Tank Destroyer Field Manual Organization And Tactics Of Tank Destroyer Units June 16 1942 Fm 18 5

This facsimile edition of the US 1942 field manual for tank destroyer units describes missions, organization, combat, and training. It scales its information from squad to company to battalion to group. Issued early during the United States' WWII experience, it predates the assignment of authorized tank destroyer gear: "It is prepared for the guidance of units that will be equipped with materiel now being developed..." Readers should recall that US WWII doctrine and the high command forbade tank vs. tank combat. The American tank was meant for targets other than Axis armor. However, tank destroyer units were specifically designed, equipped, and deployed to fight what we now think of as tank battles. This is an historic document that gives us deep insight into a long-forgotten military doctrine. For those who think of tank destroyers as cheap tanks or stopgaps, this will be an eye-opener.

February issue includes Appendix entitled Directory of United States Government periodicals and subscription publications; September issue includes List of depository libraries; June and December issues include semiannual index.

Overshadowed by the United States Army's armored divisions, the separate tank and tank destroyer battalions had the difficult mission of providing armored support for US infantry divisions in the 1944–45 campaigns. This book details the organizational structures and deployment of these units: the standard tank battalions, tank battalions (light), tank battalions (mine exploder) and tank battalions (special), self-propelled and towed tank destroyer battalions. It also covers the tactics used by these units in their attempts to assist the infantry, as well as providing a listing of all the battalions that took part in the Northwest Europe campaign.

George C. Marshall once called him "the brains of the army." And yet General Lesley J. McNair (1883-1944), a man so instrumental to America's military preparedness and Army modernization, remains little known today, his papers purportedly lost, destroyed by his wife in her grief at his death in Normandy. This book, the product of an abiding interest and painstaking research, restores the general Army Magazine calls one of "Marshall's forgotten men" to his rightful place in American military history. Because McNair contributed so substantially to America's war preparedness, this first complete account of his extensive and varied career also leads to a reevaluation of U.S. Army effectiveness during WWII. Born halfway between the Civil War and the dawn of the 20th century, Lesley McNair–"Whitey" by his classmates for his blond hair–graduated 11th of 124 in West Point's class of 1904 and rose slowly through the ranks like all officers in the early twentieth century. He was 31 when World War I erupted, 34 and a junior officer when American troops prepared to join the fight. It was during this time, and in the interwar period that followed the end of the First World War, that McNair's considerable influence on Army doctrine and training, equipment development, unit organization, and combined arms fighting methods developed. By looking at the whole of McNair's career–not just his service in WWII as chief of staff, General Headquarters, 1940-1942, and then as commander, Army Ground Forces, 1942-1944–Calhoun reassesses the evolution and extent of that influence during the war, as well as McNair's, and the Army's, wartime performance. This in-depth study tracks the significantly positive impact of McNair's efforts in several critical areas: advanced officer education; modernization, military innovation, and technological development; the field-testing of doctrine; streamlining and pooling of assets for necessary efficiency; arduous and realistic combat training; combined arms tactics; and an increasingly mechanized and mobile force. Because McNair served primarily in staff roles throughout his career and did not command combat formations during WWII, his contribution has never received the attention given to more public–and publicized–military exploits. In its detail and scope, this first full military biography reveals the unique and valuable perspective McNair's generalship offers for the serious student of military history and leadership.

If the machine gun changed the course of ground combat in the First World War, it was the tank that shaped ground combat in World War II. The tank was introduced in World War I in an effort to end the stalemate of the machine gun versus barbed-wire trenches, and by World War II, the tank’s mobility and firepower became a rolling, thundering difference-maker on the battlefield. In this detailed, deeply researched, and heavily illustrated book, tank expert Richard Anderson tells the story of how the United States developed its armored force, turning it into a war-winning weapon in World War II that powered American ground forces and supplied armies around the world, including the British and Soviets. For decades, American tanks of World War II have been undervalued in comparisons with German and Soviet tanks—and it’s true that the best of American armor tended to underperform the best of German and Soviet armor during the war. That’s because the U.S. had a different goal: not only to create battleworthy tanks like the Sherman, and to develop other tanks, but also to supply American allies with serviceable, combat-ready tanks. The United States did all this, but until now the complete story of American tanks in World War II has yet to be told. Anderson’s book is deeper and more thorough a chronicle of American tanks in World War II than has ever been done. This book is colorful, vivid, and thought-provokingly insightful on how the U.S. produced a tank force capable of conducting its own battlefield efforts and sustaining key allies around the world. This will be the go-to volume on American tanks for years to come.

In the seventy years that have passed since the tank first appeared, antitank combat has presented one of the greatest challenges in land warfare. Dramatic improvements in tank technology and doctrine over the years have precipitated equally innovative developments in the antitank field. One cycle in this ongoing arms race occurred during the early years of World War II when the U.S. Army sought desperately to find an antidote to the vaunted German blitzkrieg. This Leavenworth Paper analyzes the origins of the tank destroyer concept, evaluates the doctrine and equipment with which tank destroyer units fought, and assesses the effectiveness of the tank destroyer in battle.

The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine. Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation.