Stability And Arms Control In Europe

This book examines the recent changes in strategic stability, caused by the collapse of the international security architecture. Against the background of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, international experts discuss topics and critical issues such as the revanchist strategy of Russia and the readiness of the United States (US) and Europe to give an adequate response; the influence of new technologies in the future of nuclear deterrence; and the crumbling of the arms control and nonproliferation system under the new challenges. The book explains how the combination of these factors lead to a crucial change of strategic stability and the international security landscape, the first such change since the end of the Cold War. Divided into three parts, the book presents timely analyses on (1) US, Russia: New Challenges and Strategic Stability in Europe; (2) Extended Deterrence and Arms Control in Europe; and (3) Regional Dimensions of Strategic Stability in Europe. It further offers perspectives from and case studies on different countries, such as Ukraine, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA, Turkey, Poland, and Romania. This book is a must-read for scholars for international relations, as well as policy-makers interested in a better understanding of the changing international security architecture, Russia's strategy, arms control, nonproliferation, and the future of nuclear deterrence.

This study is an attempt to examine the political, military and technical issues as well as the opportunities and pitfalls associated with conventional arms control in Europe, providing a short outline of the developments that have led to the renewed interest in conventional arms control since 1985.

This book analyzes the military situation in Europe and the contending views about the military balance and important military variables there. It provides very useful insights into what has often been a confusing debate about the true state of the military situation.

RAND's research effort to provide analytic support over the past two years to the Office of Non-Nuclear Arms Control, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, has ranged widely. First, it aided preparation for the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Implementation Review Conference held in May 1996 and, more recently, reinforced U.S. negotiations in the CFE Adaptation Talks. Over the ensuing months, the project has explored U.S. negotiating options and the consequences associated with potential new foreign arms control proposals. This report is a record of our analytic support. The report describes the main activities and involvements of the project. It features two principal chapters, one dealing with the big questions about the future of CFE and one that describes more-technical details and modeling of arms control pacts. A final chapter suggests what can be learned from the past two years of arms control support and offers some brief recommendations for the United States' conventional arms control agenda. The author counsels in this report against undertaking additional pan-European conventional arms control initiatives. To the extent that arms control will be useful in the near future, it will involve more-local agreements tailored specifically to address grievances among neighbors. Unless circumstances alter dramatically, Europe-wide negotiations will make little sense, especially in the face of NATO enlargement, for which, presumably, allies will not negotiate arms control pacts with each other.

This book is an outcome of the conference on 'Arms Control and Conventional Defense in Europe' held in West Berlin in 1987. The discussion in the conference led to several conclusions regarding the prospects for conventional arms control.

This paper sets out recommended options for initial NATO positions and tactics in the upcoming negotiations. It reviews past negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, highlighting developments that have significance for the new undertakings. It also discusses the mandates of the Conventional Stability Talks and the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The author also addresses the military and political factors which NATO must take into account when developing negotiating positions. Finally, the paper draws conclusions from the earlier discussion in this paper and sets out recommended Western negotiating positions, both substantive and tactical.