, though one that probably falls short of the current military presence. Continued uncertainty about the types of long-term security relationships the United States intends to pursue, and the nature and degree of military presence they imply, can undermine these interests. Envisioning future security relationships in more concrete terms can do the following: (1) help communicate U.S. intentions; (2) build U.S. leverage, influence, and access; (3) guide current and future security cooperation efforts; and (4) help plan future U.S. military activities in the Middle East and Central and South Asia.

This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war

This unique report was issued in December 2018. The principle goal of the South Asia Strategy is to conclude the war in Afghanistan on terms favorable to Afghanistan and the United States. Over the past 16 months, the United States and its partners have used military force to drive the Taliban towards a durable and inclusive political settlement. There have been some notable developments - the Eid al-Fitr ceasefire and the support for peace from the broader Islamic community - which threatened the legitimacy of the Taliban and may represent leading indicators of success. The Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR) has reinforced U.S. diplomatic engagements with Afghans, neighboring states, and interested parties in the broader region. Increased military pressure on the Taliban, international calls for peace, and the new SRAR's engagements appear to be driving the Taliban to negotiations. While an array of challenges remain-Afghan political stability, Afghan security force capacity, and regional spoilers-the combination of military escalation and diplomatic initiative have made a favorable political settlement more likely than at any time in recent memory.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Executive Summary * Section 1 - Strategy and Objectives * 1.1 U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan * 1.2 U.S. Objectives in Afghanistan * 1.3 U.S. Counterterrorism Mission * 1.4 NATO-led Resolute Support Mission * 1.5 Indications of Progress * Section 2 - Threat Assessment * 2.1 Importance of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations * 2.2 Current Security Conditions * Section 3 - Overview of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces * 3.1 ANDSF Roadmap * 3.2 ANDSF Size, Posture, and assessment * 3.3 Capabilities * Section 4 - Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army * 4.1 Ministry of Defense * 4.2 Afghan National Army * Section 5 - Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police * 5.1 Ministry of Interior * 5.2 Afghan National Police * Section 6 - Financing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces * 6.1 Holding the Afghan Ministries Accountable * 6.2 U.S. Contributions * 6.3 International Contributions * 6.4 Afghan Government ContributionsThe current military situation inside of Afghanistan remains at an impasse. The introduction of additional advisors and enablers in 2018 stabilized the situation, slowing the momentum of a Taliban march that had capitalized on U.S. drawdowns between 2011 and 2016. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) remain in control of most of Afghanistan's population centers and all of the provincial capitals, while the Taliban control large portions of Afghanistan's rural areas, and continue to attack poorly defended government checkpoints and rural district centers. The ANDSF have continued to excel in offensive operations; the bulk of their casualties have come in defense of isolated checkpoints, command posts, and bases. The ANDSF, with U.S. and coalition support, have limited new Taliban territorial gains and quickly regained control of population centers when attacked. The intensity of the fighting and level of bloodshed on both sides has risen as both sides vie for leverage at the negotiating table.