Tariff Retaliation Versus Financial Compensation In The Enforcement Of International Trade Agreements

"The authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of retaliatory tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the current system. The authors also consider the use of bonds as a means of settling disputes. If bonds can be posted with a third party, they do not have to be supported by retaliatory tariffs and can improve the negotiating position of countries that are too small to threaten tariff retaliation. "--World Bank web site.

The authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of retaliatory tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the current system. The authors also consider the use of bonds as a means of settling disputes. If bonds can be posted with a third party, they do not have to be supported by retaliatory tariffs and can improve the negotiating position of countries that are too small to threaten tariff retaliation.

The book Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements is a selection of published articles examining how policy externalities motivate and can be addressed by international trading institutions. The studies provide groundbreaking evidence of the role of international market power and policy uncertainty as motives for trade agreements and on the potential clash between preferential trade liberalization (e.g. European Union, NAFTA) and multilateral agreements (WTO). The studies presented in this book not only identify and estimate how different policies interact with each other and across agreements, but also examine how international trading institutions can be used to limit redistribution towards special interest groups and enforce better cooperation across issues, such as labor and the environment, and between developing and developed countries.

A critical assessment of trade retaliation in the WTO by academics, diplomats and practitioners involved in such actions.

Addresses the process of dispute resolution and appeal under the DSU of the WTO. This book covers politics and disputes between sovereign nations; power inequities in access to the DSU; specific categories of disputes, such as in agriculture and in intellectual property; and issues pertaining to compliance, enforcement and remedies.

Handbook of Commercial Policy explores three main topics that permeate the study of commercial policy. The first section presents a broad set of basic empirical facts regarding the pattern and evolution of commercial policy, with the second section investigating the crosscutting legal issues relating to the purpose and design of agreements. Final sections cover key issues of commercial policy in the modern global economy. Every chapter in the book provides coverage from the perspectives of multilateral, and where appropriate, preferential trade agreements. While most other volumes are policy-oriented, this comprehensive guide explores the ways that intellectual thinking and rigor organize research, further making frontier-level synthesis and current theoretical, and empirical, research accessible to all. Covers the research areas that are critical for understanding how the world of commercial policy has changed, especially over the last 20 years Presents the way in which research on the topic has evolved Scrutinizes the economic modeling of bargaining and legal issues Useful for examining the theory and empirics of commercial policy

The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization provides an authoritative and cutting-edge account of the World Trade Organization. Its purpose is to provide a holistic understanding of what the WTO does, how it goes about fulfilling its tasks, its achievements and problems, and how it might contend with some critical challenges. The Handbook benefits from an interdisciplinary approach. The editorial team comprises a transatlantic partnership between a political scientist, a historian, and an economist. The distinguished and international team of contributors to the volume includes leading political scientists, historians, economists, lawyers, and practitioners working in the area of multilateral trade. All the chapters present original and state-of-the-art research material. They critically engage with existing academic and policy debates, and also contribute to the evolution of the field by setting the agenda for current and future WTO studies.The Handbook is aimed at research institutions, university academics, post-graduate students, and final-year undergraduates working in the areas of international organization, trade policy and negotiations, global economic governance, and economic diplomacy. As such, it should find an enthusiastic readership amongst students and scholars in History, Economics, Political Science, International Relations, Public Policy, and Law. Equally important, the book should have direct relevance for diplomats, international bureaucrats, government officials, and other policy-makers and practitioners in the area of trade and economic governance.

The World Trade Organization—backbone of today's international commercial relations—requires member countries to self-enforce exporters' access to foreign markets. Its dispute settlement system is the crown jewel of the international trading system, but its benefits still fall disproportionately to wealthy nations. Could the system be doing more on behalf of developing countries? In Self-Enforcing Trade, Chad P. Bown explains why the answer is an emphatic "yes." Bown argues that as poor countries look to the benefits promised by globalization as part of their overall development strategy, they increasingly require access to the WTO dispute settlement process to protect their trading interests. Unfortunately, the practical realities of WTO dispute settlement as it currently stands create a number of hurdles that prevent developing countries from enjoying the trading system's full benefits. This book confronts these challenges. Self-Enforcing Trade examines the WTO's "extended litigation process," highlighting the tangle of international economics, law, and politics that participants must master. He identifies the costs that prevent developing countries from disentangling the self-enforcement process and fully using the WTO system as part of their growth strategies. Bown assesses recent efforts to help developing countries overcome those costs, including the role of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law and development focused NGOs. Bown's proposed Institute for Assessing WTO Commitments tackles the largest remaining obstacle currently limiting developing country engagement in the WTO's selfenforcement process—a problematic lack of information, monitoring, and surveillance.