Studies In Battle Command

This study consists of a series of essays analyzing various combat engagements and military leaders throughout history. The unifying theme of these essays was provided by the direct or indirect application to each case of the five Battle Command "competencies:". The battles, operations, and leaders discussed in the chapters that follow range over the historical landscape from Gustavus Adolphus in the seventeenth century to Hamburger Hill in Vietnam. They include examples of brilliant success and dismal failure. Most of all, they offer today's military professional perspective and insight into the essence of their calling: command and leadership.

Reprint of 1995 study. Contains a series of essays a series of essays analyzing various combat engagement and military leaders throughout history. They include examples of brilliant success and dismal failure. Most of all, they offer today's military professional perspective insight into the essence of their calling: command and leadership. Topics in this issue include: Gustavus Adolphus & the Crossing of the Lech, Frederick the Great and the Battle of Leuthen, Old Fritz Stumbles: Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf, 1759, Andrew Jackson's Iron Will in the Creek War, 1813-1814, Jacob Brown & Winfield Scott in the Niagara Campaign of 1814, Menshikov at Inkerman: A Failure to Command, Battle Command Incompetencies: John C. Pemberton in the Vicksburg Campaign, William S. Rosecrans & Battle Command Competencies, Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger at Chickamauga, 20 Sept 1863, Senior-Level Leadership at the Battle of the Crater, intuitive Vision Versus Practical Realities: Custer at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, William M. Campsey; Custer's Vision, Leadership at Plevna, 11-12 September 1877, The Rock of Gallipoli, Originality & Success: Lieut. Gen. Monash & the Battle of Hamel, Jul 1918, Seeing the Battlefield: Brigadier Gen. Norman D. Cota's Bastard Brigade at Omaha Beach, Harmon and Collins at the Bulge: Committing the 2d Armored Div., 22-28 Dec 1944, Eichelberger at Buna: A Study in Battle Command, Chen Yi and Deng Ziaoping Question a Mission, Douglas MacArthur & the Advance to the Yalu, Nov 1950, Invoking Force of Will to Move the Force, Capt. William E. Barber, Commander, Fox Company, 7th Marine Regt, Toktong Pass, North Korea, 27 Nov-2 Dec 1950, Military Operations Other Than War: Dominican Intervention of 1965-66.

John McGrath's Crossing the Line of Departure is a wide-ranging historical overview of that most difficult aspect of military leadership, the art of battle command. McGrath leads the reader through case studies beginning with Alexander the Great leading up to the recent war in Iraq. Among others, he analyzes Napoleon's technique, French and British practices in World War I, the German experience with "Blitzkreig" in World War II, and the Soviet approach to battle command. McGrath also extends his historical analysis to the present day by presenting a description of battle command theory in the "Modular Army" and the Inforamation Age. Through it all, he finds that the key to successful command in battle, particularly in mobile operations, is found in the successful interplay between technology and personal technique. Unlike some pundits today, McGrath does not conclude that information age technology is likely to shift the balance between these poles in favor of technology dependence. The commander's personal sense of where to be on the battlefield, where to locate and how to use his headquarters staffs, and how to communicate with his subordinates have been-and remain today-crucial elements of successful battle command. A 21st century commander has use of technology beyond the comprehension of an Alexander, a Napoleon, or a Guderian; but he will continue to grapple with the same issues of personal presence and technique that they mastered so well.

"Sing Goddess, of the wrath of Achilles, Peleus' son." So begins the Iliad, the greatest war epic in western culture. Since the dawn of recorded history, the history of man has been nearly synonymous with the history of war, a history that begins with Homer and continues today. Then as now, war remains the ultimate arbiter of human affairs, an awful and ever-present reminder of humanity's failure to escape its wrathful roots.

The U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) Research Unit at Fort Leavenworth and the School for Command Preparation (SCP) of the Command and General Staff College have a long history of mutual support which dates back to the inception of the Tactical Commanders Development Course (TCDC) in 1988. Since then, ARI has periodically conducted interviews and surveys of numerous SCP graduates in a continuing effort to maintain the high quality of TCDC and more recently to support the development of the Battle Commanders Development Course (BCDC). One finding that has consistently emerged from these studies is the unsolicited praise for the exchange of stories and personal maxims that occurs during TCDC and BCDC. As we have found in our studies of other aspects of tacit knowledge, the military tradition of instruction through experience and historical example has a sound foundation in psychological theory. SCP seminars and exercises regularly prompt battle commanders to relate personal accounts that illustrate battlefield concepts. These practical anecdotes have a clear motivational value and also provide a lasting source of easily recalled tactical knowledge. The current project was initiated to collect stories from experienced commanders. These stories will supplement the BCDC curriculum by providing a common pool of anecdotes to successive classes. They will also provide a basis for a broader discussion of requirements for future battle command. The candor and commitment of the experienced commanders who shared their stories is greatly appreciated; they have made a significant contribution to the next generation. This book contains stories from field and general officers commanding in training exercises, most from rotations at the National Training Center. In their stories, they describe their thoughts, their actions, their successes and especially their mistakes. In each story the commander tells how he learned an important lesson in battle command - and he identifies the lesson. And every story succeeds; there is not one without a valuable lesson. The willingness to share is striking from every contributor. Each has shown no reticence in honestly describing his errors, the mark of a confident, experienced, and learning student of the military art. As you read the stories, note well. Few are about tactical maneuvers and doctrinal principles. Instead, they are stories of friction and confusion - friction generated in the challenging task of orchestrating the actions of a large complex force. This, under the pressure of a hostile environment and a wily, punishing OPFOR, who know the habits of BLUFOR commanders as well as they know the terrain. And they are stories of growth, as the commanders strengthen their intuitive feel for battlefield dynamics, a process achieved only through experience and practice. I commend the creative, forthright, hardworking, reflective, and insightful commanders presented in these stories. They are serious students of the art of battle command.

Experienced commanders discuss anecdotes and case studies from their past operations.

"This report describes a concept experimentation assessment of battle command information requirements and military decision making in the 2010-2015 timeframe. This research was the first in a series of concept experimentation programs (CEPs) planned by the Mounted Battlespace Battle Lab (MBBL) at Fort Knox, KY, to re-engineer command and staff operations. This report focuses on research methods, exploratory results, and recommendations on method improvements for assessing battle command information requirements and the military decision making process (MDMP). The exploratory results provide a benchmark for future efforts and suggestions for improving information systems and future evaluations. Limitations and lessons learned on research methods are considered. Method recommendations address measurement approach issues, such as mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time (METT-T) structure for determining information requirements, and the applicability of the MDMP in a real-time information environment. Recommendations on manual measures address the timing and scope of assessment and respondent workload. Finally, recommendations on instrumented measures stress reducing respondent workload and increasing measurement scope and precision."--Stinet.