Soviet Night Operations In World War Ii

This study examines the extensive experiences of the Soviet Army as it struggled to master the night. Driven by necessity to operate in the relative safety of darkness, the Soviet Army in World War II learned to capitalize on night operations and to exploit that capability in its quest for victory over the German Army, The Soviets have not forgotten that experience, and since the war, they have emphasized the advantages of night combat. As they train for night operations, they closely study the experiences of World War II in the belief that certain basic techniques and conditions of battle transcend time and the vagaries of technological change.

Surprise is a vital ingredient in conducting successful warfare. As early as 500 B.C., the Chinese general Sun Tzu recognized this simple fact in his oft-quoted treatise on the art of war. Throughout history, commanders have employed the darkness of night to gain surprise and to grasp th.e-initiative from the hands of the enemy. Yet, while night operations have progressed from the nocturnal marches of Joshua and the exploits of Judas Maccabeus in biblical times to the more recent firefights in Vietnam and Afghanistan, problems involving special night training, control, and manpower have more often than not dissuaded commanders from attempting large-scale operations in the dark. Night combat has frequently been the recourse af the inferior military force or, as in World War II, of the army seeking either to find some respite from air power or to reduce casualties in the face of great firepower. Still, despite the difficulties associated with conducting military operations at night, military planners and leaders cannot escape one salient fact: darkness is?a double-edged weapan,? and Iike terrain,?it favors the one who best uses it and hinders the one who does not."

Contents: The Prewar Experience; Evolution of Airborne Forces During World War II; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, January-February 1942; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, February-June 1942; Operational Employment: On the Dnepr, September 1943; Tactical Employment; The Postwar Years.

"The Battle of Moscow, 1941-1942: The Red Army's Defensive Operations and Counteroffensive Along the Moscow Strategic Direction" is a detailed examination of one of the major turning points of World War II, as seen from the Soviet side. The Battle of Moscow marked the climax of Hitler's "Operation Barbarossa," which sought to destroy the Soviet Union in a single campaign and ensure German hegemony in Europe. The failure to do so condemned Germany to a prolonged war it could not win. This work originally appeared in 1943, under the title "Razgrom Nemetskikh Voisk pod Moskvoi" (The Rout of the German Forces Around Moscow). The work was produced by the Red Army General Staff's military-historical section, which was charged with collecting and analyzing the war's experience and disseminating it to the army's higher echelons. This was a collective effort, featuring many different contributors, with Marshal Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, former chief of the Red Army General Staff and then head of the General Staff Academy, serving as general editor. The book is divided into three parts, each dealing with a specific phase of the battle. The first traces the Western Front's defensive operations along the Moscow direction during Army Group Center's final push toward the capital in November-December, 1941. The study pays particular attention to the Red Army's resistance to the Germans' attempts to outflank Moscow from the north. Equally important were the defensive operations to the south of Moscow, where the Germans sought to push forward their other encircling flank. The second part deals with the first phase of the Red Army's counteroffensive, which was aimed at pushing back the German pincers and removing the immediate threat to Moscow. Here the Soviets were able to throw the Germans back and flatten both salients, particularly in the south, where they were able to make deep inroads into the enemy front to the west and northwest. The final section examines the further development of the counteroffensive until the end of January 1942. This section highlights the Soviet advance all along the front and their determined but unsuccessful attempts to cut off the Germans' Rzhev-Vyaz'ma salient. It is from this point that the front essentially stabilized, after which events shifted to the south. This new translation into English makes available to a wider readership this valuable study.

First detailed account of the Soviet advance on Berlin in the closing months of World War II The battles that made Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov famous Numerous maps illustrating how operations unfolded On January 31, 1945, the Red Army stood on a line along the Oder River, about thirty-five miles east of Berlin. They would not reach Berlin for another two months, after battles to cross the river, seize the fortress of Küstrin, and take the Seelow Heights.