Taxation Without Representation In Rural China

This book provides the first, in-depth English study of the tax burden problems farmers face in China.

The financial burden imposed upon the Chinese farmer by local taxes has become a major source of discontent in the Chinese countryside and a worrisome source of political and social instability for the Chinese government. Bernstein and Lü examine the forms and sources of heavy, informal taxation, and shed light on how peasants defend their interests by adopting strategies of collective resistance (both peaceful and violent). Bernstein and Lü also explain why the central government, while often siding with the peasants, has not been able to solve the burden problem by instituting a sound, reliable financial system in the countryside. While the regime has, to some extent, sought to empower farmers to defend their interests - by informing them about tax rules, expanding the legal system, and instituting village elections, for example, these attempts have not yet generated enough power from 'below' to counter powerful, local official agencies.

This book develops an informational theory to account for the coexistence of China’s exceptionally resilient authoritarianism and its high decentralization. The nuanced information contained in citizens’ complaints, which are filed through the petition system, helps to sustain China’s decentralized authoritarianism in three important ways. First, petitions help to alleviate the information asymmetry problem that arises when the central government has less information than lower level governments do. When studying citizens’ petitions, higher level governments can obtain valuable and accurate information about local officials’ performance in policy implementation, public goods provision, and corruption. Higher level governments need this information in order to effectively utilize the cadre management system to reward good performance and punish malpractice. The result of this interaction is the PRC’s relatively high quality of governance and effective control of local officials. There is also a second way in which citizens’ petitions help the government to overcome the dictator’s dilemma that arises when an authoritarian regime is uncertain about how much support it really enjoys among its citizens. Citizens’ specific grievances are revealed in these petitions and are mostly addressed in their beginning stages. When citizens’ complaints are rooted in central policy, they set the agenda for policy change in order to maintain social order. There is yet a third benefit conferred upon the PRC by the petition system. Thanks to the petition system, the central government can present itself as the ally of citizens when it addresses the matters raised by their petitions. As a result, the petition system grants the central government an opportunity to hold local officials accountable, scapegoat local authorities, divide citizens and local officials, and justly claim all the credit when its policies succeed. This helps to build citizens’ trust in their central government and reinforces its legitimacy in their eyes. In Huntington’s terms, the Chinese Communist Party institutionalizes mass support by addressing citizens’ grievances expressed through the channel of communication provided by the petition system. In this sense, the complaints of citizens can be very useful tools for regime maintenance. The author substantiates these points with case studies and statistical analysis.

This book answers the important question - how does China maintain authoritarian rule while it is committed to market-oriented economic reforms?

Based on a treasure trove of information collected through fieldwork interviews and painstaking documentary research through the Chinese and Western language presses, this book analyzes one of the most important reforms implemented in China over the past decade – the rural tax and fee reform, also known as the "Third Revolution in the Countryside". The aim of the tax was to improve social stability in rural China, which has become increasingly shaken by peasant protests, many of them large-scale and violent. By examining the gap between the intentions of the reform and the eventual outcomes, Göbel provides new insights into the nature of intergovernmental relations in China and highlights the ways in which the relationship between the state and the rural populace has fundamentally changed forever. The Politics of Rural Reform in China will appeal to students and scholars of Chinese politics, governance and development studies.

In this volume, some of the leading scholars on China's development examine China's responses to the global financial crisis and their implications for China's economy, society, and the international balances of power.

Popular protest in China has been widespread and prevalent. Why do people protest and how are such demonstrations handled by the authorities? Could they ultimately imperil China’s political system? In this book, Teresa Wright analyzes the array of protests that have swept China in the post-Mao period. Exploring popular contention through a range of different groups – from farmers to factory workers, urban homeowners to environmentalists, nationalists to dissidents, ethnic minorities to Hong Kong residents, Wright shows that – with the exception of the latter – popular protest has achieved adequate government responses to the public’s most serious grievances. Yet Wright cautions that this may not last forever. For Chinese citizens that engage in protest often suffer serious emotional and physical costs. As a result, they have developed an unhealthy relationship with the regime. In this context, Xi Jinping’s recent efforts to restrict public expression may backfire – leading to an explosive dynamic that may threaten the political stability that China’s ruling elites so desire.