Selling Reagan S Foreign Policy

In this work, distinguished political figures and journalists who worked closely with Ronald Reagan examine his role in foreign policy. Contents: Preface; Introduction. PART I: PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN POLICY; Reagan's Foreign Policy Leadership, Sterling Kernek; Reagan and the Realities of Foreign Policy, Paul H. Nitze; Reagan and International Arms Agreements, Caspar Weinberger. PART II: PERSONALITY AND POLICY-MAKING; Reagan as Decisionmaker, John C. Whitehead; Serving Reagan as Negotiator, Max M. Kampelman; Reagan's Leadership: Mystery Man or Ideological Guide? Elliott Abrams. PART III: THE REAGAN STRATEGY: PERSONAL OR INSTITUTIONAL? Administration and Technical Assistance: A.I.D.'s Western Hemisphere Program, Dwight Ink; Reagan as Foreign Policy Strategist, Paul H. Nitze; Reagan's Triumph: Personal or Institutional? Don Oberdorfer. Co-published with the Miller Center of Public Affairs.

This book examines President Reagan’s and his administration’s efforts to mobilize public and congressional support for seven of the president’s controversial foreign policy initiatives. Each chapter deals with a distinct foreign policy issue, but they each is related in one way or another to alleged threats to U.S. national security interests by the Soviet Union and its allies. When taken together these case studies clearly illustrate the book’s larger thrust: a challenge to the conventional wisdom that Reagan was the indisputable “Great Communicator.” This book contests the accepted wisdom that Reagan was an exemplary and highly effective practitioner of the going public model of presidential communication and leadership, that the bargaining model was relatively unimportant during his administration, and that the so-called public diplomacy regime was a high-value addition to the administration’s public communication assets. The author employs an analytical approach to the historical record, draws on several academic disciplines and grounds his arguments in extensive archival and empirical research. The book concludes that the public communication efforts of the Reagan administration in the field of foreign policy were neither exceptionally skillful nor notably successful, that the public diplomacy regime had more negative than positive impact, that the going public model had minimal utility in the president’s efforts to sell his foreign policy initiatives, and that the executive bargaining model played a central role in Reagan’s governing strategy and essentially defined his presidential leadership role in the area of foreign policy making. This study vividly demonstrates the enormous gap between the real-word Reagan and the one that often exists in public mythology.

Using a comparative case study method, Scott examines the historical, intellectual, and ideological origins of the Reagan Doctrine as it was applied to Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Scott draws on many previously unavailable government documents and a wide range of primary material to show both how this policy in particular, and American foreign policy in general, emerges from the complex, shifting interactions between the White House, Congress, bureaucratic agencies, and groups and individuals from the private sector."--

Contrary to widely held views of Ronald Reagan as a reflexive man of action, John Arquilla's sharply revisionist study argues that he was drawn to and driven by ideas. In Mr. Arquilla's view, Reagan during his presidency articulated important new concepts that fundamentally reshaped American foreign policy. He saw the effort simply to contain Soviet expansion as too defensive in nature, so he replaced it with a doctrine designed to help others free themselves from totalitarian rule. He objected to the notion of mutual nuclear deterrence on practical and ethical grounds, a stand that led him to negotiate arms reductions as well as explore the possibility of missile defense. On these issues, as Mr. Arquilla shows, Reagan overturned a long-standing consensus of public and expert opinion, helping achieve a favorable end to the cold war and the arms race that came with it. Yet there were also areas in which Reagan s policies played out less successfullyhis inattention to the consequences of nuclear proliferation by smaller powers like Pakistan; his indecision in launching a preventive war against terrorism in the mid-1980swith consequences that continue to haunt us today.

Contains the speeches on U.S. foreign policy made since Ambassador Kirkpatrick became U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Among subjects she has spoken about are human rights, Israel, Namibia and South Africa, and Central America.

Central America was the final place where U.S. and Soviet proxy forces faced off against one another in armed conflict. In The Cold War’s Last Battlefield, Edward A. Lynch blends his own first-hand experiences as a member of the Reagan Central America policy team with interviews of policy makers and exhaustive study of primary source materials, including once-secret government documents, in order to recount these largely forgotten events and how they fit within Reagan’s broader foreign policy goals. Lynch’s compelling narrative reveals a president who was willing to risk both influence and image to aggressively confront Soviet expansion in the region. He also demonstrates how the internal debates between competing sides of the Reagan administration were really an argument about the basic thrust of U.S. foreign policy, and that they anticipated, to a remarkable degree, policy discussions following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks.