Strategy Shelved

As U.S. strategy shifts (once again) to focus on great power competition, Strategy Shelved provides a valuable, analytic look back to the Cold War era by examining the rise and eventual fall of the U.S. Navy’s naval strategy system from the post–World War II era to 1994. Steven T. Wills draws some important conclusions that have relevance to the ongoing strategic debates of today. His analysis focuses on the 1970s and 1980s as a period when U.S. Navy strategic thought was rebuilt after a period of stagnation during the Vietnam conflict and its high water mark in the form of the 1980s’maritime strategy and its attendant six hundred –ship navy force structure. He traces the collapse of this earlier system by identifying several contributing factors: the provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, the aftermath of the First Gulf War of 1991, the early 1990s revolution in military affairs, and the changes to the Chief of Naval Operations staff in 1992 following the end of the Cold War. All of these conditions served to undermine the existing naval strategy system. The Goldwater Nichols Act subordinated the Navy to joint control with disastrous effects on the long-serving cohort of uniformed naval strategists. The first Gulf War validated Army and Air Force warfare concepts developed in the Cold War but not those of the Navy’s maritime strategy. The Navy executed its own revolution in military affairs during the Cold War through systems like AEGIS but did not get credit for those efforts. Finally, the changes in the Navy (OPNAV) staff in 1992 served to empower the budget arm of OPNAV at the expense of its strategists. These measures laid the groundwork for a thirty-year “strategy of means” where service budgets, a desire to preserve existing force structure, and lack of strategic vision hobbled not only the Navy, but also the Joint Force’s ability to create meaningful strategy to counter a rising China and a revanchist Russian threat. Wills concludes his analysis with an assessment of the return of naval strategy documents in 2007 and 2015 and speculates on the potential for success of current Navy strategies including the latest tri-service maritime strategy. His research makes extensive use of primary sources, oral histories, and navy documents to tell the story of how the U.S. Navy created both successful strategies and how a dedicated group of naval officers were intimately involved in their creation. It also explains how the Navy’s ability to create strategy, and even the process for training strategy writers, was seriously damaged in the post–Cold War era.

As U.S. strategy shifts (once again) to focus on great power competition, Strategy Shelved provides a valuable, analytic look back to the Cold War era by examining the rise and eventual fall of the U.S. Navy's naval strategy system from the post-World War II era to 1994. Steven T. Wills draws some important conclusions that have relevance to the ongoing strategic debates of today. His analysis focuses on the 1970s and 1980s as a period when U.S. Navy strategic thought was rebuilt after a period of stagnation during the Vietnam conflict and its high water mark in the form of the 1980s' maritime strategy and its attendant six hundred -ship navy force structure. He traces the collapse of this earlier system by identifying several contributing factors: the provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, the aftermath of the First Gulf War of 1991, the early 1990s revolution in military affairs, and the changes to the Chief of Naval Operations staff in 1992 following the end of the Cold War. All of these conditions served to undermine the existing naval strategy system. The Goldwater Nichols Act subordinated the Navy to joint control with disastrous effects on the long-serving cohort of uniformed naval strategists. The first Gulf War validated Army and Air Force warfare concepts developed in the Cold War but not those of the Navy's maritime strategy. The Navy executed its own revolution in military affairs during the Cold War through systems like AEGIS but did not get credit for those efforts. Finally, the changes in the Navy (OPNAV) staff in 1992 served to empower the budget arm of OPNAV at the expense of its strategists. These measures laid the groundwork for a thirty-year "strategy of means" where service budgets, a desire to preserve existing force structure, and lack of strategic vision hobbled not only the Navy, but also the Joint Force's ability to create meaningful strategy to counter a rising China and a revanchist Russian threat. Wills concludes his analysis with an assessment of the return of naval strategy documents in 2007 and 2015 and speculates on the potential for success of current Navy strategies including the latest tri-service maritime strategy. His research makes extensive use of primary sources, oral histories, and navy documents to tell the story of how the U.S. Navy created both successful strategies and how a dedicated group of naval officers were intimately involved in their creation. It also explains how the Navy's ability to create strategy, and even the process for training strategy writers, was seriously damaged in the post-Cold War era.

Großmachtkonflikte, die Zukunft von sicherheitspolitischen Institutionen sowie transnationalen Generationenherausforderungen bergen eine neue globale Unsicherheit. Vor diesem Hintergrund bekommen maritime Sicherheit und Seestreitkräfte sowie deren Einordnung im außenpolitischen Werkzeugkasten eine zunehmende Bedeutung. Was sind die Rollen und Einsatzaufgaben von Seemacht, und wie haben Staaten und ihre Institutionen maritime Ziele, Mittel und Wege konzeptualisiert? Dieser Sammelband bringt ausgewiesene Experten aus den USA, Europa und Asien zusammen, die ihre Perspektive auf maritime Strategie teilen. Das Buch dient gleichzeitig die Festschrift für Peter M. Swartz, Kapitän zur See a.D. der US-Marine, der seit seiner Arbeit als einer der Autoren der "Maritime Strategy" (1980er) als Mentor, Freund, intellektueller Leuchtturm und vor allen Dingen als Spiritus Rektor wesentlich zur Schärfung des Verständnisses von Seestrategie in den globalen Beziehungen beigetragen hat. Mit Beiträgen von James Bergeron, Sebastian Bruns, Seth Cropsey, Larissa Forster, Michael Haas, John Hattendorf, Peter Haynes, Andrzej Makowski, Amund Lundesgaard, Narushige Michishita, Martin Murphy, Sarandis Papadopoulos, Nilanthi Samaranayake, Jeremy Stöhs, Eric Thompson, Geoffrey Till, Sarah Vogler, Steve Wills.

