Start Treaty And Beyond

I. Introduction -- II. Targeting, doctrine, and deterrence -- III. Options for U.S. forces -- IV. Costs of the options -- V. Nuclear forces and simulated nuclear war -- VI. Verification -- VII. Nuclear forces and international politics -- Appendix A. Details of the forces and their costs -- Appendix B. Exchange calculations -- Appendix C. Effectiveness of missile defenses -- Appendix D. Soviet forces.

Deals with the size & capabilities of U.S. & Soviet nuclear forces. The enormous size of these arsenals may be incongruous with their great destructive capacity. Others have found a very large U.S. arsenal necessary, given the difficulty of defending distant interests. Still others have viewed nuclear modern¿n. programs as bargaining chips for arms control negotiations. The START treaty, signed in 1991, is the end product of an effort to wrestle with these perspectives. But these events have overshadowed it: the transformation of the Soviet Union, concern over Iraq¿s nuclear capabilities, & Soviet Pres. Gorbachev¿s response. This study explores the issues these developments raise. It analyzes a number of possible future approaches to U.S. nuclear deterrence.

Rose Gottemoeller, the US chief negotiator of the New START treaty-and the first woman to lead a major nuclear arms negotiation-delivers in this book an invaluable insider's account of the negotiations between the US and Russian delegations in Geneva in 2009 and 2010. It also examines the crucially important discussions about the treaty between President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev, and it describes the tough negotiations Gottemoeller and her team went through to gain the support of the Senate for the treaty. And importantly, at a time when the US Congress stands deeply divided, it tells the story of how, in a previous time of partisan division, Republicans and Democrats came together to ratify a treaty to safeguard the future of all Americans. Rose Gottemoeller is uniquely qualified to write this book, bringing to the task not only many years of high-level experience in creating and enacting US policy on arms control and compliance but also a profound understanding of the broader politico-military context from her time as NATO Deputy Secretary General. Thanks to her years working with Russians, including as Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, she provides rare insights into the actions of the Russian delegation-and the dynamics between Medvedev and then-Prime Minister Vladmir Putin. Her encyclopedic recall of the events and astute ability to analyze objectively, while laying out her own thoughts and feelings at the time, make this both an invaluable document of record-and a fascinating story. In conveying the sense of excitement and satisfaction in delivering an innovative arms control instrument for the American people and by laying out the lessons Gottemoeller and her colleagues learned, this book will serve as an inspiration for the next generation of negotiators, as a road map for them as they learn and practice their trade, and as a blueprint to inform the shaping and ratification of future treaties. This book is in the Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series (General Editor: Dr. Geoffrey R.H. Burn) and has received much praise, including: “As advances in technology usher in a new age of weaponry, future negotiators would benefit from reading Rose Gottemoeller’s memoir of the process leading to the most significant arms control agreement of recent decades.” —Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State “Rose Gottemoeller’s book on the New START negotiations is the definitive book on this treaty or indeed, any of the nuclear treaties with the Soviet Union or Russia. These treaties played a key role in keeping the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union from breaking out into a civilization-ending war. But her story of the New START negotiation is no dry academic treatise. She tells with wit and charm the human story of the negotiators, as well as the critical issues involved. Rose’s book is an important and well-told story about the last nuclear treaty negotiated between the US and Russia.” —William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense “This book is important, but not just because it tells you about a very significant past, but also because it helps you understand the future.” — George Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State

This volume examines the possibility of a world without nuclear weapons. It starts from the observation that, although nuclear deterrence has long been dominant in debates about war and peace, recent events show that ridicule and stigmatization of nuclear weapons and their possessors is on the rise. The idea of non-nuclear peace has been around since the beginning of the nuclear revolution, but it may be staging a return. The first part reconstructs the criticism of nuclear peace, both past and present, with a particular emphasis on technology. The second part focuses on the most revolutionary change since the beginning of the nuclear revolution, namely the Humanitarian Initiative and the resulting Nuclear Ban Treaty (2017), which allows imagining non-nuclear peace anew. The third and last part explores the practical and institutional prospects of a peace order without nuclear weapons. If non-nuclear peace advocates want to convince skeptics, they have to come up with practical solutions in the realm of global governance or world government.

This volume sets out and examines the major issues affecting the future of strategic arms control beyond the START Treaty, beyond the old East-West confrontation, and beyond the Soviet state itself. The product of a working group convened by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it contains selected papers by an authoritative group of scholars and practitioners, among them Paul H. Nitze, former chief START negotiator and senior adviser to the Reagan administration, and Gennady K. Khromov former senior representative of Soviet military industries in the Kremlin. Addressing options for reducing strategic arms, approaches for negotiation, and the impact of factors such as cost and new technologies, Strategic Arms Control in the Post-START Era is a timely work which will inform discussion and debate at the highest levels and within the broad policy community.

This monograph was presented at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)-Carnegie Council conference connected with the Council's U.S. Global Engagement Program. In this case, the engagement in question is with Russia, and this monograph specifically addressed the issues of how those aspects of the reset policy with Moscow that concern arms control and proliferation are proceeding. It duly addresses the question of whether further reductions in strategic offensive weapons are likely anytime soon, i.e., is it possible to go beyond the parameters in the recently signed and so-called New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty with respect to reductions. Other critical issues involve the issues of missile defenses that Moscow vehemently opposes and the question of tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wishes to have Russia reduce. The asymmetries in force structures and in strategic orientations of the two or three main actors, the United States, NATO, and Russia, will make it difficult to move forward on these issues quickly. At the same time, a key component of the reset policy is to obtain Russian assistance in stopping, if not reversing, Iranian and North Korean proliferation. Here, it appears that the reset policy has reached the limit of its utility, for Russia maintains a highly ambivalent and ambiguous policy with respect to Iran and the Six-Party Talks on North Korea have reached an impasse. This monograph analyzes Russia's posture on these issues and suggests alternative courses of action for the United States to undertake with regard to Russia in order to advance U.S. goals, particularly with respect to the Korean issue. This is the first publication to come out of the conference, and this series of publications continues SSI's mandate and past record of publishing timely and substantive contributions to the debate on critical national security issues as well as its record of academic outreach with leading institutions of higher learning, research, and debate on these selfsame issues of national security.

During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today’s international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.