Strategy In The American War Of Independence

This book examines the strategies pursued by the Colonies and the other combatants in the American War for Independence, placing the conflict in its proper global context. Many do not realize the extent to which the 1775 colonial rebellion against British rule escalated into a global conflict. Collectively, this volume examines the strategies pursued by the American Colonies, Great Britain, France, Spain, and Holland, and the League of Armed Neutrality, placing the military, naval, and diplomatic elements of the struggle in their proper global context. Moreover, assessing how each nation prosecuted their respective wars provides lessons for current students of strategic studies and military and naval history. This book will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, American history, Military History and political science in general. Donald Stoker is Professor of Strategy and Policy for the US Naval War College’s Monterey Program in Monterey, California. He joined the Strategy and Policy faculty in 1999 and has taught both in Monterey and Newport. Kenneth J. Hagan, Professor Emeritus, the U.S. Naval Academy, is currently Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War College’s Monterey Program. Michael T. McMaster is a Professor at the U.S. Naval War College in Monterey. He is a retired U.S. Navy Commander.

A sweeping and insightful grand strategic overview of the American Revolution, highlighting Washington's role in orchestrating victory and creating the US Army Led by the Continental Congress, the Americans almost lost the war for independence because their military thinking was badly muddled. Following the victory in 1775 at Bunker Hill, patriot leaders were convinced that the key to victory was the home-grown militia--local men defending their families and homes. But the flush of early victory soon turned into a bitter reality as the British routed Americans fleeing New York. General George Washington knew that having and maintaining an army of professional soldiers was the only way to win independence. As he fought bitterly with the leaders in Congress over the creation of a regular army, he patiently waited until his new army was ready for pitched battle. His first opportunity came late in 1776, following his surprise crossing of the Delaware River. In New Jersey, the strategy of victory was about to unfold. In The Strategy of Victory, preeminent historian Thomas Fleming examines the battles that created American independence, revealing how the creation of a professional army worked on the battlefield to secure victory, independence, and a lasting peace for the young nation.

A sweeping and insightful grand strategic overview of the American Revolution, highlighting Washington's role in orchestrating victory and creating the US Army Led by the Continental Congress, the Americans almost lost the war for independence because their military thinking was badly muddled. Following the victory in 1775 at Bunker Hill, patriot leaders were convinced that the key to victory was the home-grown militia--local men defending their families and homes. But the flush of early victory soon turned into a bitter reality as the British routed Americans fleeing New York. General George Washington knew that having and maintaining an army of professional soldiers was the only way to win independence. As he fought bitterly with the leaders in Congress over the creation of a regular army, he patiently waited until his new army was ready for pitched battle. His first opportunity came late in 1776, following his surprise crossing of the Delaware River. In New Jersey, the strategy of victory was about to unfold. In The Strategy of Victory, preeminent historian Thomas Fleming examines the battles that created American independence, revealing how the creation of a professional army worked on the battlefield to secure victory, independence, and a lasting peace for the young nation.

A reexamination of major Southern battles and tactics in the American War of Independence A finalist for the 2005 Distinguished Writing Award of the Army Historical Foundation and the 2005 Thomas Fleming Book Award of the American Revolution Round Table of Philadelphia, The Southern Strategy shifts the traditional vantage point of the American Revolution from the Northern colonies to the South in this study of the critical period from 1775 to the spring of 1780. David K. Wilson suggests that the paradox of the British defeat in 1781--after Crown armies had crushed all organized resistance in South Carolina and Georgia--makes sense only if one understands the fundamental flaws in what modern historians label Britain's "Southern Strategy". In his assessment he closely examines battles and skirmishes to construct a comprehensive military history of the Revolution in the South through May 1780. A cartographer and student of battlefield geography, Wilson includes detailed, original battle maps and orders of battle for each engagement. Appraising the strategy and tactics of the most significant conflicts, he tests the thesis that the British could raise the manpower they needed to win in the South by tapping a vast reservoir of Southern Loyalists and finds their policy flawed in both conception and execution.

A classic study of naval strategy and tactics during the American Revolutionary War, written by a renowned naval historian and theorist. The book analyzes the British and American fleets' strengths and weaknesses, their evolving doctrines, and the key battles that shaped the outcome of the conflict. Mahan's insights into the role of sea power in modern warfare influenced generations of military leaders and policymakers. Military history enthusiasts, sailors, and strategists will appreciate this authoritative work. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

Wars rarely turn out as expected. This book shows how Britain entered a conflict that it believed could not be lost. The American Patriots were similarly optimistic about their martial prospects. Although they eventually secured independence, it was only with the assistance of France and indirectly Spain, who diverted British resources from the conflict in America, allowing France eventually to deliver a knockout blow at Yorktown. This extensive yet accessible exploration into the War of American Independence provides aclear analysis of why this complex conflict occurred and why it ended as it did, revealing the fragile nature of the American Patriot cause. An essential guide for any history student, including those specializing in war/peace studies and the study of international relations, as well the general reader with an interest in the study of war.

The American Revolution presented a series of unique tactical challenges to its competing factions. For Britain, the Army would be forced to re-learn many of the lessons from the Seven Years' War. After the debacle of Concord and Bunker Hill, the British implemented a range of changes throughout the Army, including the modification of accepted tactical doctrine. Additionally, the British formed alliances with various independent German states. The soldiers they provided thus answered to different armies. How much their tactics adapted during the war, therefore varied from state to state. The Continental Army was founded in 1775 and was initially heavily styled on its British opponents. That began to change in 1778 thanks to the efforts of Prussian officer Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. Following their formal alliance with the colonies in 1778, France deployed military assets to North America. French officers also provided tactical advice to the Continental Army, and vice versa, particularly when they worked together successfully during the siege of Yorktown in 1781. Featuring specially commissioned artwork, this absorbing study investigates the various participants' battlefield tactics, casting light on how tactical theory and battlefield experience shaped the conduct of battle in the American Revolution.