Studies In Plato S Metaphysics

Did Plato abandon, or sharply modify, the Theory of Forms in later life? In the Phaedo, Symposium, and Republicit is generally agreed that Plato held that universals exist. But in Parmenides, he subjected that theory to criticism. If the criticism were valid, and Plato knew so, then the Parmenidesmarks a turning point in his thought. If, however, Plato became aware that there are radical differences in the logical behaviour of concepts, and the later dialogues are a record of his attempt to analyse those differences, then Plato’s thought can be said to have moved in a new and vitally important direction after the Parmenides. Studies in Plato’s Metaphysicsbrings together twenty essays by leading philosophers from the UK and the USA reflecting upon this important issue and upon the questions arising from it.

Studies of Plato’s metaphysics have tended to emphasise either the radical change between the early Theory of Forms and the late doctrines of the Timaeus and the Sophist, or to insist on a unity of approach that is unchanged throughout Plato’s career. The author lays out an alternative approach. Focussing on two metaphysical doctrines of central importance to Plato’s thought – the Theory of Forms and the doctrine of Being and Becoming – he suggests a continuous progress can be traced through Plato’s works. He presents his argument through an examination of the metaphysical sections of six of the dialogues: the Euthyphro, Phaedo, Republic, Parmenides, Timaeus, and Sophist.

This book consists of Gregory Vlastos' studies on a variety of themes in Plato's metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy. Although many of the essays have appeared in various philosophical and classical journals or symposia, new in the volume are two major studies. One is on Plato's theory of love, exploring its metaphysical dimension and its far-reaching implications for personal and political relations. The other centers on semantic and logical problems in the Sophist; it offers solutions to crucial difficulties in this fundamental Platonic work. In these essays the author presents ideas which are likely to provoke comment and may be discussed as vigorously in scholarly journals as has some of his earlier work. The other papers, some of them extensively revised, comprise virtually all the author's published work on Plato, with the exception of a few papers easily accessible elsewhere. This second edition includes three additional essays and extensive notes that were not included in the original edition.

i. Introductory remarks 1 Plato, but not Socrates, concluded that the Forms are substances. Whether the Forms are substances is not an issue that Socrates had in mind. He did not deny it, but neither did he affirm it. If Socrates were asked a series of questions designed to determine whether he believed that the Forms are substances, he would admit that he had no opinion about this philosophical issue. Unlike Plato, Socrates was not a metaphysician. The same, of course, would not have always been true of Plato. Unlike Socrates, he was a metaphysician. At some point in his career, and at least by the time of the Phaedo and the Republic, Plato did what Socrates never thought to do. Plato considered the question and concluded that the Forms are substances. Although this development occurred more than two thousand years ago, time has not eclipsed its importance. It is one of the most seminal events in the history of the philosophy. With his defense of Socrates's method of intellectual inquiry, and the development of his Theory of Forms, Plato caused a now familiar cluster of metaphysical and epistemological issues to become central to philosophy.

This volume, the fourth in the Edinburgh Leventis Studies series, comprises a selection of papers from the conference held in Edinburgh March 2005 in conjunction with Professor Terry Penner's tenure of the A. G. Leventis Visiting Research Chair in Greek. It brings together contributions from leading Plato scholars from Britain, Europe and North America on a closely defined topic central to Plato's thought and to Ancient Philosophy--Plato's Form of the Good. The importance of the collection lies in the combination and presentation in one place of a range of different approaches to the good in Plato's Republic, and different solutions to the problems posed and proposed by these approaches. The two central issues, which form an underlying thread throughout the collection, are: first whether Plato's Republic is centred on what is good for individual humans, or on some quasi-moral good; and secondly, what the Form of the Good is. Pursuing the Good goes beyond recent studies in the field, and will appeal to classicists and philosophers alike. To the advanced student, it represents a wide-ranging introduction to central issues of Plato's philosophy; for the academic it will provide stimulus through antithetical and controversial solutions to questions old and new.

This book investigates the thought of two of the most influential philosophers of antiquity, Plato and his predecessor Anaxagoras, with respect to their metaphysical accounts of objects and their properties. The book introduces a fresh perspective on these two thinkers' ideas, displaying the debt of Plato's theory on Anaxagoras's, and principally arguing that their core metaphysical concept is overlap; overlap between properties and things in the world. Initially Plato endorses Anaxagoras's model of constitutional overlap, and subsequently develops qualitative overlap. Overlap is the crux to our understanding of objects participating in Forms in Plato's metaphysics; of Plato's account of relata without relations; of the role of Forms as causes; of the metaphysics of necessity; and of the role of the Great Kinds and of the paradeigma in the development of Plato's thought. Anna Marmodoro argues that Plato is ground-breaking in the history of metaphysics, in different ways from those acknowledged so far, and with respect to more metaphysical questions than had been hitherto appreciated; e.g. Plato's treatment of structure as property; of complexity; and his introduction of the first ever account of metaphysical emergence. In addition to these results, Marmodoro makes Anaxagoras's and Plato's systems philosophically accessible to us, today's philosophers, by applying conceptual tools from analytic metaphysics to the study of ancient metaphysics. In this way, the book brings Anaxagoras's and Plato's ideas to bear on todays' philosophical discussions and opens up new venues of research for current philosophical discussions.

The most widely accepted view in the West today, particularly among postmodernists, is that Plato attempted to ground politics on a rational metaphysics and initiated the tradition of foundationalism that has given rise to systems of oppression ranging from racism, sexism, and ethnocentrism to the technological mastery of the earth. Metaphysics as Rhetoric controverts this view, arguing that Plato was not the originator of this metaphysical tradition. Using as a basis the tenth-century Muslim philosopher Alfarabi's interpretation of Plato, especially his Summary of Plato's "Laws", Parens shows that what appears to be Plato's metaphysics was intended as a rhetorical defense of his politics. Parens demonstrates that rather than seek to establish politics on the definitive metaphysical ground, Alfarabi's Plato analyzes politics on its own terms, phenomenologically.