Statebuilding And Counterinsurgency In Oman

In the depths of the Cold War and in the wake of Britain's announcement of its intention to withdraw 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971, Britain was faced with the stark reality of a Marxist rebellion in the Dhofar province of Oman. 'State Building and Counter Insurgency in Oman' offers an exploration of the attempts by officials and politicians in Whitehall and the Gulf to reconcile attempts to protect national interests and create an effective, centralised Omani administration and security bodies, whilst maintaining the image of strategic withdrawal and the sovereign independence of Oman. This book thus provides vital information and analysis for students and researchers of Middle East History and Politics, the decline and end of empire and the policymaking processes at the heart of an imperial and military withdrawal.

Introduction -- 1. Between the Pax Britannica and the World -- 2. Events and Policy Surrounding Britain's Increasing Involvement in Oman -- 3. The Conservative Ascendancy: Getting the Troops In -- 4. Britain and Oman's Internal//External Legitimacy Dilemma -- 5. The Search for International Recognition: Britain's Role in Securing Legitimacy -- 6. British Policy, Whitehall Debates and External Aid, 1972-74 -- 7. Continuity and Change: The Labour Government and Defence Reviews -- Conclusion: Themes and Implications.

This two-volume history of counterinsurgency covers all the major and many of the lesser known examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict, addressing the various measures employed in the attempt to overcome the insurgency and examining the individuals and organizations responsible for everything from counterterrorism to infrastructure building. How and when should counterinsurgency be pursued as insurgency is growing in frequency and, conversely, while conventional warfare continues to decline as a means by which political rivals seek to impose their will upon each other? What lessons from the past should today's policymakers, strategists, military leaders, and soldiers in the field keep in mind while facing off against 21st-century insurgents? This two-volume set offers a comprehensive history of modern counterinsurgency, covering the key examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict. It identifies the political, military, social, and economic measures employed in attempting to overcome insurgency, examining the work of the individuals and organizations involved, demonstrating how success and failure dictated change from established policy, and carefully analyzing the results. Readers will gain valuable insight from the detailed assessments of the history of counterinsurgency that demonstrate which strategies have succeeded and which have failed—and why. After an introductory essay on the subject, each chapter provides historical background to the insurgency being addressed before focusing on the specific policies pursued and actions taken by the counterinsurgency force. Each section also provides an assessment of those operations, including in most cases an analysis of lessons learned and, where appropriate, their relevance to counterinsurgency operations today. The set's coverage spans modern counterinsurgencies from Europe to Asia to Africa since 1900 and includes the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan today. Its wide, international approach to the subject makes the set a prime resource for readers seeking specific information on a particular conflict or a better understanding of the general theories and practices of counterinsurgency.

Oman today is a rapidly modernizing and peaceful country on the fringes of a region in turmoil. It does, however, have a long history of internal strife. In the twentieth century, this strife took the form of two internal conflicts. The Northern Oman or al-Jabal al-Akhdar War of the 1950s was a struggle between the forces of the old tribally based Imamate and the newer Sultanate in the northern part of the country. In the Dhufar War of the 1960s-70s an anti-Sultanate - and later Marxist - front sought secession in the south. J. E. Peterson takes a detailed look at these two wars in the context of insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare. He surveys Oman's transition from a strictly traditional regime controlling only parts of the country to a modern, inclusive state, particularly in terms of security concerns. Peterson analyses the development of the Sultanate's successful responses to security challenges, especially in the creation and evolution of modern armed forces. 'John Peterson provides the nearest we will perhaps ever see of an official history.' David Benest, The British Army Review 'Peterson does an excellent job of developing the thesis that victory in these counter-insurgencies resulted from the two factors of establishing political legitimacy by meeting the local demands of the population and military efforts, which succeeded largely through British support.' Calvin H. Allen Jr., Middle East Journal

The wars of decolonization fought by European colonial powers after 1945 had their origins in the fraught history of imperial domination, but were framed and shaped by the emerging politics of the Cold War. In all the counter-insurgencies mounted against armed nationalist risings in this period, the European colonial powers employed locally recruited militias – styled as ‘loyalists’ – to fight their ‘dirty wars’. These loyalist histories have been neglected in the nationalist narratives that have dominated the post-decolonization landscape, and this book offers the first comparative assessment of the role played by these allies at the end of empire. Their experience illuminates the deeper ambiguities of the decolonization story: some loyalists were subjected to vengeful violence at liberation; others actually claimed the victory for themselves and seized control of the emergent state; while others still maintained a role as fighting units into the Cold War. The overlap between the history of decolonization and the emergence of the Cold War is a central theme in the studies presented here. The collection discusses the categorization of these ‘irregular auxiliary’ forces after 1945, and presents seven case studies from five European colonialisms, covering nine former colonies – Portugal (Angola), the Netherlands (Indonesia), France (Algeria), Belgium (Congo) and Britain (Cyprus, Kenya, Aden, South Yemen and Oman). This book was originally published as a special issue of the International History Review.

The notion of counter-insurgency has become a dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This volume brings together international academics and practitioners to evaluate the broader theoretical and historical factors that underpin COIN, providing a critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking.

Oman's 1970 coup launched a new political and economic structure that was created by and for Sultan Qaboos. The initially haphazard construction matured into a durable structure that continues under Sultan Haitham. This work details the early construction of the Qabusid state in the 1970s-1980s, emphasizing the interplay between personalities and the process of institutionalization. The narrative continues to the present demonstrating the resilience of the Qaboosid system.