Tax Harmonization In The European Community

Through the arguments for corporate tax harmonization in the EU and describing the current stage of this process, the legislative rules which are insufficient to solve the many problems implied by the proper functioning of the Single Market, are revealed. The book also exposes the issues involved in the consolidation of the corporate tax base.

This book considers the tax provisions of the Treaty of Rome with its late modifications. Particular attention is given to fiscal discrimination, harmonization of VAT, excise duties and other indirect taxes, taxes and the capital market.

The results of the work of the Conference on Tax Coordination in the European Community appear at a time when the Community has undertaken, as a priority task, the completion of the internal market. The Commission's programme and proposed timetable for the achievement of that goal are spelt out in the White Paper, which was endorsed by the European Council at Milan in June 1985, an endorsement which was repeated at the Council's subsequent meeting in Luxemburg in December 1985. The Commission wholly endorses the views of the Conference as regards the need for urgent action to remove the grave restrictions on the free movement of the factors of production which continue to exist within the Community. It is the Commission's firm view that only a true dismantling of fiscal frontiers can permit the creation of an area without internal frontiers for which the Single European Act provides. To that end a certain approximation of rates of indirect taxation is indispensable if unacceptable distortion of competition is to be avoided. It is noteworthy that the Conference attaches great importance to the Community's problems in the field of direct taxation. This work will be particularly useful to the Commission, which intends to produce a further White Paper on company taxation in the near future. As the Conference rightly notes, action in this field is important for equalisation of the conditions of competition necessary for the completion of the internal market.

This book provides a comprehensive and systematic overview of the main topics of taxation in European law. The sequence of arguments follows an institutional logic, respecting the academic tradition of tax law. It first outlines the general framework of EU institutions, with a particular focus on the set of regulations regarding taxation with reference to the stage of formation of EU rules and the potential contrast with national legal systems. It then explores the general principles emerging from the European treaties that typically involve the taxation system, and examines in detail the fiscal importance of European freedoms, the principle of tax non-discrimination, the balance between national interest and EU values, tax harmonization, state aids and other general principles applicable in tax jurisdiction. Lastly, it offers an overall assessment of the development of the European integration process, with particular regard to the nexus between taxation power and sovereignty, in order to highlight the possible and desirable next stages of the evolution of “European tax law”.

Through the arguments for corporate tax harmonization in the EU and describing the current stage of this process, the legislative rules which are insufficient to solve the many problems implied by the proper functioning of the Single Market, are revealed. The book also exposes the issues involved in the consolidation of the corporate tax base.

Through the e×amination of theoretical models as well as practical e×amples, the author studies why repeated attempts at harmonization have failed and concludes that they must take into account not only economic aspects, but also political and legal factors. Harmonization of corporate ta×ation is not only a legislative e×ercise; other institutions, such as the EC Court, have an important role to play in the harmonization process, as the US federal e×perience suggests.

This study has been concerned with the general issues that arise from the interdependency of national commodity taxation on the one hand and international trade on the other. The discussion was applied to a specific institutional setting, given by the taxation of value added in the European Community's internal market. The abolition of border controls raises two distinct questions for tax harmonization in the EC: 1) Which tax principle should be chosen in the internal market? and 2) Should member states' value added tax rates be harmonized in the internal market? This study evaluates the policy decisions taken by the European Community with respect to these two issues from a welfare-theoretic perspective.

This book uses a computable general equilibrium framework to eval uate recent value-added tax reform proposals in the European Union from a welfare point of view. After the publication of the "White Paper" (1985) on the completion of the internal European market, an intense and heated debate about tax impediments to free trade set in. According to the original plans of the Commission of the European Union, not only physical border controls but also fiscal frontiers within the European Union would have been abolished on New Year's Day 1993. With respect to value added taxation this amounted to replacing the destination by the origin principle. Even though the origin principle had been favored by some economists from the establishment of a common European value-added tax system, time was not yet ripe for this change. In December 1991, the ECOFIN Council could only agree on the so called transitional system. In essence, these transitional arrangements maintain the destination principle as far as possible but shift the border tax procedure from national frontiers to firms. The transitional system is supposed to expire on December 31, 1996, with the final solution for value-added taxation in the European Union being decided upon by the ECOFIN Council until December, 1995. In the event of no decision the transitional arrangements will be continued. The most likely solution will be a switch to the origin principle combined with some clearing mechanism to prevent major revenue reallocations between member states.