Thameslink Rolling Stock Procurement

The procurement process completed by the Department for Transport which led to the selection of Siemens rather than Bombardier as the preferred bidder for new Thameslink rolling stock should be independently reviewed by the National Audit Office. The Transport Committee could not evaluate whether the decision to choose Siemens was arrived at correctly because all of the bids were and remain confidential. It is believed that it is in the public interest to have an independent review to evaluate whether this massive contract was awarded correctly on the basis of the criteria in the original invitation to tender. The Transport Committee has therefore written to the Comptroller and Auditor General to request he undertake this work and report to Parliament before summer 2012. There is now widespread agreement that the criteria used in the procurement were too narrowly drawn in excluding socio-economic factors

The dramatic results of the 2014 European Parliament elections have highlighted the European Union’s urgent need for a review of the scope and purpose of its social objectives and for a reordering of European priorities. This book advocates a radical and original alternative to the current philosophy that determines the set of rules for the awarding of EU public procurement contracts. It calls for a reordering of the EU’s economic and social priorities. In doing so, it advocates for a social dimension to be placed at the core of public procurement, which could elicit a social model of integration in the EU in which the European citizen is the key actor. This is achieved through an analytical approach as well as concise and contextualised explanations relating to free trade theories, poverty and public interest theories. This book will be of key interest to students and scholars of the European Union, political theory, and EU law.

There has been little analysis of the constitutional framework for management of the UK economy, either in constitutional law or regulatory studies. This is in contrast to many other countries where the concept of an 'economic constitution' is well established, as it is in the law of the European Union. Given the extensive role of the state in attempting to resolve recent financial crises in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, it is particularly important to develop such an analysis. This book sets out different meanings of an economic constitution, and applies them to key areas of economic management, including taxation and public borrowing, the management of public spending, (including the Spending Review), monetary policy, financial services regulation, industrial policy (including state shareholdings) and government contracting. It analyses the key institutions involved such as the Treasury and the Bank of England, also including a number of less well-known bodies such as the Office for Budget Responsibility. There is also coverage of the international context in which these institutions operate especially the European Union and the World Trade Organisation. It thus provides an account of the public law applying to economic management in the UK. This book also adopts a critical approach, assessing the degree to which there is coherence in the arrangements for economic management, the degree to which economic policy-making is constrained by constitutional norms, and the degree to which economic management is subject to deliberation and accountability through Parliament, the courts and other institutions.

Successive UK governments have pursued ambitious programmes of private sector competition in public services that they promise will deliver cheaper, higher quality services, but not at the expense of public sector workers. The public procurement rules (most significantly Directive 2004/18/EC) often provide the legal framework within which the Government must deliver on its promises. This book goes behind the operation of these rules and explores their interaction with the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE); regulations that were intended to offer workers protection when their employer is restructuring his business. The practical effectiveness of both sources of regulation is critiqued from a social protection perspective by reference to empirical findings from a case study of the competitive tendering exercise for management of HMP Birmingham that was held by the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) between 2009 and 2011. Overall, the book challenges the Government's portrayal of competition policies as self-evident sources of improvement for public services. It highlights the damage that can be caused by competitive processes to social capital and the organisational, cultural and employment strengths of public services. Its main conclusions are that prison privatisation processes are driven by procedure rather than aims and outcomes and that the complexity of the public procurement rules, coupled with inadequate commissioning expertise and organisational planning, can result in the production of contracts that lack aspiration and are insufficiently focused upon improvement or social sustainability. In sum, the book casts doubt upon the desirability and suitability of using competition as a policy mechanism to improve public services.

