Stalin S Early Cold War Foreign Policy

Immediately after the Allied WW2 victory in Europe, claims were made by the Soviet Union over the eastern regions of Turkey, to secure direct control over the Bosporus, Dardanelles, and Turkish Straits. The detailed study of the international components of these events, featuring the veiled complexities of Stalin’s anti-Turkish diplomacy, provides a key to understanding crucial aspects of these Soviet territorial claims. Iranian Azerbaijan became another hotspot of post-war confrontation between the western Allies and the USSR: Soviet policy towards Iran manifested in the desire to access their oil resources. A further direction emerging within Soviet post-war strategy was the Kurdish issue in the Near and Middle East. At the conjunction of Turkish and Iranian events, Soviet secret service bodies and diplomatic institutions exploited their strengths and toyed with Kurdish minorities in the region. Their decisions placed the bordering regions of China, Turkey, and Iran squarely in the shadowy reaches of Moscow’s policy. This research uses newly discovered archive material to illustrate the underlying intrigue behind Soviet ambition and intimately tracks how the Soviet Union was defeated in the first Cold War confrontation over its southern borders. It also links events of this period with the critical issue of Uyghur assimilation, and further contemporary developments highlighting Putin’s policies, making it invaluable for both academic and general readers.

Hasanli uses a range of newly available archival sources to unveil key aspects of the Soviet Union's relations with its southern neighbours in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Covering relations with Turkey, Iran and China, Hasanli examines how Stalin strategized Soviet influence over the Bosporus and Dardanelles, Iranian Azerbaijan and Xinjiang. At various times this involved degrees of coercion, diplomacy, espionage and mediation. While the Cold War has typically been associated with tensions in Europe, some of its earliest movements in fact occurred in Central and Western Asia. In particular, Hasanli argues, the period from 1945 to 1947 was an active phase of Soviet expansion to the south and a new Stalin-Molotov doctrine. These regions were used as a testing ground for Soviet expansionist policies, many of which were unsuccessful and thus important in the later shaping of Soviet policy towards the West. Valuable new insights from one of the foremost scholars of South Caucasia and Central Asia post-war history, for students and scholars of the Soviet Union.

Exploiting new findings from former East Bloc archives and from long-ignored Western sources, this book presents a wholly new picture of the coming of World War II, Allied wartime diplomacy, and the origins of the Cold War. The author reveals that the story - widely believed by historians and Western wartime leaders alike - that Stalin's purposes in European diplomacy from 1938 on were mainly defensive is a fantasy. Indeed, this is one of the longest enduring products of Stalin's propaganda, of long-term political control of archival materials, and of the gullibility of Western observers. The author argues that Stalin had concocted a plan for bringing about a general European war well before Hitler launched his expansionist program for the Third Reich. Stalin expected that Hitler's war, when it came, would lead to the internal collapse of the warring nations, and that military revolts and proletarian revolutions like those of World War I would break out in the capitalist countries. This scenario foresaw the embattled proletarians calling for the assistance of the Red Army, which would sweep across Europe. The book further shows that the wartime disputes between Stalin and his Western allies originated over the postwar redisposition of the territories Stalin had gained from his pact with Hitler. The situation was complicated by the incautious, unrestricted commitment of support to the Soviet Union first by Churchill and then by Roosevelt, and wartime circumstances provided cover to obscure these diplomatic failures. The early origins of the Cold War described in this book differ dramatically from the usual accounts that see a sudden and surprising upwelling of Cold War antagonisms late in the War or early in the postwar period.

In the first analysis of the start of the Cold War from a Soviet viewpoint, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe draws on Russian source material to reach some startling conclusions. She challenges the prevailing orthodoxy of Western historians to show how Moscow saw the presence of US troops in Europe in the 1940s and early 1950s as advantageous rather than as a check on Soviet ambitions. The author points to a complex web of concerns than fuelled Moscow's actions, and explores how the Soviet leadership, and Stalin in particular, responded to American policy. She shows how the Soviet experience of the United States and Europe, both before, during and after the Second World War, led Moscow to a policy that was not simply fuelled by anti-Americanism. Six chapters cover events from the wartime conferences of 1943 until the death of Stalin. A final chapter places the book in the context of the current debate over the causes of the Cold War.

Debating the Origins of the Cold War examines the coming of the Cold War through Americans' and Russians' contrasting perspectives and actions. In two engaging essays, the authors demonstrate that a huge gap existed between the democratic, capitalist, and global vision of the post-World War II peace that most Americans believed in and the dictatorial, xenophobic, and regional approach that characterized Soviet policies. The authors argue that repeated failures to find mutually acceptable solutions to concrete problems led to the rapid development of the Cold War, and they conclude that, given the respective concerns and perspectives of the time, both superpowers were largely justified in their courses of action. Supplemented by primary sources, including documents detailing Soviet espionage in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s and correspondence between Premier Josef Stalin and Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov during postwar meetings, this is the first book to give equal attention to the U.S. and Soviet policies and perspectives.

In this long-awaited sequel to his acclaimed Russia's Road to the Cold War (1979), Vojtech Mastny offers a thorough history of the early years of the Cold War, drawing upon his extensive research in newly opened Soviet archives. Just as the earlier volume offered the definitive portrait of Joseph Stalin's foreign policy during World War II, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity affords readers an equally superb account of Stalin's foreign policy during his last years. Combining important new data with the fascinating insights of one of our leading authorities on Soviet affairs, this book illuminates a crucial period in recent world history.

Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, first published in 1962, reviews the constants and variables in the Soviet international course after Stalin. It examines the legacy of Stalin’s policy of Soviet imperialism, and how much his foreign policy was followed by his successors. It looks at the period of transition, the uprisings in Europe, the new Soviet course toward the ‘uncommitted nations’, Sino-Soviet relations, the ascent of Khrushchev and the stiffening of the Soviet view toward the West.

Drawing on recently declassified Soviet archival sources, this book sheds new light on how the division of Europe came about in the aftermath of World War II. The book contravenes the notion that a neutral zone of states, including Germany, could have been set up between East and West. The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin was determined to preserve control over its own sphere of German territory. By tracing Stalin's attitude toward neutrality in international politics, the book provides important insights into the origins of the Cold War.