Stable Coalition Proposals In Majority Rule Voting

This volume brings together eight original essays designed to provide an overview of developments in spatial voting theory in the past ten years. The topics covered are: spatial competition with possible entry by new candidates; the "heresthetical" manipulation of vote outcomes; candidates with policy preferences; experimental testing of spatial models; probabilistic voting; voting on alternatives with predictive power; elections with more than two candidates under different election systems; and agenda-setting behavior in voting. Leading scholars in these areas summarize the major results of their own and other's work, providing self-contained discussions that will apprise readers of important recent advances.

First published in 1976, this classic volume of original essays provides a unique and comprehensive review of the approaches and assumptions that dominate the field of election studies and voting behaviour. Critical reviews of theory and established research are combined with innovative and original studies of a variety of European countries, as well as North America. The volume presents valuable comparative data and methodological insights, including statistical analyses of voting data and critical accounts of major approaches to the representation of voting and party competition. These include party identification (the socio-psychological approach); dimensional analysis (the production of party spaces based on social and political cleavages); and rational choice analysis (the interaction between voters and parties within a policy space). This edition includes a new introduction by Ian Budge.

This volume presents an analysis of the problems and solutions of the market mockery of the democratic collective decision-choice system with imperfect information structure composed of defective and deceptive structures using methods of fuzzy rationality. The book is devoted to the political economy of rent-seeking, rent-protection and rent-harvesting to enhance profits under democratic collective decision-choice systems. The toolbox used in the monograph consists of methods of fuzzy decision, approximate reasoning, negotiation games and fuzzy mathematics. The monograph further discusses the rent-seeking phenomenon in the Schumpeterian and Marxian political economies where the rent-seeking activities transform the qualitative character of the general capitalism into oligarchic socialism and making the democratic collective decision-choice system as an ideology rather than social calculus for resolving conflicts in preferences in the collective decision-choice space without violence.

Robert Aumann's career in game theory has spanned over research - from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. "When you look closely at one scientific idea", writes Aumann, "you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study". The papers are organized in several categories: general, knot theory, decision theory (utility and subjective probability), strategic games, coalitional games, and mathematical methods. Aumann has written an introduction to each of these groups that briefly describes the content and background of each paper, including the motivation and the research process, and relates it to other work in the collection and to work by others. There is also a citation index that allows readers to trace the considerable body of literature which cites Aumann's own work.

Richard McKelvey's classic papers, accompanied by original essays by leading names in the field

In this volume are papers written by students and co-authors of Stanley Reiter. The collection reflects to some extent the range of his interests and intellectual curiosity. He has published papers in statistics, manage ment science, international trade, and welfare economics. He co-authored early papers in economic history and is reported to be largely responsible for giving the field its name of Cliometrics. He helped initiate, nurture and establish the area of economics now known as mechanism design which studies information decentralization, incentives, computational complexity and the dynamics of decentralized interactions. The quality, craft, depth, and innovative nature of his work has always been at an exceptionally high level. Stan has had a strong and important direct effect on many students at Purdue University and Northwestern University. He created and taught a course which all of his students have both dreaded and respected. Using the Socratic method in remarkably effective ways to teach theory skills, he has guided, prodded, and encouraged us to levels we did not think we were capable of. Some of his students are represented in this volume. But even those whose careers took directions other than mathematical economics still consider that training to be an important component of their success. Stan's students include department chairmen, business executives, Deans, a Secretary of the Air Force, and a College President. His guidance has been necessary and fundamental to whatever successes we have had.

First published in 1984. In this book, the authors set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coalition forming behavior. These theories address situations of partial conflict of interest with the following aspects: (1) there are three or more players, (2) players may openly communicate with each other, and (3) players form coalitions by freely negotiating agreements on how to disburse the gains that result from the coalition members’ joint coordinated efforts. These models arise from the two disciplines of mathematics, in the theory of cooperative n-person games with side payments, and social psychology, in theories of small group behavior in mixed-motive situations. The goal is to explore the various solution concepts that make up this body of theory, and in particular to examine the psychological premises that underlie the various theoretical models.