Sovereign Default Risk And Private Sector Access To Capital In Emerging Markets

Top down spillovers of sovereign default risk can have serious consequences for the private sector in emerging markets. This paper analyzes the effects of these spillovers using firm-level data from 31 emerging market economies. We assess how sovereign risk affects corporate access to international capital markets, in the form of external credit (loans and bond issuances) and equity issuances. The study first analyzes the impact of sovereign debt crises during the 1980s and 1990s. It goes on to examine the 1993 to 2007 period, using additional measures of sovereign risk-sovereign bond spreads and sovereign ratings-as explanatory variables. Overall, we find that sovereign default risk is a crucial determinant of private sector access to capital, be it external debt or equity. We also find that crisis resolution patterns matter and that defaults towards private creditors have stronger adverse consequences than defaults to official creditors.

This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.

This paper builds a model of a sovereign borrower that has access to credit from private sector creditors and an IFI. Private sector creditors and the IFI offer different debt contracts that are modelled based on the institutional frameworks of these two types of debt. We analyze the decisions of a sovereign on how to allocate its borrowing needs between these two types of creditors, and when to default on its debt to the private sector creditor. The numerical analysis shows that, consistent with the data; the model predicts countercyclical IFI debt along with procyclical commercial debt flows, also matching other features of the data such as frequency of IFI borrowing and mean IFI debt stock.

We analyze the long-run impact of emerging-market sovereign bond yields on corporate bond yields, finding that the average pass-through is around one. The pass-through is larger in countries with greater sovereign risks and where sovereign bonds are more liquid. It is also greater for corporate bonds with lower ratings, shorter maturities, and for those issued by financial companies and government-related firms. Our results support theoretical arguments that corporate and sovereign yields are linked together through credit risks and liquidity premiums. Consequently, high sovereign risks may slowdown growth by persistently increasing private sector borrowing costs.

This paper proposes a new empirical measure of cooperative versus conflictual crisis resolution following sovereign default and debt distress. The index of government coerciveness is presented as a proxy for excusable versus inexcusable default behaviour and used to evaluate the costs of default for the domestic private sector, in particular its access to international debt markets. Our findings indicate that unilateral, aggressive sovereign debt policies lead to a strong decline in corporate access to external finance (loans and bond issuance). We conclude that coercive government actions towards external creditors can have strong signalling effects with negative spillovers on domestic firms. "Good faith" debt renegotiations may be crucial to minimize the domestic costs of sovereign defaults.

The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.

The history of debt relief goes back several decades. It reveals that a country s accumulation of unsustainable debt stems from such factors as deficiencies in macroeconomic management, adverse terms-of-trade shocks, and poor governance. Debt-relief initiatives have provided debt-burdened countries with the opportunity for a fresh start, but whether the benefits of debt relief can be preserved depends on transformations in a country s policies and institutions. In 1996, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was launched as the first comprehensive, multilateral, debt-relief framework for low-income countries. In 2005, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative was established, which increased the level of debt relief provided to HIPCs. As of early 2009, assistance through these two initiatives had been committed to 35 countries and amounted to US$117 billion in nominal terms, or half of the 2007 GDP of these countries. 'Debt Relief and Beyond' assesses the implications of debt relief for low-income countries and how its benefits can be preserved and used to fight poverty. The chapter authors bring unique operational experience to their examination of debt relief, debt sustainability, and debt management. Several key questions are addressed, including, what consequences does debt relief have for poverty-reducing expenditures, growth, and access to finance? Can debt relief guarantee debt sustainability? How can debt management at all levels of government be improved? What lessons can be learned from countries that have experienced debt restructuring? Finally, this book provides sound empirical evidence using current econometric techniques.

Emerging markets business cycle models treat default risk as part of an exogenous interest rate on working capital, while sovereign default models treat income fluctuations as an exogenous endowment process with ad-noc default costs. We propose instead a general equilibrium model of both sovereign default and business cycles. In the model, some imported inputs require working capital financing; default on public and private obligations occurs simultaneously. The model explains several features of cyclical dynamics around default triggers an efficiency loss as these inputs are replaced by imperfect substitutes; and default on public and private obligations occurs simultaneously. The model explains several features of cyclical dynamics around deraults, countercyclical spreads, high debt ratios, and key business cycle moments.