Self Regulatory Organizations

Despite the popularity of self-regulatory organizations in practice, from the perspective of organizational theory these organizations remain much a mystery. Research on institutional change suggests that the very organizations that self-regulation scholars identify as most likely to either become or spin off self-regulatory organizations are likely to resist the changes that precipitate self-regulation's emergence (Andrews, 2002; Mottl, 1980; Zald & Ussem, 1987). The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the process through which self-regulatory organizations emerge from traditional industry associations. By selecting a single prototypical case of the effective emergence of a self-regulatory organization from an existing industry level organization, I aim to understand the process and drivers of this significant organizational transformation. The case that I analyze is the development of an environmental self-regulatory certification system in the US Forest Products Industry, significant organizational transformation. I focus on two broad questions; (1) how did structural elements of the self-regulatory organization and its relationship with its external environment change in a way that allowed the organization to be taken seriously as an effective self-regulatory body, and (2) how did the rhetoric of the self-regulatory organization facilitate and contextualize these structural changes. I argue that rhetoric combines with more concrete changes, enabling industry associations to create effective self-regulatory bodies and therefore attempt to exert control and manage the rate and nature of environmental change.

Securities and Exchange Commission: Opportunities Exist to Improve Oversight of Self-Regulatory Organizations

As competition among markets has increased, so have some market participants' concerns about the inherent conflicts of interest that securities self-regulatory organizations (SRO) face in their dual roles as market operators & regulators. This report describes how the SEC, the NASD, & the NYSE have been addressing concerns about: the impact of increased competition, including demutualization, on the ability of SROs to effectively regulate members with which they compete, & possible regulator inefficiencies associated with broker-dealer membership in multiple SROs. Describes alternative approaches that some securities market participants have discusses as a means of addressing concerns about the current self-regulatory structure.

Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) (US Commodity Futures Trading Commission Regulation) (CFTC) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) (US Commodity Futures Trading Commission Regulation) (CFTC) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 29, 2018 This book contains: - The complete text of the Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) (US Commodity Futures Trading Commission Regulation) (CFTC) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section

The author examines the implications of demutualization of financial exchanges for their roles as self-regulatory organizations. Many regulators and exchanges believe that conflicts of interest increase when exchanges convert to for-profit businesses. Demutualization also changes the nature of an exchange's regulatory role as broker-dealers' ownership interests are reduced. These factors are leading to reduced regulatory roles for exchanges in many jurisdictions. The resulting changes have significant implications for regulation of financial markets, especially as exchanges are the only self-regulating organizations (SROs) in most countries. Major changes in the role of exchanges require a rethinking of the allocation of regulatory functions and the role of self-regulation, as well as stronger mechanisms to mitigate conflicts of interest. Carson looks at the views of both exchanges and regulators on these issues in Asian, European, and North American jurisdictions where major exchanges have converted to for-profit businesses. He finds that views on the conflicts of interest faced by demutualized exchanges vary widely. In addition, the tools and processes used by exchanges and regulators to manage conflicts also differ significantly across jurisdictions. The author concludes that new and greater conflicts result from demutualization and canvasses the regulatory responses in the jurisdictions examined.