Socrates Education To Virtue

Socrates' Education to Virtue argues that Plato's account of Socrates offers the fullest account of virtue and of the place of virtue in political life. Focusing on Platonic dramas such as the Symposium, Alcibiades Major, and the Republic, Lutz recounts how Socrates came to understand the longing for the "noble" and to believe that this longing is best satisfied by the search for knowledge or wisdom. By scrutinizing how Socrates' conversations allow him to acquire, extend, and confirm his knowledge of eros and of noble virtue, the book recovers a powerful, concrete, and nondogmatic Platonic reply to ancient critics of philosophy such as Aristophanes and suggests a further Platonic response to modern critics of classical rationalism such as Nietzsche and Rorty. Moreover, it shows how Socrates' education to virtue teaches him that the philosopher must always respect and examine alternative accounts of nobility and excellence. The book argues that the recovery of Socratic education can strengthen liberal democracy not only by broadening and invigorating political, moral, and religious debate but also by serving as an example of virtue in an open society.

Argues that Plato's dialogues contain a surprisingly neglected account of Socrates' education about the love of noble virtue and that recovering this education could help broaden and deepen liberalism's moral and political horizon.

This book develops for the readers Plato’s Socrates’ non-formalized “philosophical practice” of learning-through-questioning in the company of others. In doing so, the writer confronts Plato’s Socrates, in the words of John Dewey, as the “dramatic, restless, cooperatively inquiring philosopher" of the dialogues, whose view of education and learning is unique: (1) It is focused on actively pursuing a form of philosophical understanding irreducible to truth of a propositional nature, which defies “transfer” from practitioner to pupil; (2) It embraces the perennial “on-the-wayness” of education and learning in that to interrogate the virtues, or the “good life,” through the practice of the dialectic, is to continually renew the quest for a deeper understanding of things by returning to, reevaluating and modifying the questions originally posed regarding the “good life.” Indeed Socratic philosophy is a life of questioning those aspects of existence that are most question-worthy; and (3) It accepts that learning is a process guided and structured by dialectic inquiry, and is already immanent within and possible only because of the unfolding of the process itself, i.e., learning is not a goal that somehow stands outside the dialectic as its end product, which indicates erroneously that the method or practice is disposable. For learning occurs only through continued, sustained communal dialogue.

The relation between virtue and knowledge is at the heart of the Socratic view of human excellence, but it also points to a central puzzle of the Platonic dialogues: Can Socrates be serious in his claims that human excellence is constituted by one virtue, that vice is merely the result of ignorance, and that the correct response to crime is therefore not punishment but education? Or are these assertions mere rhetorical ploys by a notoriously complex thinker? Lorraine Smith Pangle traces the argument for the primacy of virtue and the power of knowledge throughout the five dialogues that feature them most prominently—the Apology, Gorgias, Protagoras, Meno, and Laws—and reveals the truth at the core of these seemingly strange claims. She argues that Socrates was more aware of the complex causes of human action and of the power of irrational passions than a cursory reading might suggest. Pangle’s perceptive analyses reveal that many of Socrates’s teachings in fact explore the factors that make it difficult for humans to be the rational creatures that he at first seems to claim. Also critical to Pangle’s reading is her emphasis on the political dimensions of the dialogues. Underlying many of the paradoxes, she shows, is a distinction between philosophic and civic virtue that is critical to understanding them. Ultimately, Pangle offers a radically unconventional way of reading Socrates’s views of human excellence: Virtue is not knowledge in any ordinary sense, but true virtue is nothing other than wisdom.

Socrates was not a moral philosopher. Instead he was a theorist who showed how human desire and human knowledge complement one another in the pursuit of human happiness. His theory allowed him to demonstrate that actions and objects have no value other than that which they derive from their employment by individuals who, inevitably, desire their own happiness and have the knowledge to use actions and objects as a means for its attainment. The result is a naturalised, practical, and demystified account of good and bad, and right and wrong. Professor Reshotko presents a freshly envisioned Socratic theory residing at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and ethics. It makes an important contribution to the study of the Platonic dialogues and will also interest all scholars of ethics and moral psychology.

Discussing Plato’s views on knowledge, recollection, dialogue, and epiphany, this ambitious volume offers a systematic analysis of the ways that Platonic approaches to education can help students navigate today’s increasingly complex moral environment. Though interest in Platonic education may have waned due to a perceived view of Platonic scholarship as wholly impractical, this volume addresses common misunderstandings of Plato’s work and highlights the contemporary relevance of Plato’s ideas to contemporary moral education. Building on philosophical interpretations, the book argues persuasively that educators might employ Platonic themes and dialogue in the classroom. Split into two parts, the book looks first to contextualise Plato’s theory of moral education within political, ethical, and educational frameworks. Equipped with this knowledge, part two then offers contemporary educators the strategies needed for implementing Plato’s educational theory within the pluralistic, democratic classroom setting. A Platonic Theory of Moral Education will be of interest to academics, researchers, and post-graduate students in the fields of: ethics; Plato scholarship; moral psychology; educational foundations; and the philosophy of education. This book would also benefit graduate students and scholars in teacher education. Mark E. Jonas is Professor of Education and Professor of Philosophy (by courtesy) at Wheaton College, US. Yoshiaki Nakazawa is Assistant Professor of Education at University of Dallas, US.

The Theory and Practice of Virtue Education offers the reader a comprehensive and authoritative account of both the theoretical and practical complexities of cultivating virtue in education and beyond. The book moves beyond the usual philosophical literature that merely discusses virtue in the abstract, and offers scholarly, research-informed suggestions for practice. Drawn from a highly successful international conference organised by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, the chapters in this volume offer a unique insight into the varieties of approaches that leading scholars have identified for putting the learning and nurturing of virtues into practice. Featured are chapters from internationally acclaimed scholars primarily in the fields of philosophy, psychology and education, which are categorised under three headings: philosophical and theoretical foundations for cultivating virtues; developing virtues in practice; and nurturing specific virtues. Beginning with chapters that examine differing theoretical complexities of virtue education, the book then moves on to explore different approaches to nurturing virtue in the classroom and beyond. This practical approach is further evidenced in the final section, where individual virtues are discussed. The Theory and Practice of Virtue Education highlights the theoretical complexity of putting virtue education into practice and, as a result, is of real use to researchers, academics and postgraduates in the fields of education, philosophy, psychology, sociology and theology. It should also be essential reading for educators in character and virtue.

It is an excellent book – highly intelligent, interesting and original. Expressing high philosophy in a readable form without trivialising it is a very difficult task and McAleer manages the task admirably. Plato is, yet again, intensely topical in the chaotic and confused world in which we are now living. Philip Allott, Professor Emeritus of International Public Law at Cambridge University This book is a lucid and accessible companion to Plato’s Republic, throwing light upon the text’s arguments and main themes, placing them in the wider context of the text’s structure. In its illumination of the philosophical ideas underpinning the work, it provides readers with an understanding and appreciation of the complexity and literary artistry of Plato’s Republic. McAleer not only unpacks the key overarching questions of the text – What is justice? And Is a just life happier than an unjust life? – but also highlights some fascinating, overlooked passages which contribute to our understanding of Plato’s philosophical thought. Plato’s 'Republic': An Introduction offers a rigorous and thought-provoking analysis of the text, helping readers navigate one of the world’s most influential works of philosophy and political theory. With its approachable tone and clear presentation, it constitutes a welcome contribution to the field, and will be an indispensable resource for philosophy students and teachers, as well as general readers new to, or returning to, the text.