Stopping Wars And Making Peace

During most of human history, war was a basic instrument of statecraft, considered, for the most part, a lawful, honorable, ennobling, and even romantic pursuit. By contrast, peacemaking remained a marginal and indeed incongruous interstate activity. A war would end when the belligerents ended it. The experience of the twentieth century’s two world wars has changed, at least, the official view. The introduction of ever more destructive weapons, the drastic escalation of civilian deaths, and the economic and environmental devastation that modern war brought combined to forge an international legal impulse to stop, if not prevent, wars, resolve ongoing conflicts, and build peace. Yet stopping a war, though a useful, if not indispensable, step toward making peace, does not lead ineluctably to peace. Nor does the international community’s interposition of “peacekeepers”; their title notwithstanding, peacekeepers only try to keep a stopped war stopped. Making peace is a separate operation, often applying some parts of the same armamentarium but in very different ways. International efforts at stopping wars and making peace, in the era in which such initiatives have become lawful and virtuous, have proved remarkably unsuccessful. Yet the proliferation of ever more destructive weapons, the growing sense of insecurity and expectation of violence, the increasing difficulty of containing wars within a single arena, the threat of breakdown of order, with the prospect of epidemics and mass migration, all work to intensify the demand to stop wars and to make peace. This volume explores these issues by analyzing the theoretical literature on stopping wars and making peace and its application to a number of concrete cases, including the Falklands, Nagorno Karabakh, Rwanda, Malaya, Thailand, and Mozambique. Each case examines one conflict and the efforts undertaken to stop it and transform it into a peace system. The case studies draw general lessons from the incidents studied, extracting guidelines and principles that might serve those called upon to stop wars and make peace and offering a number of instructive points.

War-stopping techniques in the Falklands / Christina Parajon -- Nagorno Karabakh : a war without peace / Nicholas W. Miller -- War and peace in Rwanda / Tom Dannenbaum -- War-stopping and peacemaking in Mozambique / Caroline Gross.

Making War and Building Peace examines how well United Nations peacekeeping missions work after civil war. Statistically analyzing all civil wars since 1945, the book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn't. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, however, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertaken by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN's role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded.

MAKING PEACE stopping all that leads to war: here are about 100 activists working in different ways over more than a century to stop the things that lead to war. They ask to be heard.From the 'Forgotten War' between settlers/invaders to Australia in the 1800's to now, people have spoken out. During WW1 women in the Women's Political Association (WPA) and its offshoot the Women's Peace Army looked to the causes and effects of war as well as the war itself. Starvation was their first concern. The war created unemployment in Melbourne so they quickly established a Women's Unemployment Bureau to provide work 'from which they themselves will draw the profit'. That was just the start; soon they were tackling food prices, freedom of the press, social and economic injustice, the White Australia policy and other legislation they saw as bad - and much more. For a while it seemed nothing could stop them. It seemed nothing was outside their concern if it had to do with social and economic human relationships. The stories in MAKING PEACE are told in their own words by mainly feminists, mainly women, working in Melbourne from WW1 when the WPA was active through to today. The methods vary from the pacifist approach of the Society of Friends to the militant approach of socialists.The holistic approach continues. 'Culture can change, we can change it, our fight has just begun' is the message I hear again and again. We know that war is not inevitable; we know it is created and supported by human beings so human beings can change this. Here is evidence. And what glorious evidence it is.

As recent conflicts in Panama and the Persian Gulf demonstrate, we know much more about making war than we do about making peace. Such conflicts are not likely to disappear, and this volume reviews what has and hasn't worked in negotiating an end to war. Six case studies-ranging from World War I to the Persian Gulf crisis-illustrate a variety of actors, stakes, and strategies involved in the peacemaking process. Key turning points toward peace or deadlock are identified along the way. Making Peace also provides discussion questions, historical backgrounds, and theoretical introductions to show different-and differentially successful-avenues to peace.

Fifteen minutes before five o'clock on Good Friday, 1998, Senator George Mitchell was informed that his long and difficult quest for an Irish peace accord had succeeded--the Protestants and Catholics of Northern Ireland, and the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, would sign the agreement. Now Mitchell, who served as independent chairman of the peace talks for the length of the process, tells us the inside story of the grueling road to this momentous accord. For more than two years, Mitchell, who was Senate majority leader under Presidents Bush and Clinton, labored to bring together parties whose mutual hostility--after decades of violence and mistrust--seemed insurmountable: Sinn Fein, represented by Gerry Adams; the Catholic moderates, led by John Hume; the majority Protestant party, headed by David Trimble; Ian Paisley's hard-line unionists; and, not least, the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, headed by Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair. The world watched as the tense and dramatic process unfolded, sometimes teetering on the brink of failure. Here, for the first time, we are given a behind-the-scenes view of the principal players--the personalities who shaped the process--and of the contentious, at times vitriolic, proceedings. We learn how, as the deadline approached, extremist violence and factional intransigence almost drove the talks to collapse. And we witness the intensity of the final negotiating session, the interventions of Ahern and Blair, the late-night phone calls from President Clinton, a last-ditch attempt at disruption by Paisley, and ultimately an agreement that, despite subsequent inflammatory acts aimed at destroying it, has set Northern Ireland's future on track toward a more lasting peace.