Stinger Missile Publications Combined Manportable Air Defense Manpad Technical And Doctrinal History From 1980 To 2018

Over 2,800 total pages ... INTRODUCTION Today’s operational environment presents threats the Army has not faced in nearly 20 years. Against peer competitors, the joint force may face air parity or even localized enemy air overmatch, challenging the assumption of air superiority the joint force has held since the Korean War. This will make maneuver forces vulnerable to air attack by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, and cruise missiles. Maneuver forces lack capacity and capability to address these threats and the Army requires a speedy response. Stinger missiles provide a key capability for maneuver forces to defend themselves from aerial observation and attack. However, without direct involvement from senior brigade combat team leaders and effective leader training, these missiles will become dead weight at best or a fratricide in waiting at worst. Units must plan effectively to utilize this capability and ensure it ties directly to their scheme of maneuver as opposed to simply task-organizing one Stinger team per company. Just a SAMPLE of the CONTENTS CALL HANDBOOK NO. 18-16 Maneuver Leader’s Guide to Stinger - Lessons and Best Practices (2018) INTRODUCTION TO MANPORTABLE (Stinger) AIR DEFENSE WEAPON SYSTEM - SUBCOURSE NO. AD 0575 (no date) FM 3-23.25 SHOULDER-LAUNCHED MUNITIONS (2006) FM 10-550/TO 13C7-22-71 AIRDROP OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT: RIGGING STINGER WEAPON SYSTEMS AND MISSILES (2000) FM 44-18-1 STINGER TEAM OPERATIONS (1984) FM 3-01.11 (FM 44-100-2) AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY REFERENCE HANDBOOK (2000) MCRP 3-25.10A Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Gunner’s Handbook (2011) TM 9-1425-429-12 OPERATOR'S AND ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE MANUAL: STINGER GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEM (1980) TM 9-1425-429-12-HR HAND RECEIPT MANUAL COVERING SYSTEM COMPONENTS OF END ITEM (COEI) BASIC ISSUE ITEMS (BII), AND ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION LIST (AAL) FOR STINGER AIR DEFENSE GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEM, STINGER TRAINING SET GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEM M134, COOLANT RECHARGING UNIT TRAINING SYSTEM M80, AND BATTERY CHARGER PP-7309/T (1983) TM 55-1425-429-14 TECHNICAL MANUAL TRANSPORTABILITY GUIDANCE STINGER WEAPON SYSTEM (1981) TM 9-1265-209-10 TECHNICAL MANUAL OPERATOR’S MANUAL FOR MULTIPLE INTEGRATED LASER ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM (MILES) SIMULATOR SYSTEM, FIRING, LASER: M74 NSN 1265-01-159-0485 FOR STINGER WEAPON SYSTEM (1987) TM 9-2330-357-14&P TECHNICAL MANUAL OPERATOR'S, ORGANIZATIONAL, DIRECT SUPPORT, AND GENERAL SUPPORT MAINTENANCE MANUAL (INCLUDING REPAIR PARTS AND SPECIAL TOOLS LISTS) FOR SEMITRAILER, FLATBED: RADAR SET AND LAUNCHING STATION M860A1 (NSN 2330-01-117-3280) (1993)

Noted authority Steven J. Zaloga charts the development, combat use, and influence of man-portable air defense systems, from the late 1960s to the present day. The first attempts at developing a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) based around a guided missile began in the mid-1950s, as a response to the increased speed and maneuverability of jet aircraft. This book charts the technological evolution of the MANPADS and explores their combat usage and the lessons from these encounters. Besides detailing the missiles, it also surveys the various methods developed as countermeasures to the MANPADS threat. The first generation of MANPADS, such as the US Army's Redeye and the Soviet Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail), saw combat use in the Vietnam War in 1972 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The next generation of infrared-guided MANPADS, such as the US Stinger and Soviet Igla, came to prominence following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Since the 1970s, MANPADS have been used in innumerable wars, border conflicts, civil wars and insurrections. Featuring specially commissioned artwork and carefully chosen photographs, this study tells the story of these lethally effective weapons, from their origins to their use today.

This anthology discusses the converging operational issues of air base defense and counterinsurgency. It explores the diverse challenges associated with defending air assets and joint personnel in a counterinsurgency environment. The authors are primarily Air Force officers from security forces, intelligence, and the office of special investigations, but works are included from a US Air Force pilot and a Canadian air force officer. The authors examine lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflicts as they relate to securing air bases and sustaining air operations in a high-threat counterinsurgency environment. The essays review the capabilities, doctrine, tactics, and training needed in base defense operations and recommend ways in which to build a strong, synchronized ground defense partnership with joint and combined forces. The authors offer recommendations on the development of combat leaders with the depth of knowledge, tactical and operational skill sets, and counterinsurgency mind set necessary to be effective in the modern asymmetric battlefield.

The United States faces major challenges in dealing with Iran, the threat of terrorism, and the tide of political instability in the Arabian Peninsula. The presence of some of the world’s largest reserves of oil and natural gas, vital shipping lanes, and Shia populations throughout the region have made the peninsula the focal point of US and Iranian strategic competition. Moreover, large youth populations, high unemployment rates, and political systems with highly centralized power bases have posed other economic, political, and security challenges that the Gulf states must address and that the United States must take into consideration when forming strategy and policy.

The gap between the growing cruise and ballistic missile threat to U.S. Air Force bases in Europe and the U.S. capacity and capability to counter the threat is worrisome. This report assesses alternative Air Force courses of action.

Examines global terrorist networks and discusses the long-term future of terrorism.

Despite the rising salience of missile threats, current air and missile defense forces are far too susceptible to suppression. Today’s U.S. air and missile defense (AMD) force lacks the depth, capacity, and operational flexibility to simultaneously perform both missions. Discussions about improving AMD usually revolve around improvements to the capability and capacity of interceptors or sensors. Rather than simply doing more of the same, the joint integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) efforts might be well served by new or reinvigorated operational concepts, here discussed collectively as “Distributed Defense.” By leveraging networked integration, Distributed Defense envisions a more flexible and more dispersible air and missile defense force capable of imposing costs and dilemmas on an adversary, complicating the suppression of U.S. air and missile defenses. Although capability and capacity improvements remain essential to the high-end threats, the Distributed Defense concept focuses on creating a new architecture for today’s fielded or soon-to-be fielded IAMD force to boost flexibility and resilience.

"Examines the air power experience of a selected range of European countries since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War of 1991. The study offers an assessment of key issues influencing the evolution of air power in continental Europe. Amongst the main challenges are deployed operations, the intellectual grasp of air power doctrine, and the imbalance between combat aircraft and force enablers. Regarding the latter, the development of common capabilities that are equally available to both NATO and the European Union is crucial."--P. [4] of cover.