Terrorism Information Sharing And The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative

The 9/11 Commission cited breakdowns in info. sharing and the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence as key factors in the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) contain info. about criminal activity that may also reveal terrorist pre-operational planning. The Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) is an effort to have most law enforcement org. participate in a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing, and analyzing terrorism-related SARs. This report describes the NSI, the rationale for the sharing of terrorism-related SARs, and how the NSI seeks to achieve this objective. It also examines the privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by the initiative.

The imperative for the exchange of terrorism-related intelligence information among law enforcement and security officials at all levels of government is founded on three propositions. The first is that any terrorist attack in the homeland will necessarily occur in a community within a state or tribal area, and the initial response to it will be by state, local, and tribal emergency responders and law enforcement officials. Second, the plotting and preparation for a terrorist attack within the United States will also occur within local communities. Third, information acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable laws, with seemingly unrelated information from other sources. This book describes the Nationwide Sar Initiative (NSI), and the rationale for the sharing of terrorism-related Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), and how the NSI seeks to achieve this objective.--Publisher's description.

The imperative for the exchange of terrorism-related intelligence information among law enforcement and security officials at all levels of government is founded on three propositions. The first is that any terrorist attack in the homeland will necessarily occur in a community within a state or tribal area, and the initial response to it will be state, local, and tribal emergency responders and law enforcement officials. Second, the plotting and preparation for a terrorist attack within the United States (such as surveillance of a target, acquisition and transport of weapons or explosives, and even the recruitment of participants) will also occur within local communities. Third, "information acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable laws, with seemingly unrelated information for other sources." Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) contain information about criminal activity that may also reveal terrorist pre-operational planning. Many believe that the sharing of SARs among all levels of government and the fusing of these reports with other intelligence information will help uncover terrorist plots within the United States. This book describes the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), the rationale for the sharing of terrorism-related SARs, and how the NIS seeks to achieve this objective. It also examines civil liberties concerns raised by the initiative and identifies other oversight issues for Congress.

"The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Initiative as described in this Concept of Operations (CONOPS) builds on what law enforcement and other agencies have been doing for years--gathering information regarding behaviors and incidents associated with crime--and establishes a process whereby SAR information can be shared to help detect and prevent terrorism-related criminal activity. Although not specifically using the term "suspicious activity reporting," the 9/11 Commission Report is replete with examples of opportunities lost because available information was inaccessible outside a specific agency or narrow community of interest because of what the Commission referred to as "the human or systemic resistance to sharing information."The Commission recognized that Federal, State, local, and tribal (SLT) governments have access to information which could, when synthesized with information from other sources, help identify precursor activities of terrorist attacks. The challenge is to make this information available to those who need it in time to protect our people and institutions while at the same time ensuring that information privacy, civil liberties, and other legal rights are adequately protected."--Introduction.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has largely implemented the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative among fusion centers--entities that serve as the focal point within a state for sharing and analyzing suspicious activity reports and other threat information. The state and local law enforcement officials GAO interviewed generally said the initiative's processes worked well, but that they could benefit from additional feedback from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on how the reports they submit are used. The FBI has a feedback mechanism, but not all stakeholders were aware of it. Implementing formalized feedback mechanisms as part of the initiative could help stakeholders conduct accurate analyses of terrorism-related information, among other things.

In 2007, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its federal partners developed the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative to establish a capability to gather and share terrorism-related suspicious activity reports. This report examined the initiative’s progress and performance. It addresses the extent to which (1) federal agencies have made progress in implementing the initiative, and what challenges, if any, remain; (2) the technical means used to collect and share reports overlap or duplicate each other; (3) training has met objectives and been completed; and (4) federal agencies are assessing the initiative’s performance and results. Tables and figures. This is a print on demand report.

" In 2007, DOJ and its federal partners developed the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative to establish a capability to gather and share terrorism-related suspicious activity reports. GAO was asked to examine the initiative's progress and performance. This report addresses the extent to which (1) federal agencies have made progress in implementing the initiative, and what challenges, if any, remain; (2) the technical means used to collect and share reports overlap or duplicate each other; (3) training has met objectives and been completed; and (4) federal agencies are assessing the initiative's performance and results. GAO analyzed relevant documents and interviewed federal officials responsible for implementing the initiative and stakeholders from seven states (chosen based on their geographic location and other factors). The interviews are not generalizable but provided insight on progress and challenges. "

In 2005, the issue of information sharing (IS) for homeland security was placed on a high-risk list of fed. functions needing broad-based transformation. Since then, the govt.¿s progress has been monitored in resolving barriers to IS. This testimony discusses 3 key IS efforts: (1) the actions that have been taken to guide the design and implementation of the IS Environment and to report on its progress; (2) the characteristics of state and local fusion centers and the extent to which fed. efforts are helping to address some of the challenges that centers reported; and (3) the progress made in developing streamlined policies and procedures for designating, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating sensitive but unclassified information.