Systemic Risk From Global Financial Derivatives

Financial network analysis is used to provide firm level bottom-up holistic visualizations of interconnections of financial obligations in global OTC derivatives markets. This helps to identify Systemically Important Financial Intermediaries (SIFIs), analyse the nature of contagion propagation, and also monitor and design ways of increasing robustness in the network. Based on 2009 FDIC and individually collected firm level data covering gross notional, gross positive (negative) fair value and the netted derivatives assets and liabilities for 202 financial firms which includes 20 SIFIs, the bilateral flows are empirically calibrated to reflect data-based constraints. This produces a tiered network with a distinct highly clustered central core of 12 SIFIs that account for 78 percent of all bilateral exposures and a large number of financial intermediaries (FIs) on the periphery. The topology of the network results in the “Too- Interconnected-To-Fail” (TITF) phenomenon in that the failure of any member of the central tier will bring down other members with the contagion coming to an abrupt end when the ‘super-spreaders’ have demised. As these SIFIs account for the bulk of capital in the system, ipso facto no bank among the top tier can be allowed to fail, highlighting the untenable implicit socialized guarantees needed for these markets to operate at their current levels. Systemic risk costs of highly connected SIFIs nodes are not priced into their holding of capital or collateral. An eigenvector centrality based ‘super-spreader’ tax has been designed and tested for its capacity to reduce the potential socialized losses from failure of SIFIs.

An accessible and detailed overview of the risks posed by financial institutions Understanding Systemic Risk in Global Financial Markets offers an accessible yet detailed overview of the risks to financial stability posed by financial institutions designated as systemically important. The types of firms covered are primarily systemically important banks, non-banks, and financial market utilities such as central counterparties. Written by Aron Gottesman and Michael Leibrock, experts on the topic of systemic risk, this vital resource puts the spotlight on coherency, practitioner relevance, conceptual explanations, and practical exposition. Step by step, the authors explore the specific regulations enacted before and after the credit crisis of 2007-2009 to promote financial stability. The text also examines the criteria used by financial regulators to designate firms as systemically important. The quantitative and qualitative methods to measure the ongoing risks posed by systemically important financial institutions are surveyed. A review of the regulations that identify systemically important financial institutions The tools to use to detect early warning indications of default A review of historical systemic events their common causes Techniques to measure interconnectedness Approaches for ranking the order the institutions which pose the greatest degree of default risk to the industry Understanding Systemic Risk in Global Financial Markets offers a must-have guide to the fundamentals of systemic risk and the key critical policies that work to reduce systemic risk and promoting financial stability.

Over the last decade dealing in derivative financial instruments (basically forwards, futures, options and combinations of these), particularly in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market has become a central activity for major wholesale banks and financial institutions. Measured in terms of notional principal amount, OTC derivatives outstanding are near, if not greater than, US$10 trillion, even after deduction of double-counting for intra-dealer transactions. Major new regulatory initiatives, including proposed new capital requirements, are under consideration as a means of reducing systemic risk. This paper examines the concept of systemic risk -- that failure of one firm will lead to the failure of a large number of other firms or indeed the collapse of the international financial system. Alternative proposed definitions are considered and integrated and the effects of OTC derivatives on these risks discussed. The key conclusion is that systemic risk has been reduced by the development of the OTC derivatives market due to shifting economic risks to those better able either to bear the risk or, in many cases, cancel it against offsetting risks. The implications of the Basle II capital proposals for systemic risk are analyzed and shown to increase this risk due to encouraging transactions which increase portfolio risks of the dealers and discouraging transactions which decrease their portfolio risk.

After the credit crisis, supervisors enacted a range of financial reforms. In particular, they radically changed the nature of the OTC derivatives market via a number of measures, notably mandatory central clearing. This book discusses the market before the crisis, explains what central clearing is, and outlines the consequences of the new rules.

DIVCultural studies exploration of the implications of the circulation of increasingly abstract forms of capital in the contemporary global economy./div

Seminar paper from the year 2009 in the subject Economics - Monetary theory and policy, grade: A, City University London, language: English, abstract: This work is to discuss the role and power of derivatives in the global financial markets and their ability to reduce, diversify and enhance risks associated with international capital flows. During the last two decades derivatives, as fiscal instruments, experienced enormous growth and gained increasingly of importance. This is mainly due to their ability to allow the spreading of risks in cross border capital movements, making such investments more appealing and the diversification of portfolios more likely. Yet, derivative markets are controversial because they are not well known outside a small group of specialists. Most people look at them with suspicion and focus on their role as highly effective instruments for speculation. Given the leverage they provide fortunes can be made or lost in the wink of an eye. Although derivatives do not create anything it will be shown in the course of this study that the importance of derivatives lies in the fact that they can be used to reduce, diversify and control uncertainty and risks associated with various corporate activities, thus creating substantial benefits as well as complexities. Section one is going to define the most common derivative products before addressing their general purpose followed by exemplifying two principal risks aligned with the use of derivatives, namely credit- and market risk. Subsequently this works is going to discuss the positive as well as the negative effects derivatives may have on banks and investors. Sections five, six and seven will then illuminate systematic predicaments, address risks and eventually conclude after having considered the entanglement and market share of derivatives. Warren Buffett, Forbes-listed as the richest person in the world, has called credit derivatives financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal. Nominally they are insurances against defaults, but they encourage greater gambles and credit expansion, which are moral hazards whereas Alan Greenspan, on the other hand, observed that derivatives have come to play an exceptionally important role in our financial system and in our economy. These instruments allow users to unbundle risks and allocate them to the investors most willing and able to use them. It is this study’s object to illuminate the complexity of derivatives and exemplify both, their advantageous and unfavourable but yet undeniably powerful characteristics.

To mitigate systemic risk, some regulators have advocated the greater use of centralized counterparties (CCPs) to clear Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives trades. Regulators should be cognizant that large banks active in the OTC derivatives market do not hold collateral against all the positions in their trading book and the paper proves an estimate of this under-collateralization. Whatever collateral is held by banks is allowed to be rehypothecated (or re-used) to others. Since CCPs would require all positions to have collateral against them, off-loading a significant portion of OTC derivatives transactions to central counterparties (CCPs) would require large increases in posted collateral, possibly requiring large banks to raise more capital. These costs suggest that most large banks will be reluctant to offload their positions to CCPs, and the paper proposes an appropriate capital levy on remaining positions to encourage the transition.

This chapter provides an overview of market practices, market structure, and official supervision and regulation in financial markets. This paper also highlights the key features of modern banking and over the counter (OTC) derivatives markets that seem to be relevant for assessing their functioning, their implications for systemic financial risks in the international financial system, and areas where improvements in ensuring financial stability can be obtained. The paper also describes how OTC derivatives activities have transformed modern financial intermediation and discusses how internationally active financial institutions have become exposed to additional sources of instability because of their large and dynamic exposures to the counterparty (credit) risks embodied in their OTC derivatives activities. In order to rebalance private and official roles, it is essential first to clarify the limits to market discipline in OTC derivatives markets, before leaning more heavily on aspects of market discipline that seem to work well in these markets.