Soviet Decision Making For Defense

This book, first published in 1984, analyses the critically important Cold War issue of the Soviet national security decision-making process dealing with weapons acquisition, arms control and the application of military force. It conceptualises Soviet decision-making for national security from Stalinist antecedents to 1980s modes, and examines the problems of decision-making concerning weapons development, defence research and development and SALT negotiations. It also focuses on the decision-making processes which led to the use or threatened use of military force in Czechoslovakia (1968), the Middle East (1973) and Afghanistan (1979).

The importance to Western policymakers of determining the significance of Soviet strategic arms decisions is matched by the difficulty of doing so. The high stakes involved and, in many cases, the inadequacy of evidence can all too easily lead to generalizations that rest more on passionate conviction than on accepted principles of scholarly inquir

Soviet perceptions of American strategic doctrine have influenced then-use of military power in foreign policy. An understanding of how those perceptions are being derived at and of their specific contents is therefore essential to any reflection on direction that American defense policy should take. Particularly in the field of arms control and disarmament, Soviet perceptions carry severe implications for U.S. proposals as well as general behavior. Lockwood bases his examination on Soviet sources such as newspapers, periodicals, radio broadcasts, and books. He establishes that Soviet analysts tend to project their own notions of clear strategy onto U.S. doctrine and intentions. Starting from the premise that the Soviets mean what they say Lockwood is able to give a historical account of Soviet perceptions starting from "massive retaliation" up to and including Presidential Directive 59. In his final chapter, the author gives possible policy strategies to successfully counteract the Soviet military policy.

Om beslutningstagen i militær/forsvarssammenhæng. Forfatteren er tidligere Secretary of Defense og giver en oversigt over forsvarsplanlægningen i USA 1789-1960, og redegør for moderne programmering og budgettering, cost-effectivenessanalyser, m.m.

Bogen handler om de tekniske og især politiske ideologiske problemer i forbindelse med udviklingen af det strategiske missilsystem MIRV (Multiple Independentlytargetable Reentry Vehicle).