The Government's motoring agencies are undergoing reorganisation and are introducing digital services; both changes have potential to bring welcome improvements. The Government has a mixed approach to organisational change in the agencies with different emphasis on efficiency savings, restructuring, and private sector involvement across the agencies. It needs to do more to explain the future direction for all the motoring agencies and how it will create a more unified service. The agencies could do more to recognise and respond to the needs of business users. There are a number of specific areas that require action by the Government and its motoring agencies: the driver Certificate of Professional Competence may not be delivering all the benefits expected of it and the Government should negotiate changes at a European level; the agencies need to have effective assisted digital strategies in place to help those who cannot or are unwilling to use the internet to access services; the agencies need to work with the Government Digital Service and others to address the problem of misleading copycat websites; the DVLA needs to do more to explain how it is required to share personal data with private parking companies and the safeguards that are in place to protect such data; the DVLA needs to adjust it's fees to ensure costs are covered and do more to explain it's calculations; and data sharing needs to be effective, if revenue collection, action on safety and work by enforcement agencies are to be effective, and new services need to be planned with data sharing in mind

Crime on Britain's railways decreased year-on-year over the past decade. That trend shows the effectiveness of the specialist rail policing provided by the British Transport Police (BTP). The Committee were impressed by the BTP's commitment to tackling crime while minimising delays for the travelling public. Despite the welcome decline in overall crime, we identified areas where the BTP could improve its performance. The British Transport Police Authority (BTPA) is the body with responsibility for setting the BTP challenging but achievable targets to tackle crime on the railway. The BTPA must fulfil its remit and avoid any perception that it is too close to the people whom it should be holding to account. The Committee concluded that the BTP model of developing specialist policing skills and securing funding from transport providers might usefully be applied to other transport modes, such as aviation. Such an approach could minimise delays, maximise security and reduce the cost of policing to taxpayers. In the course of the inquiry, the Committee heard that vulnerable children and young people are often found in and around railway stations and were surprised to learn that the BTP currently has no targets in relation to child protection. The Department for Transport, the BTPA, the BTP and the charity sector should work together to tackle this emerging issue by examining the available data and reviewing current practice.

The Department for Transport's decision to buy the new trains for Intercity Express and Thameslink itself has left the taxpayer bearing all the risk. The Department has no previous experience of running a procurement of this kind, let alone two with a combined value of £10.5 billion. The only way the Department can limit this risk is by requiring train operating companies to use these new trains to run their services regardless of whether they best fit the services they would like to offer. The Department could have addressed the lack of incentives that mean train operating companies do not have an interest in buying trains which minimise maintenance costs to Network Rail. Furthermore the Department's decision to take over the procurement has led to confusion over the respective roles and responsibilities of government and the industry which need to be clarified. The Intercity Express Programme was poorly managed from the outset. After Sir Andrew Foster completed a review into the value for money of Intercity Express in 2010, the original successful bidder Agility Trains came back with a revised bid that was 38% cheaper than its original one. The taxpayer could have been badly ripped off. The Department had begun the procurement without a clear idea of how many trains would be needed, which routes they would run on and what form of power would be required. In future the Department must be much more assertive in ensuring that the UK economy benefits from large public sector capital investment programmes

The Department for Transport competition to let the Intercity West Coast franchise lacked management oversight and the governance of the project was confused, according to the National Audit Office. The full cost to the taxpayer is unknown but likely to be significant, with at least £1.9 million in staff and adviser costs, £2.7 million in legal costs and £4.3 million on external advisers for the reviews that it has commissioned. The refranchising process was a major endeavour, with considerable complexity and uncertainty. The objectives of the Department for Transport were insufficiently clear during the franchise competition. The Department delayed the issuing of the invitation to tender by eight months because it had not finalized how it would implement recent policy changes. There was also confusion among Department staff about some aspects of the process. The subordinated loan facility was a particular area of confusion. A subordinated loan is capital provided by the parent company which guarantees franchise payments will be made to the Department should the franchisee get less passenger revenue than expected. However, there were significant errors in the tool the Department used to calculate how big a loan it would require bidders to have. The competition lacked strong project management and there was no clear route for the project team to get approval for major issues. No one person oversaw the whole process or could see patterns of emerging problems.