Tailored Deterrence Influencing States And Groups Of Concern Case Studies Of Russia China In The Taiwan Strait Nuclear Armed Iran North Korea Triad Hussein And Gulf War Lessons Zero Nukes

Deterrence thinking has evolved from the Cold War to the present. During the period from 1945-1991 when the United States sought to deter attacks by the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Pact, U.S. nuclear forces were fielded primarily to prevent nuclear war or escalation of war. However, with the breakup of the Soviet Union, as an immediate threat to the United States, and the rise of lesser nuclear states proliferating nuclear technologies, deterrence is once again reexamined for newer solutions.During the Cold War, deterrence strategy evolved over time as officials and defense strategists thought through the changes brought by nuclear weapons. Clearly after 1945, warfare had a new component. Long-range airpower gave states an intercontinental reach. The first A-bombs had an explosive power a thousand times more powerful than an equivalent weight of high explosive bombs like TNT. When thermonuclear weapons were created half a decade later, they, in turn, were a thousand times more powerful per unit weight than the A-bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So in a period of four or five years, bomb explosive yields per unit weight increased a thousand times a thousand. This combination of long-range delivery vehicles coupled with warheads or bombs a million times more powerful than their World War II conventional counterparts led to a revolution in the way wars might be fought in the future if such weapons were employed.Abbreviations * 1 New Thinking on Deterrence - Dr. Barry Schneider and Mr. Patrick Ellis * Part One - Deterring State and Non-State Actors: Case Studies * 2 Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries: A Key Requirement for Tailored Deterrence - Dr. Jerrold Post * 3 Tailoring U.S. Strategic Deterrence Effects on Russia - Mr. Franklin Miller * 4 Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait - Dr. Douglas McCready * 5 Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran from Adventurism and Nuclear Use - Mr. Gregory F. Giles * 6 Deterring North Korea from Employment of WMD in Future Korean Conflicts and Crises - Dr. Bruce Bennett * 7 Deterrence & Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the 1990-1991 Gulf War - Dr. Barry Schneider * 8 Influencing Terrorists' Acquisition and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction - Exploring a Possible Strategy - Dr. Lewis Dunn * Part Two - Deterrence Issues and Challenges: A Topical Approach * 9 U.S. Extended Deterrence: How Much Strategic Force Is Too Little? - Mr. David Trachtenberg * 10 Deterrence Issues in a World of Very Few or Zero Nuclear Weapons - Dr. Barry Blechman * 11 Deterrence, the Triad, and Possible Dyads - Mr. Kurt Guthe * 12 The Role of Strategic Communications in Deterrence: Lesson from History - Mr. Richard Estes * 13 A Nation's Resilience as a Deterrence Factor - Mr. Patrick D. Ellis * 14 Summary and Conclusions - Dr. Barry Schneider and Mr. Patrick Ellis

This book examines six decades of RAND Corporation research on deterrence for lessons relevant to the current and future strategic environments.

Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."

A 2005 update of ¿The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran¿ by Kori Schake and Judith Yaphe, which had been issued in 2001 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). Contents of this report: Iran¿s Perspective: National Rights and Nuclear Weapons; Neighbors, Negotiators, and Non-proliferators; U.S. Policy Options; Endnotes; Appendix A: Timeline of Iran¿s Path to Nuclear Weapons; Appendix B: Iran¿s Nuclear Program: Status, Risks, and Prospects; Appendix C: Walking the Tightrope: Israeli Options in Response to Iranian Nuclear Developments.

This Report contains a Consensus Report and the papers submitted to the April 6 -10, 1995 NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Strategic Stability In The Post-Cold War World And The Future Of Nuclear Disarmament, held in Washington D. C. , United States Of America of at The Airlie Conference Center. The workshop was sponsored by the NATO Division Scientific and Environmental Affairs as part of its ongoing outreach programme to widen and deepen scientific contacts between NATO member countries and the Cooperation Partner countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. The participants recognize that the collapse of the former Soviet Union has left a conceptual vacuum in the definition of a new world order. Never before have the components of world order all changed so rapidly, so deeply, or so globally. As Henry Kissinger points out, the emergence of the new world order will have answered three fundamental questions:" What are the basic units of the international order? What are their means of interacting? and What are the goals on behalf of which they interact? " The main question is whether the establishment and maintenance of an international system will turn out to be a conscious design, or the outgrowth of a test of strength. The concept of a planning framework that could shape or govern these interactions is emerging and may now be at hand. Capturing this emerging framework is the thrust of this NATO-sponsored Advanced Research Workshop.

We have recently experienced the rather sudden end of the cold war, an event that ranks among not only the top public events of this century, but in view of the projected consequences had a nuclear war occurred, may be judged as a seminal point in the history of our civilization. Mankind's highest level of technology had been impressed into the service of military security as two sizable alliances faced each other nervously as they contemplated the horrendous costs of implementing their war-making capabilities. For the great powers, a big war didn't make sense. But for many states, smaller wars may well remain attractive.

Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The author reviews the history of nuclear deterrence and calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of concepts such as first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers, smaller nuclear powers, and nonstate actors.