Somalia Operations

The American mission in Somalia presented U. S. forces with a variety of difficult operational challenges as they tried to bring peace to a county ravaged by natural and man-made disasters. After initial success in the summer of 1992 in restoring order and saving thousands of lives, American soldiers clashed with Somali forces and were withdrawn in the spring of 1994. In the months that followed, we have studied what the Somalia experience can teach us about peace missions and learned how we might improve our capabilities across the spectrum of joint operations. This book represents the first time a new tool - the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System - is being used to evaluate an operation in its totality. With it, Colonel Kenneth Allard assesses the operation from its early stages of humanitarian relief through the de facto combat of peace enforcement. He has organized the lessons learned for ease of reading and enlivened them with numerous concrete and anecdotal examples. Although focused on the operational level, the insights of this study should be of interest to strategists and policymakers as well. Lessons are only truly learned when we incorporate them into our planning, doctrine, tactics, and training - a process which can take some time. The author has taken the essential first step by identifying and articulating the hard lessons of Somalia with candor and objectivity. But even as we resolve not to repeat mistakes, we should not allow the tragic events in the latter stages of our Somalia operations to obscure the many things we did right. These too are lessons, ones to build upon as we prepare to meet further challenges in the complex world of peace operations. Ervin J. Rokke Lieutenant General, United States Air Force President, National Defense University

The American mission in Somalia presented U.S. forces with a variety of difficult operational challenges as they tried to bring peace to a country ravaged by natural and man-made disasters. After initial success in the summer of 1992 in restoring order and saving thousands of lives, American soldiers clashed with Somali forces and were withdrawn in the spring of 1994. The author has studied what the Somalia experience can teach us about peace missions and learned how we might improve our capabilities across the spectrum of joint operations. Includes numerous concrete and anecdotal examples. Photos and maps.

This monograph explores the problem of mission creep. The trend toward ethnic and regional unrest has characterized the world security environment since the breakup of the former Soviet Union. The U.S. has struggled to find its place in the new world order. As a result US military forces have increasingly found themselves involved in various operations other than traditional warfare. Often the political aims of these operations are difficult to identify and translate into military operational objectives and end states. Worse yet, the political aims themselves are prone to rapidly shift and evolve from those originally intended, leaving the military commander the difficult task of catching up with policy or even guessing at the political objectives. This uncertain environment sets the conditions for the delinkage between the political goal and military operations which may result in disaster. The monograph examines US operations in Somalia to provide the data for the analysis in order to determine the factors which contribute to mission creep. Examining US-Somalia policy from 1992 (Operation Restore Hope) to Oct. 1993 (United Nations Operations in Somalia II) this monograph analyses the evolution of national policy objectives and the military and political operations undertaken to achieve those objectives. An analysis of operational and tactical objectives and end states as well as military methods determines the factors which contributed to the failed US involvement in UNOSOM II. In addition, the monograph identifies the Somali geo-political, historical, cultural, and economic factors which influenced US operations. This monograph concludes that contradictory and uncoordinated national strategy and political policy resulted in poor operational planning and execution. There were also significant factors at the operational level which contributed to the failed US intervention.

The American mission in Somalia presented the U.S. forces with a variety of difficult operational challenges as they tried to bring peace to a country ravaged by natural and man-made disasters. The author has taken the essential first step by identifying and articulating the hard lessons of Somalia with candor and objectivity.

Because of lack of planning, the top UNOSOM II military commanders had no understanding of the transition; the number, capability, or concept of employment of their forces; or the rules of engagement (ROE). Their staff consisted only of that assembled hastily for them by UNITAF from its component units which would stay for UNOSOM II and they received only weak support from the inexperienced, undermanned, and overworked UN Secretariat staff. (At this time the Secretary General's military advisor had a staff of only two officers. Two years later, by the time planning began for UNMIH, this office had expanded to over one hundred experienced officers). Given this background, it is not surprising that UNOSOM II encountered the difficulties it did.

Partial contents include: (I) The Operational Context-The U.N. and Peace Operations; Joint Doctrine; The Effects of the Operational Environment; Situations and Missions; (II) Operational Lessons Learned-(1) Planning-Mandates and Missions; Mission Analysis: Entry and Exit Strategies; Multinational Conflicts; Rules of Engagement; Personnel Selection and Training; Joint Planning; (2) Deployment-Airlift; Sealift; Pre-Positioned Shipping; Administrative Requirements; (3) Conduct of Operation-Command and Control; Mission Execution; Civil-Military Operations; Negotiations; Intelligence; (4) Support-Communications and Interoperability; In-Country Logistics; Medical; Media.

The American mission in Somalia presented U.S. forces with a variety of difficult operational challenges as they tried to bring peace to a country ravaged by natural and man-made disasters. After initial success in the summer of 1992 in restoring order and saving thousands of lives, American soldiers clashed with Somali forces and were withdrawn in the spring of 1994. In the months that followed, we have studied what the Somalia experience can teach us about peace missions and learned how we might improve our capabilities across the spectrum of joint operations. This book represents the first time a new tool-the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System-is being used to evaluate an operation in its totality. With it, Colonel Kenneth Allard assesses the operation from its early stages of humanitarian relief through the de facto combat of peace enforcement. He has organized the lessons learned for ease of reading and enlivened them with numerous concrete and anecdotal examples. Although focused on the operational level, the insights of this study should be of interest to strategists and policymakers as well. Lessons are only truly learned when we incorporate them into our planning, doctrine, tactics, and training-a process which can take some time. The author has taken the essential first step by identifying and articulating the hard lessons of Somalia with candor and objectivity. But even as we resolve not to repeat mistakes, we should not allow the tragic events in the latter stages of our Somalia operations to obscure the many things we did right. These too are lessons, ones to build upon as we prepare to meet further challenges in the complex world of peace operations. Chapter I - The Operational Context * The U.N. and Peace Operations * Joint Doctrine * The Effects of the Operational Environment * Situations and Missions * Chapter II - Operational Lessons Learned * Planning * Mandates and Missions * Mission Analysis: Entry and Exit Strategies * Multinational Contingents * Rules of Engagement (ROE) * Personnel Selection and Training * Joint Planning * Deployment * Airlift * Sealift * Pre-positioned Shipping * Administrative Requirements * Conduct of Operations * Command and Control * Mission Execution * Civil-Military Operations * Negotiations * Intelligence * Support * Communications and Interoperability * In-Country Logistics * Medical * Media * Chapter III - Conclusions * Appendix A: Selected Bibliography * Joint Publications * Multi-Service Publications * U.S. Army Publications * U.S. Navy Publications * U. S. Marine Corps Publications * U. S. Air Force Publications * National Defense University Publications * Appendix B: Humanitarian Relief Organizations Active in Somalia * United Nations Humanitarian Agencies