Separate But Loyal

Beijing has faced the challenge of granting autonomy to ethnic minorities but maintaining their loyalty to the Chinese state. This paper tackles complex issues of ethnic identity and nationalism among the most politically sensitive groups in China: the Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Huis, and Kazaks. Specifically, it draws on original research conducted by the authors, the 2006-2007 Chinese Ethnicity Surveys, to explore the extent to which ethnic minorities are sinicized and the meaning of being Chinese. With an analysis of current arguments about whether national identity in contemporary China is based on a Han-dominant Confucian tradition or a multiethnic society that originated during the Qing empire, Separate but Loyal examines ethnic identity through the lens of ethnic-language learning, religious practices, and interethnic marriage. It also provides an illuminating comparison of perceptions of group identity and national identity in China with those in the United States and Russia. The survey points to some surprising findings, including the fact that ethnic minorities in China showed higher levels of both ethnic identity and national identity than U.S. and Russian respondents. These findings seem to support the argument that national identity is based on the multiethnic Chinese state, and they offer a rare empirical perspective on how the government can maintain the balance needed to preserve its legitimacy.

Federal provincial relations, Ontario Politics.

Loyal Subjects considers how the Civil War complicated the cultural value of emotion, especially the ideal of sympathy.

In 1906 and 1907 I gave, as a part of my regular work at the Summer School of Harvard University, an “Introduction to Ethics, with Special. Reference to the Interests of Teachers” A few lectures, summing up the main principles that lay at the basis of this ethical course as it had been given in the summer of 1906, were delivered in January and February, 1907, before a general academic audience, during a brief visit of mine at the University of Illinois. In several other places, both in the West and in the East, I have also presented portions of my views upon ethics; and in the summer of 1907 four general lectures on the topic were repeated before the Summer School of Theology at Harvard. In November and December of 1907, the lectures that constitute the present book were delivered for the first time before the Lowell Institute in Boston. visiting lecturer, to give to undergraduate students at Yale University in weekly class meetings. The present book, although in this way related to present and past academic tasks, is, nevertheless, not a text-book, and does not mean to be elaborately technical philosophical research. It is simply an appeal to any reader who may be fond of ideals, and who may also be willing to review his own ideals in a somewhat new light and in a philosophical spirit. Loyalty is indeed an old word, and to my mind a precious one; and the general idea of loyalty is still far older than the word, and is immeasurably more precious. But this idea has nearly always been confused in men's minds by its chance social and traditional associations. Everybody has heard of loyalty; most prize it; but few perceive it to be what, in its inmost spirit, it really is, —the heart of all the virtues, the central duty amongst all duties. In order to be able to see that this is the true meaning of the idea of loyalty, one has to free this idea from its unessential if somewhat settled associations with this or that special social habit or circumstance. And in order to accomplish this latter end, one has indeed to give to the term a more exact meaning than popular usage defines. It is this freeing of the idea of loyalty from its chance and misleading associations; it is this vindication of the spirit of loyalty as the central spirit of the moral and reasonable life of man, —t is this that I believe to be somewhat new about my “Philosophy of Loyalty” The conception of “Loyalty to Loyalty”, as set forth in my third lecture, constitutes the most significant part of this ethical task. For the rest, if my philosophy is, as a theory, more or less new, I am still only trying to make articulate what I believe to be the true spirit and meaning of all the loyal, whoever they may be, and however they define their fidelity. The result of conceiving duty in terms of the conception of loyalty which is here expounded is, indeed, if I am right, somewhat deep-going and transforming, not only for ethics, but for most men's views of truth and reality, and of religion. My own general philosophical opinions have been set forth in various works some time since (most elaborately in the volumes entitled “The World and the Individual”). I have no change to report in my fundamental metaphysical theses. But I have not published any formulation of my ethical opinions since the brief review of ethical problems in the first part of my “Religious Aspect of Philosophy” (published in 1885). One learns a good deal about ethics as one matures. And I believe that this present statement of mine ought to help at least some readers to see that such philosophical idealism as I have long maintained is not a doctrine remote from life, but is in close touch with the most practical issues; and that religion, as well as daily life, has much to gain from the right union of ethics with a philosophical theory of the real world. At the moment there is much speech, in current philosophical literature, regarding the “nature of truth“ and regarding “pragmatism” An ethical treatise very naturally takes advantage of this situation to discuss the relation between the “practical” and —the Eternal. I have done so in my closing lectures. In order to do so, I have had to engage in a certain polemic regarding the problem of truth, —a polemic directed against certain opinions recently set forth by one of the “dearest of my friends, and by one of the most loyal of men; my teacher for a while in my youth; my honoured colleague for many years, —Professor William James. Such a polemic would be indeed much out of place in a book upon Loyalty, were it not that my friend and myself fully agree that, to both of us, truth indeed “is the greater friend” Had I not very early in my work as a student known Professor James, I doubt whether any poor book of mine would ever have been written, —least of all the present one. What I personally owe him, then, I most heartily and affectionately acknowledge. But if he and I do not see truth in the same light at present, we still do well, I think, as friends, each to speak his mind as we walk by the way, and then to wait until some other light shines for our eyes. I suppose that so to do is loyalty. Meanwhile, I am writing, in this book, not merely and not mainly for philosophers, but for all those who love, as I said, ideals, and also for those who love, as I may now add, their country, —a country so ripe at present for idealism, and so confused, nevertheless, by the vastness and the complication of its social and political problems. To simplify men's moral issues, to clear their vision for the sight of the eternal, to win hearts for loyalty, —this would be, in this land, a peculiarly precious mission, if indeed I could hope that this book could aid, however little, towards such an end. Amongst the numerous friends to whom (whether or no they agree with all my views) I am especially indebted for direct and indirect aid in preparing this book, and for criticisms and other suggestions, I must mention: first, my wife, who has constantly helped me with her counsel, and in the revision of my text; then, my sister, Miss Ruth Royce, of San José, California, with whom I discussed the plan of the work in the summer of 1907; then, Doctor and Mrs. R. C. Cabot of Boston; Doctor J. J. Putnam of Boston; and, finally, my honoured colleague, Professor George H. Palmer....FROM THE BOOKS.

This work engages Royce's moral theory, revealing how loyalty rather than being just one virtue among others, is central to living a genuinely moral and meaningful life. Foust shows how the theory of loyalty Royce advances can be brought to bear on issues such as the partiality/impartiality debate in ethical theory.

Political Loyalty and the Nation-State examines the gradual weakening of the state's ability to order the political allegiances of its subjects. At the focal centre of the book lies the question of the extent to which it is possible to invest political principles, such as the rules and procedures of democracy, with a sentiment of loyalty and whether political loyalty can become merely a matter of choice and personal responsibility. The authors consider theoretical issues, problems of loyalty arising from population movement and case studies of conflicts of loyalty from Italy, Northern Ireland, and Russia. It is shown that loyalty can become decoupled from state, territory and nation; that loyalties can be multiple; and that today's loyalties reflect advanced attitudes towards difference.

An examination of the nature and virtuousness of loyalty and of some of its primary associations: friends, families, organizations, professions, nations, countries (patriotism), and religion (absolute loyalty). Loyalty is distinguished from its cognates and contrasts, its role in human associative life is articulated, and its status as a virtue is defended. The particularist-universalist debate is addressed, the idea of a loyal opposition explored, and its limits defined.