Strengthening Long Term Nuclear Security

In July 2005, the National Academies released the report Strengthening Long-term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia. The report highlighted several obstacles in the transition from a U.S.-Russian cooperative program to a Russian-directed and Russian-funded fully indigenized program that will ensure the security of 600 tons of weapon-usable nuclear material at a level of international acceptability. Overcoming these obstacles requires an increased political commitment at a number of levels of the Russian Government to modern material protection, control, and accounting systems (MPC&A). Adequate resources must be provided to facilities where weapon-usable material is located for upgrading and maintaining MPC&A systems. Additionally, the technical security systems that are being installed through the cooperative program need to be fully embraced by Russian managers and specialists. The report recommends the establishment of a ten-year indigenization fund of about $500 million provided by Russia and its G-8 partners as a new mechanism for gradually shifting the financial burden of MPC&A to the Russian Government.

In July 2005, the National Academies released the report Strengthening Long-term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia. The report highlighted several obstacles in the transition from a U.S.-Russian cooperative program to a Russian-directed and Russian-funded fully indigenized program that will ensure the security of 600 tons of weapon-usable nuclear material at a level of international acceptability. Overcoming these obstacles requires an increased political commitment at a number of levels of the Russian Government to modern material protection, control, and accounting systems (MPC&A). Adequate resources must be provided to facilities where weapon-usable material is located for upgrading and maintaining MPC&A systems. Additionally, the technical security systems that are being installed through the cooperative program need to be fully embraced by Russian managers and specialists. The report recommends the establishment of a ten-year indigenization fund of about $500 million provided by Russia and its G-8 partners as a new mechanism for gradually shifting the financial burden of MPC&A to the Russian Government.

On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

New international approaches to strengthening nuclear security and combating the threat of nuclear terrorism have been introduced throughout the first decade of the 21st century. The adoption of new and revised mandatory international legal instruments, as well as other non-binding initiatives and voluntary mechanisms, have led to improved security measures in this critical area, but there is still a need for substantive and procedural arrangements to be significantly strengthened.This book is a collection of the presentations and deliberations of participants at the NATO Advanced Research Workshop held in Vienna, Austria in January 2010. The workshop was attended by over 100 international experts from more than 20 countries, and the papers presented here summarize current understanding of, and approaches to, the legal framework for nuclear security and counterterrorism. The book will be of interest to all governments, international organizations, researchers and practitioners worldwide who are involved in securing nuclear materials and preventing nuclear terrorism

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program was created in 1991 as a set of support activities assisting the Former Soviet Union states in securing and eliminating strategic nuclear weapons and the materials used to create them. The Program evolved as needs and opportunities changed: Efforts to address biological and chemical threats were added, as was a program aimed at preventing cross-border smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. CTR has traveled through uncharted territory since its inception, and both the United States and its partners have taken bold steps resulting in progress unimagined in initial years. Over the years, much of the debate about CTR on Capitol Hill has concerned the effective use of funds, when the partners would take full responsibility for the efforts, and how progress, impact, and effectiveness should be measured. Directed by Congress, the Secretary of Defense completed a report describing DoD's metrics for the CTR Program (here called the DoD Metrics Report) in September 2010 and, as required in the same law, contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to review the metrics DoD developed and identify possible additional or alternative metrics, if necessary. Improving Metrics for the DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program provides that review and advice. Improving Metrics for the DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program identifies shortcomings in the DoD Metrics Report and provides recommendations to enhance DoD's development and use of metrics for the CTR Program. The committee wrote this report with two main audiences in mind: Those who are mostly concerned with the overall assessment and advice, and those readers directly involved in the CTR Program, who need the details of the DoD report assessment and of how to implement the approach that the committee recommends.

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was signed at Vienna and at New York on 3 March 1980. The Convention is the only international legally binding undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material. It establishes measures related to the prevention, detection and punishment of offenses relating to nuclear material. A Diplomatic Conference in July 2005 was convened to amend the Convention and strengthen its provisions. The amended Convention makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. It also provides for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences. The amendments will take effect once they have been ratified by two-thirds of the States Parties of the Convention.