Continuing the tradition of Naval Institute Blue and Gold series classics such as Command at Sea and the Watch Officer’s Guide, the Navy Staff Officer’s Guide will equip naval leaders for success in the challenging professional environment of a Navy staff. Navy staffs build and equip the Navy, plan its future, and guide its current operations. During a staff tour, a savvy Navy leader can have positive reach beyond the lifelines of a single command, with impact across the fleet and years into the future. Staff duty emphasizes a different set of tools from those typically employed in sea duty billets. It has its own formal and informal expectations and its own opportunities, challenges, and pitfalls. This guide provides and explains those tools — and marks the shoals that can wreck the unaware — enabling both new and seasoned staff officers to be prepared for the unique requirements of staff duty. Through extensive use of historical examples and “sea stories,” it introduces the reader to why staffs exist, how they impact the Navy, and how they can offer both professional development and meaningful accomplishment. Recognizing that Navy staffs vary in their purposes and organization, The Navy Staff Officer’s Guide synthesizes those differences into meaningful guidance for all staff officers, civilians, and Sailors, whether assigned to a destroyer squadron staff operating from a DDG or to the OPNAV staff in the Pentagon. Effective coordination, clear communication, and an understanding of the commander and their mission are central to staff success and are clearly articulated. In twenty-three chapters covering the many aspects of Navy staff work—including “The Staff Command Triad,” “Communicating as a Staff Officer,” “Civilian Personnel,” “Fleet Commands and the Maritime Operations Centers,” and “TYCOMs and SYSCOMs”—Captain Rielage has “covered the waterfront” (in Sailor-speak) with this comprehensive and readable guide. Staffs may not win the fight, but good staff work creates the conditions for victory before the first shot is fired. This guide is the key to ensuring the success of Navy staffs and all those who serve them.

This edition brings together specially commissioned reviews of key areas of social policy and considers a range of current issues within the field. The book contains invaluable research, including discussions on modern slavery, childcare and social justice and welfare chauvinism, as well as a chapter centred on the Grenfell Tower fire. Bringing together the insights of a diverse group of experts in social policy, this book examines critical debates in the field in order to offer an informed review of the best in social policy scholarship over the past year. Published in association with the SPA, the volume will be of interest to students and academics in social policy, social welfare and related disciplines.

The Navy in the Post-Cold War World is the first book to invite the reader to think strategically&—that is, in means-ends terms&—about the navy in the new post-Soviet era. It provides a unique synthesis of strategic theory, defense analysis, and history. Colin Gray first explains how sea power &"works&"; explores the strategic relationship among sea, land, and air power, with particular attention to the course of a conflict viewed as a whole; and ventures boldly into the region of the meaning of space strategy for maritime power and the relevance of that power in the still emerging post-Cold War security environment. The Navy in the Post-Cold War World is unusual because it is written by an internationally recognized general strategic theorist and analyst rather than by a long-standing naval writer. Gray is thus better able to view naval issues in proper perspective. Gray delves deeply into the role of sea power as an enabling agent and team player in the overall enterprise of national and international security. He provides the most current assessment of what sea and space power mean for each other as well as envisioning the future of maritime-oriented defense.

This book examines the large but neglected topic of the development of maritime power from both an historical and a contemporary point of view. Navies have never been more important than they are now, in a century becoming, as widely expected, increasingly and profoundly maritime. The growing competition between China and Russia with the United States and its allies and partners around the world is essentially sea-based. The sea is also central to the world's globalised trading system and to its environmental health. Most current crises are either sea-based or have a critical maritime element to them. What happens at sea will help shape our future. Against that background, this book uses both history and contemporary events to analyse how maritime power and naval strength has been, and is being, developed. In a reader-friendly way, it seeks to show what has worked and what has not, and to uncover the recurring patterns in maritime and naval development which explain past, present and future success - and failure. It reflects on the historical experience of all navies, but in particular it poses the question of whether China is following the same pattern of naval development illustrated by Britain at the start of the 18th century, which led to two centuries of naval dominance. This book will be of much interest to students of maritime power, naval studies, and strategic studies, as well as to naval professionals around the world.

Providing a novel approach to business policy and strategic management, this book focuses on the implementation of a firm's competitive strategy throughout all levels of the organization.